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Abstract 
 
 
 This dissertation studies the inscription of social mores along Upper Canada’s 
early frontier. It argues, first, that despite coming from the top and presuming 
the weight of tradition and religious sanction, prescriptions for conduct masked 
local circumstances that did not cohere, politically, culturally or socially, as 
neatly as the model of conduct being promoted. These prescriptions did not 
merely recognize messiness on the ground as their raison d’etre, but also helped 
constitute that complexity directly. The dissertation also argues, though, that the 
force of prescriptions does not lie only or even mainly in the brute top-down 
authority of a social elite, but draws much of its strength from resonance among 
social practices that were not obviously related. The spaces examined in this 
dissertation include survey methods, prescriptions about conduct in a provincial 
newspaper, domestic practices, geographic implementations of gender ideology, 
the practices of dueling and game hunting, and the nighttime prowl of a burglar. 
The argument is that their importance at the time owed much to their conceptual 
interdependence, which gave weight and character to the meaning of each.  
 Through examination of proper conduct, the mundane “dwelling house” 
emerges in this study as a core moral space in the society of early Upper Canada. 
Whether a stately mansion or a rented room, this space ranked even above a 
church in the intensity with which the law defended it. At the heart of this moral 
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protection resided a notion of fairness, whose overtones sounded in the wide 
range of practices noted earlier.   
 My theoretical baseline is the practice approach of Ortner (2006, 1989), which 
views action, embodied in individuals, as emergent in analytic tensions between 
public institutions, particular situations and moments, patterns in history and 
experience, and unpredictable, extra-systemic feedback. Since conduct is based in 
observation, and because the immanent structuring forces of practice entail 
relationships, I add to Ortner’s model the necessary presence of multiple actors 
who are present to each other. This model helps unpack the concrete bodies, 
relations, moments, and constraints in which exemplars emerge, and also 
emphasizes their overall conservative tendency.  
 
Keywords 
Exemplar, Frontier, Practice theory, Ortner, Upper Canada, Upper Canada 
Gazette, Conduct, Crime, Burglary, Dwelling House, Domesticity, Gender, 
Female 
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Preface 
 Standing below the Ambassador Bridge that joins Windsor and Detroit, looking 
up at its massive pillars, girders and cables and the progress of traffic they 
support, one is struck by a peculiar irony. This imposing construct, designed to 
connect two countries, is precisely where division between the two hardens into 
rigid, armed formality. Traffic lines, fences, booths, wait times, uniforms, 
questions, documents, shows of available force, all supported by past experience 
and an awareness of nation, conjure up a convincing obstacle. In this conjuring, 
the river itself—the raison d’etre for the bridge—plays the part of a line in the 
sand. So perfectly superimposed is this line upon alternative notions of a river 
that even the passage of container ships and the frisky slant of sailboats fail, in 
that moment, to suggest the connective possibilities of water. 
 How different this spot must have looked two centuries ago on the eve of war, 
with enemy troops squaring off across the water. It gives pause, gazing across 
today’s banks in an effort to connect those two moments, so awesomely strange 
to each other one is reminded of Dorothy landing in Oz. One side of that 
mystical divide features a bustling metropolis of magnificent scale, built 
hundreds of feet skyward, interwoven across the water with other communities 
by bridges, a tunnel, busy flight paths and endless water traffic, insulated from 
even the most distant war drums by the cocoon of a long peacetime. In its scale, 
the imposing and reassuring solidity of its structures, and the buttressing effect 
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of living memory devoid of international aggression relevant to the place, the 
present banks invite one to imagine that things were always this way. The other 
moment, ostensibly identical in space, could hardly have been recognizable 
viewed from today, even ignoring the matter of war. The settled population 
along the Detroit River was something over three orders of magnitude smaller 
on the eve of war than it is now.1 Relative to today, there was also no such thing 
as building vertically—either skyward in the form of skyscrapers (never mind air 
traffic), or into the earth in the form of massive, watertight traffic tunnels under 
the river. Perhaps “place” was judged in more planar terms without access to 
these vertical dimensions.2 One imagines subtler differences too, such as a more 
direct connection to the processes, effort and liabilities of settlement materials 
and structures than people typically possess in today’s huge urban spaces, vastly 
greater technological complexity, and the highly specialized divisions of labor 
characteristic of both. Not only were materials of the time hard-won in terms of 
effort, expense and time, the average settler had a more direct sense of what it 
took to obtain them and what it would take to obtain them again. This 
awareness, if one follows McGregor (1985), derived its specific hue in turn from a 
garrison mentality that viewed settlement as a kind of permanent pitched battle 
                                                 
1 The closest census date (that I’ve found) for Detroit, for the year 1820, lists the population at 1422, about 
one-three-thousandth of the present population including the metro area, and that accounts also for 
significant population decline after 1950. The population on the Canadian side at the turn of the century is 
harder to find precise data for; what I’ve found so far is by county, but according to Statistics Canada, the 
entire population of Essex county in 1824 was 4,274 
2 This limitation of available dimensions—absence of technology to build vertically, as well as technology 
to expand surveillance beyond the visual—may have shaped the role that surfaces play in military strategy. 
Without access to vertical elevation that would allow one to see beyond, the tree line hardens as a barrier to 
line-of-sight and as a threat of hostile forces concealed beyond.  
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against wilderness, which always encroached and must be pushed back, if only a 
little.3  
 And one cannot ignore war, how the gleam of an enemy’s cannon might have 
shaped appreciations of distance, how the presence of a hostile army, poised to 
do its worst, would reconfigure anyone’s sense of everyday life. Among Upper 
Canada’s migrants who had fled America after its war of independence, threats 
across the water also acquired the extra shading of personal memory. Far from 
the settled routines and expectations of a long peacetime, this lining up along the 
banks was the starkest of reminders that in moments of cataclysm, all bets for the 
future were off. If the primacy of embodiment and concreteness, as opposed to 
abstractions, has become the new theoretical normal, the awesome scale of stakes 
and consequences entailed by war—human lives, geo-political territory, 
community identity, international relations, individual rights, family narratives 
that get passed down through generations—elevates ubiquitous concreteness 
into something devastatingly poignant. 
                                                 
3 Appropriately, given a discussion of a looming war, McGregor opens her argument with the view of 
landscape as seen from an isolated fort. The fort, McGregor argues, gets imposed through “art and 
laborious exertion to push back the forest a short distance and to maintain its safety” (5), which requires the 
protecting sweep of a cannon. Quoting Richardson’s Wacousta she adds, “to have crossed the ravine, or to 
have ventured out of reach of the cannon of the fort, would have been to seal the destruction of the 
detachment. But the officer to whom their security was entrusted, although he had his own particular views 
for venturing thus far, knew also at what point to stop” (7). McGregor uses the term “langscape” to 
highlight the sense in which encroaching nature, and the maintenance of a safety zone, is an active social 
construction, which gets lost in a more passive idea of “landscape” as something independent of an 
observer and merely perceived. This fort and its cannon, she says, is “a correlative for the beleaguered 
human psyche attempting to preserve its integrity in the face of an alien, encompassing nature.” (5) Her 
deeper argument is that this psyche entails a balance of imposition and accommodation, a practical 
acceptance that the forest can only be pushed back so far, and that social life must be eked out in view of 
that limit. This vision of encroaching nature and spirit of accommodation is a particularly Canadian 
recasting of Lockean notions of progress and property rights, neither of which stresses accommodation or 
real social limits imposed back on settlers by an active, encroaching nature. 
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 How does one get from one place to the other, from the river of 1812 to the 
Detroit River of a customs line or sailboat today? Not, of course, by some 
presumed permanence of the river “itself”, indelible and object-ified like ink that 
dries to become a map. The very idea of a river, and also its physical matter, 
gives the lie to any notion of permanence: rivers flow lengthwise and meander 
sideways; they swell, shrink, freeze over and break up; they breathe life into 
irrigable land and connect communities along and across its banks. They also 
bring quick death to any who forget their ever-changing demeanor. We get to 
today, then, through connections and continuities appropriate to the metaphor of 
a river. 
 And it is a metaphor, at least in a dissertation that is not really about the Detroit 
River, or the War of 1812. For a study that began by looking at constructions of 
gender along exactly those banks and at that time, the present focus on conduct 
prescribed by a government based in York, with special attention to the nature of 
burglary, seems many meanders from home. Like movement of a river, though, 
this new vantage point makes sense given the material and conceptual 
connections in between, which allow one to jump frame and see the project of 
research in new ways. 
 In one sense, I got to the present project by accident: I bumped into something I 
didn’t expect to find, and it deflected me into directions I couldn’t have 
anticipated. In the case of the Burton Historical Collection, where this accident 
occurred, the notion of accident acquires the added inflections of a complexly 
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and inconsistently organized mass of materials, where there’s often no telling 
what you’ll trip over along the circuitous route toward an intended or missing 
object. The problem with a notion of accident, though, is that it downplays the 
vitality of connections, that decisive moment of traction through which a new 
insight or project is stumbled upon, the “gee whiz!” moment as your attention 
shifts and lands in a new place. The word leaps over this crucial moment as if 
decreeing that the connection isn’t itself important, only a brief sensation one 
quickly suppresses in returning to the archival business at hand. 
 My meander away from gender and the Detroit River began by bumping into a 
burglary trial transcript, which only caught my eye because someone left it out 
on a nearby table. What I really noticed was the sentencing, especially the 
metaphors it used in marching the culprit off to the gallows. The trial then 
removed to a back burner for several months, until I came across a newspaper 
column expressing outrage at the persistence of dueling in Upper Canada, and 
especially, the perfect tendency to acquit duelists of any wrongdoing, despite the 
clear letter of law to the contrary. The question suddenly wouldn’t go away: 
what system of logic explains executing for stealing rum and a few furs, but 
acquits for killing in cold blood in a duel? By looking further into legal 
definitions of burglary and attitudes to dueling, the humble dwelling house 
began to move into the limelight. On close inspection, it helped explain legal 
orientations to dueling, burglary, and other high crimes such as rape and 
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robbery. It also gave purchase to an emerging gender ideology at the time that 
aligned women with domestic space. 
 The seeming disparity between practices of burglary, dueling, and everyday 
domestic life thus helped me imagine that the strength of ideals centered in a 
dwelling house had broad roots, and that other core ideals probably did too. The 
question became how to talk about these roots, this resonance across social 
spaces, in a way that accounts for its force, not only its presence. This is what I 
attempt to do in this study. 
1 
 
     
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 Through the lens of what it calls exemplary practices, this dissertation explores 
the inscription of social mores in Upper Canada from its formation in 1791 until 
1820, when a wealth of new newspapers started to appear in the province.4 
Specifically, it examines notions of conduct handed down from the top, from a 
relatively small number of social elite who formed the government and 
attempted to fashion the new society according to their own conservative ideals. 
I argue, first, that this process of inscription, buttressed by rhetoric of enduring 
loyalty to a British homeland overseas and to a God above, attempted to mask 
local circumstances that were far less homogeneous, coherent, and politically 
aligned than the view of society being promoted. The deepest challenge to that 
alignment, indeed, was that wayward impulses usually ran oblique rather than 
counter to top-down inscription, and thus didn’t even evoke its viewpoint 
through the clarifying structures of opposition. In this view, certainty about the 
society advertised in prescriptions on conduct betrayed deep unease about 
creative adaptability evident at local levels, where enforcement of conduct often 
                                                 
4 Chapter 4’s focus on the Upper Canada Gazette, the province’s first newspaper, makes sense of the 1820 
cutoff: until that decade, the Gazette had no real rivals among locally published newspapers, which makes 
talking about its positions, politics and audience easier. Noting, however, that politics in Upper Canada 
changed markedly after the War of 1812, especially with the rise of the Family Compact (for which see 
Chapter 3, note 54), this dissertation stresses the period before that war. 
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met with failure, and where practices in any case overflowed the tidy images 
being promoted. 
 Second, I argue that seemingly disparate social practices, not obviously related 
in terms of task, social purpose, geography or individuals involved, may 
resonate at a level below the narrower field represented by each. Just as an 
overtone series defines a particular timbre in sound, so culturally-specific 
overtones of meaning shared among far-flung social practices produces a deep 
signifier, a particular timbre of meaning perceptible only across social spaces, 
and not when taking the surface-level logic or specificity of each in isolation. The 
spaces examined in this dissertation include survey methods, prescriptions about 
conduct in a provincial newspaper, domestic practices, geographic 
implementations of gender ideology, the practices of dueling and game hunting, 
and the nighttime prowl of a burglar. The argument is that their importance at 
the time owed much to their conceptual interdependence, which gave weight 
and character to the meaning of each. From an analytical point of view, such 
interdependence is belied by the ease of imagining and explaining these spaces 
in mutual isolation. 
 In one sense, these two arguments pull against each other, the one a claim that 
top-down models of conduct were more tentative, wary and fragile than they 
purported to be, the other a basis for finding the top-down view more robust 
than it would appear from exemplars considered independently. But to question 
which aspect might trump the other, and in which circumstances, would miss the 
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larger moment behind each—the larger elephant hidden from the six blind men 
of Hindustan by the particularity of what each one senses. The point of the two 
arguments laid out here is that, together, they suggest a more detailed and 
complex sense of an exemplar’s social force than either would do independently.  
 Another general claim of this study, one which unites “exemplar” and 
“practice”, is that the habits and structures of interpretation manifested in 
exemplars are irreducibly concrete, a crystallization of particulars whose sine qua 
non is traction among what get perceived, mostly after the fact, as discrete 
standpoints. Traction is primary, the basis of distinction, and not a secondary 
effect of pre-existing bodies, histories, experiences and networks coming into 
contact. The underlying model of the world this implies is that traction, while 
highly variable, is also unavoidable, at least in the habitable world sequestered 
from the vacuum of space. Contact with particular things or people may be 
intermittent or occasional, but contact with matter generally speaking is not; we 
pass from one place to another by virtue of constant contact with air to breathe, 
environments that are controlled for comfort, safety and basic existence, access to 
supply lines where material necessities can be replenished, safe spaces in which 
to decompress or become periodically unconscious, and so on. As distinct 
moments, exemplars are thus defined not by the fact of traction, but by their 
capacity to draw attention away from their contingencies and entanglements and 
appear to stand by themselves. 
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 Traction in this sense is similar to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic relations. As with 
Bakhtin, traction rejects the idea that people either exist or move in isolation. 
Identities don’t relate: identity is relationship. Bakhtin further argues that 
differences of perception and experience between two people who are 
simultaneously present to each other are what drive an encounter. Indeed, there 
is nothing suggested by traction that is not also implicit in the dialogic principle. 
The difference is emphasis. Where Bakhtin’s focus is on the dynamics of 
relationship, especially the complex dynamics internal to a person who is 
dialogically constituted, traction stresses the dynamics and irreducibility of grip 
among people in sight of each other, engaged in conversation or argument, at 
war with each other, or otherwise on the radar screen. It forces attention away 
from the hypothetical and the abstract, granting of course that language itself is 
abstraction. 
 My decision to sideline such a promising model of dialogue, and base this 
study instead on practice theory, recognizes that latter’s particular emphasis on 
the integration of things usually conceived as separate. Except in certain 
specialized vocabulary, which I try to avoid here, practice theorists try to inject 
relations with heightened dynamism by playing opposing words off against each 
other. The effect of focusing so intensely on the co-dependence of push and pull, 
growth and inertia, subjective and objective, predisposition and feedback, 
individual bodies and immanent social structures, is to evoke a deeper 
appreciation of complexity and vital interdependence, locally and across scales. 
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As a basic frame, practice is thus congenial to both the concreteness of traction 
and broader interdependence suggested by timbre. In its use of rhetorical push 
and pull,  practice also exposes the unavoidable crudeness of words as they 
struggle, through various circumlocutions, to produce a view outside 
themselves. In effect, they point out that there is no word for the thing they point 
to, whose utter immediacy is always just out of view and evident only as trace 
fossils.  
 Practice theory has a more specific advantage, too, in the context of early Upper 
Canada. If we imagine interaction between two people, one common form of 
traction in the province was mutual misperception of what the other was doing 
or saying; and since this study focuses on top-down efforts at controlling 
conduct, we are most interested in how the person on top—we’ll call him a 
magistrate—misreads the one below. On various fronts—social or political 
station, vested legal authority, political loyalty, religious orientation, ethnic 
difference, (dis)connectedness to local affairs—the magistrate exercises his view 
of and on the person below. In the particular traction this brings into view, he 
does not grasp that his own view could be the problem. It is officially sanctioned, 
after all. He also views this encounter as oppositional in many cases where the 
local trajectories being confronted are actually more complex, oblique rather than 
starkly oppositional, and this misperception drives the encounter still further. 
Practice theory does not always capture well the minute articulations along 
which transformations tend to be small and conservative habits made durable, 
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but even when it only begs the question, that is exactly the right question to beg 
in studying how, against the evidence of a complex demographic and local 
circumstances, government authorities often reproduced their conservative 
views of loyalty, conduct and proper society. 
 Exemplary practice, then, refers in a specific way to how official standpoint in 
early Upper Canada crystallized locally and reverberated more widely. Using 
that model, the mundane “dwelling house” emerges in this study as a core moral 
space in the society of early Upper Canada. Whether a stately mansion or a 
rented room, this space ranked even above a church in the intensity with which 
the law defended it. At the heart of this moral protection resided a notion of 
fairness, whose overtones sounded in the wide range of practices noted earlier.  
Getting to those connections, of course, is the work of chapters to follow. 
 After a detailed consideration of the title’s key terms in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
then provides a brief historical sketch of events leading to the new province’s 
formation. “Event”, of course, presupposes the capacity of certain moments—call 
these presuppositions “landmarks”—to shape things to come. The purpose here, 
however, is not to deconstruct historical narratives or to be comprehensive, only 
to provide basic context for discussions to follow. The chapter then offers a 
glimpse of the prior experiences, ideas and commitments of migrants to the 
province, as manifested in encounters with new people and situations in Upper 
Canada. 
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 Chapter 4 moves on to the imposition of guidelines upon the province. Taking 
this word first in the sense of prescriptions for morality and proper conduct, it 
explores standpoints of the new administration evident in early issues of the 
Upper Canada Gazette, Upper Canada’s first newspaper and mouthpiece for the 
government (and hereafter called the Gazette). The chapter then considers 
guidelines in a second, more literal sense: as survey lines that guided 
administrators and settlers in transforming undeveloped parcels of land into 
property. This second sense of guideline—produced in this case by David Smith, 
the first Surveyor General of Upper Canada5—may seem apples and oranges 
next to prescriptions in a newspaper. Below specific differences of task, purpose, 
place and people involved, however, lay a shared sense of boundaries, proper 
spaces and the basic value of property, and proper activities based on all of these. 
In language introduced a moment ago, this common ground, a feature of shared 
fields rather than any field in isolation, suggests the force of social overtones, the 
enculturated (and enculturating) timbre of a practice when it resonates in 
otherwise disparate fields. 
 Chapter 5 then looks at conduct defined in Upper Canada’s criminal code, 
specifically as revealed through a burglary trial. It is here, finally, that the loaded 
concept of a dwelling house takes the limelight. Once again, juxtaposition with 
discussions of guidelines in Chapter 4 may seem incongruous. What does a land 
                                                 
5 Simcoe appointed him “Acting Surveyor General” in 1792, a title that became “Surveyor General” in 
1798. Throughout this time he functioned as chief surveyor, a position responsible for producing all the 
townships in the province. 
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survey have to do with burglary, other than setting up the evolution from vacant 
land into property one can steal? How, beyond obvious suspicions that a burglar 
is probably also disloyal, do acts of burglary connect to discussions about loyalty 
to Britain? And what do associations between female and domestic space really 
have to do with burglars at night, other than their opportunistic potential to 
sensationalize the vulnerability of women? By working through the trial and 
toward a focused notion of a dwelling house, the chapter argues that these 
apparently disparate elements have a great deal to do with each other—at the 
level of timbre, where they would also have the deepest influence.  
 This sets the stage, in a concluding Chapter 6, to appreciate connections among 
the various realms of social practice considered here. The abstract point behind 
an exploration that covers newspaper content and order, survey lines and grids, 
literature on female conduct, and a burglary trial (with its look at duelling and 
game hunting), is that meaningful connection among diverse social realms goes 
beyond their administration and beyond legal or social decree, into a realm of 
shared basic orientations to proper and productive human lives and 
communities. Committing to these orientations in one place resonates in others, 
thus deepening the idea and commitment to it. As a final note, the dissertation 
returns to the issue, raised in the preface, of doing anthropological fieldwork in 
an archival setting.
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Chapter 2 
Parsing the Terms 
 
 To help set a foundation for ideas to come, this chapter parses three key 
words—exemplar, practice, and frontier—in the dissertation title. The terms 
overlap substantially, but it may be clearer, after the discussion that follows, to 
propose that they are really three ways of articulating the same larger idea. A 
first step involves distinguishing commonsense meanings of the terms from the 
more specific usage deployed here. 
2.1  Exemplary… 
 Although my sense of example and exemplar developed through encounters 
with archival materials I used, credit for the impulse to look for them at all goes 
to a story from grade school, which a judge’s report on a rape crime prompted 
me to recall. The story begins moments after a modern-day sixteen-year-old boy 
has been stabbed, then left on the sidewalk to bleed to death. He was a member 
of a gang called The Royals, which is all the identity he gets from either his 
attacker or from the policeman who finds him at the end, after he is already 
dead. The reader, of course, gets an insider’s view of the real boy, Andy, through 
his musings, which form the body of the story. The premise is that categories—
“Royal”, “gang member”, “criminal”—entail erasure: the coherence of category 
comes at the expense of details that are singular rather than generalizable to 
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other people or groups; it hides complexity and ignores messiness and 
contradictions. It also favors objective formality over subjective consideration. 
 The letter that provided a springboard to that recollection dates to September 
22, 1820, and like the story, involves a victim, a felon, and the categorical 
judgment of formal authority. Writing to the Governor’s secretary, Judge 
William Dummer Powell tells about a group of men who had raped the wife of a 
comrade after catching her alone at home. Powell recommended that the law, 
which defined rape as a capital offence, should hold firm to the letter rather than 
grant exceptions. When the rape victim herself and her husband, based on 
knowing the rapists personally, appealed to Powell for leniency, Powell 
responded: “I cannot consistently, with my sense of duty, second the application 
of the injured party…. Example is necessary for the protection of females, whose 
occupation retains them alone in their houses, in the absence of their husbands, 
fathers and brothers.” The rapists were duly convicted, and as with Andy, no 
fuller information about their identity was known, sought, or publicized in 
making examples of them, whatever else may have been known in other 
contexts.  
 So it is with examples: they are always of something, either to be emulated or 
avoided, and clarity requires that they be schematic in reproducing a moral 
formula. As a schematic, divergent and extraneous detail would be particularly 
out of place—examples are no place for the meandering incongruities of a life 
story. The schematic is also figured in advance of actual examples, as tokens that 
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presume an existing type; examples do not embody new ideas or ways of 
thinking. In this sense they are conservative, not radical. And owing to this 
reduction of detail on one hand, and conformity to something already shaped on 
the other, examples are not about individuals or individuality at all, although 
sleight of hand causes them to appear so. In being singled out and named, 
located in specific bodies, entered as case information, and passed along as news, 
examples and exemplars seem to stand out from the crowd. Their sheer visibility 
easily distracts from the carefully crafted, structured, and omission-based aspect 
of the narratives that prop them up to serve as warnings or monuments. Andy 
was a Royal, which in turn exemplifies violent gangs. He wore the jacket, and 
one needs no further explanation to make easy sense of the attack. The rapists, in 
juxtaposition to their female victim, represented a class of violent felony as 
categorically obvious as it was universally abhorred. Making examples of the 
perpetrators required the public reproduction of both that category and the 
abhorrence in the form of a legal verdict and associated punishment. Further 
information would only hinder that purpose.  
 Another dimension of exemplars and examples appears if we consider the 
female victim. She was certainly visible—obscenely so, in fact. No doubt she was 
the subject of much news by word of mouth at the time, in addition to 
disclosures in a courtroom. But what makes her a victim rather than exemplar (at 
least in the absence of detailed case information) is that her role in the event was 
passive: the crime was done to her, not by her own hand. And in the making of 
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exemplars and examples—the perpetrator of a deed, the courageous act of a 
patriot, the defense of honor in a duel—the active voice turns out to be critical. 
At a basic level, this is supported in legal discourse through the distinction 
between criminals and victims. But action gets parsed more finely than simple 
agency by considering culpability as well, the main foundation of which is 
intention. Throughout the Magistrate’s Manual—the legal bible for Upper 
Canada as of its publication in 1835 (and hereafter the Manual)—one finds crimes 
defined or distinguished through close consideration of intention. In one 
illustration of culpability for killing someone, the Manual imagines a cart driver 
causing the death of a child by running over it. If the driver saw the child and 
drove on heedless, it is murder. If he didn’t see the child but drove carelessly, it 
is manslaughter. But if he drove with due care and the child came out of 
nowhere, then it is homicide by misadventure, which removes culpability from 
the driver. Wrongdoing is thus graded according to how intention associates 
with the outcome: intention to do wrong, simple lack of intention to drive safely, 
and sure intention to drive safely that gets circumvented in ways beyond the 
driver’s control. In keeping with this scheme, one murder trial from the court 
records of Oyer and Terminer6 describes how a young man named Louis Roy 
threw a stone that ended up killing his friend, Francis Lalonde. Through the trial, 
it emerged that four young men were simply horsing around by throwing things, 
                                                 
6 The court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery tried the most serious criminal cases in early 
Upper Canada, while lesser crimes often landed in other courts in the court circuit. On the structure and 
evolution of Upper Canada’s court system, see Riddell (1918). 
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and one particularly unlucky throw proved fatal, in part because the victim 
rushed toward the stone after it had been launched, and if not for this would 
have remained out of range. Satisfied that there was no intention even to harm, 
and that playing in reasonable good fun also ruled out a judgment of 
carelessness, the judge ruled the event as homicide by misadventure, which 
assigns no culpability to Roy.7 
 Similar distinctions occur in burglary scenarios. Given burglary as a breaking 
and entering into a dwelling house by night with intention to commit a felony, 
each aspect of the definition is measured by intention. As the Manual states, 
every entering is not a breaking, as when a door stands open and the offender 
walks in. Even stealing at that point would not make it a burglary. For that crime 
to apply, there must be intention to destroy or undo something that fastens the 
entry closed. A door that is simply latched but not locked, therefore, is a breaking 
if the offender pulls back the latch. Entering is necessarily by intention in the case 
of burglary, otherwise a plan to commit crimes inside would make no sense. 
Night is also by intention, of course, since one chooses the time of action. And 
the condition on which all else rides: for it to be burglary, all this breaking and 
entering into a dwelling at night must happen with the intention of committing a 
                                                 
7 For a summary of this trial, see Riddell (1926:345-346). Note that while no culpability was assigned to 
Roy for a verdict also called “excusable homicide by misadventure”, the courts nonetheless leveled a fine, 
which Roy was to pay or do jail time until he could. Not having the fee at hand, he was remanded into 
custody of the sheriff. This inconsistency between excusing Roy of all culpability, and fining or 
incarcerating him anyway, seems to be a casualty of mixed traditions where a newer definition of 
culpability mostly replaced an older system that downplayed intention in assessing the act. 
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felony. An intention merely to trespass, for example, would not make the event a 
burglary (Manual 86). 
 Intention also accretes to accidental felonies, where a perpetrator intends to 
commit one felony but accidentally commits a different one. The Manual (222) 
introduces this idea by imagining a man shooting at a deer in his own field, 
whose arrow goes astray and kills a child he didn’t know was there. This, again, 
is homicide by misadventure. But if he shoots at a deer in someone else’s field, 
intending to steal it, and accidentally kills a child he didn’t see, then it becomes 
murder because intention to commit a felony applies to whatever felony actually 
unfolds.8 In the case of burglary, moreover, intent to commit a felony measures 
the crime whether the intent was acted upon or not (Manual 82).9 It also accretes 
to the actions of a person who was admitted properly into a dwelling house, and 
                                                 
8 This only applies when one felony is intended, and then another one occurs. It does not seem to apply 
when one did not originally intend a felony at all. The crime of burglary is not charged, for example, when 
someone breaks and enters a dwelling house with the intention merely to beat the owner, and then contrary 
to intention, the owner is killed. (See Manual 86.) Murder and manslaughter are felonies, but beating is not. 
Such a culprit would thus be susceptible to a charge of homicide for the killing, and a separate charge of 
breaking and entering, but not of burglary since relevant intent was lacking both when breaking and 
entering, and when applying the violence. One thing to stress is that burglary was among the most heinous 
crimes in existence, and following Blackstone’s caution about death sentences, the onus was squarely on 
the legal system to define this crime carefully. One sees this in exhaustive reference to precedents in 
burglary cases, including cases where comparable circumstances were interpreted in conflicting ways. 
Although one strives for consistency (a main purpose of precedent) and although fair judgment depends 
upon profound legal understanding, the ultimate arbiter in heavy cases seems to be conscience. We 
observed this, for example, in William Dummer Powell’s letter to the Governor’s secretary regarding 
leniency over rape, which appealed to his sense of duty in taking the stand he did. 
9 Although intent is probably hard to measure if the felony is not actually carried out, this severe stance on 
culpability reflects how serious the crime of burglary was taken to be. As the MM says later in the same 
passage, “the law will not endure to have its justice defrauded by . . . evasions” (83). Perhaps it stamps out 
just such an evasion in clarifying that accessories, who merely stood watch from a distance and did not 
perform the breaking, entering, or felony within, are nonetheless guilty as principals. We will observe this 
uncompromising stance on accessories again when discussing the practice of dueling, where seconds on 
both sides are to be charged as principals to homicide if someone is killed. 
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once there, decided to commit a felony and then broke out of the house during 
the night to escape. 
 Taking all such cases as examples before the law, what emerges is a sense of 
exemplars as narratives of commitment to intention. It thus sifts out events, 
however awful, that were innocent of any improper intention, like killing a child 
in the wrong place and time. The cart driver did his full duty as a member of 
society as long as he drove with due care and, despite that, could not avoid the 
child. On close inspection, however, legal emphasis on intention exposes a gulf 
between individual and society at the heart of the British legal system, 
particularly when read against specific definitions of human rights that form the 
underlying premise of English law. This gulf helps make sense of the stress on 
appearances that one observes in conduct literature, notions of gender and 
domesticity, and defense of honor in duels. It also helps illuminate egregious 
violations of conduct, as in the crime of burglary. 
 The relevant notion of human rights comes from William Blackstone, an 
eminent eighteenth-century English law professor and legal scholar whose 
"Commentaries on the Laws of England" became a main interpretive standard on 
English law. The four-volume work is also referenced ubiquitously throughout 
the Manual and also in court records from Oyer and Terminer, where the 
burglary case examined later in this dissertation was tried. Human rights, in 
Blackstone's view, divide into absolute rights, which are due every person 
independently of anyone else, and relative or civil rights, which describe a 
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limited curtailment of absolute rights for the sake of a greater communal good 
when masses of people start to live together. Absolute rights acknowledge 
“man” (his language) as being possessed of free will, and guided by God-granted 
discernment that knows good from evil. But this free agency, left unchecked 
when people having diverse interests and priorities live together, would become 
ineffective or even dangerous when one person's act of will impinges on 
someone else's right to security, liberty or property. Thus the compromise system 
of civil law.10  
 Blackstone (I, I, 119) also observes a close interrelationship between rights and 
duties. To illustrate, he notes that allegiance is the right of a magistrate and the 
duty of the people; and that conversely, protection is the right of the people and 
the duty of the magistrate. Not only does a particular right only exist in 
connection to a related duty, but a converse set of rights/duties is entailed by the 
first set. A similar interrelationship exists between magistrates and the king they 
serve, and ramified throughout society, one appreciates intricate webs of 
reciprocal rights and duties binding people together. As far as the reach of law 
                                                 
10 Blackstone actually uses a four-fold system that includes absolute versus civil rights on one axis, and 
rights versus wrongs on the other. This results in separate discussions for absolute rights, absolute wrongs, 
civil rights and civil wrongs. He seems to parse absolute versus civil as meaning private versus public. 
Keeping in mind that human law has no access to completely private, non-social elements like private 
drunkenness that never emerges into public, “absolute” or “private” in the context of human law really 
means issues that concern only specific individuals rather than the public at large. He uses the example of 
disagreement over ownership of a field to illustrate this: the issue does matter to the particular people 
involved, but not to anyone else in a legal sense. A murderer on the loose, by contrast, is a danger to 
everyone, and is thus a public matter. Crimes and misdemeanors are defined in Blackstone’s system as civil 
wrongs. 
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goes, this mutual relationship between rights and duties concerns only their 
relative rather than absolute forms, for as Blackstone says,  
Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws: 
private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or 
not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never 
enforce it by any civil sanction (I, I, 120). 
Crucially, private matters that are out of sight from the public are not merely 
beyond law’s jurisdiction: human law is actually blind to that which is not 
shared socially. As far as law goes, then: 
Let a man be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice, 
provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against 
the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws (I, I, 120). 
The law, this suggests, is a science11 of interpreting observable human behavior 
(that is, behavior that is not merely available to be observed, but actually is) in 
order to produce and ensure an orderly society designed for the greatest good of 
its members, both individually and in their social membership. What opens a 
gulf between individual and society is that the measure of these observable 
behaviors is intention, which is not directly observable: it can only be inferred, 
interpreted through lenses of language, protocols that measure integrity, and the 
weight of supporting or conflicting evidence. 
                                                 
11 This is Blackstone’s own word in introducing his Oxford lectures that became the published 
commentaries: “The science thus committed to [my] charge, to be cultivated, methodized, and explained in 
a course of academical lectures, is that of the laws and constitution of our own country” (I, intro, I, 4). 
Given a preamble that sets human laws within a larger conversation about other laws of the universe, 
including gravitation, this term is not intended casually. 
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 This conundrum deepens when we hear Blackstone say that private duties 
(sobriety in private, for example) cannot be measured and hence are out of reach 
of laws, whereas with private rights, “human laws define and enforce as well 
those rights which belong to a man considered as an individual, as those which 
belong to him considered as related to others” (I, I, 120). Didn’t we just hear him 
exclude from legal purview the individual considered in isolation, beyond 
relationship to others? A way to make sense of this is to note another distinction 
between rights and duties: duties must be performed in order to exist, while 
absolute rights are intrinsic to people, whether trespassed upon or not, and 
whether the person acts or not. They are defined as being part of what makes us 
humans, and as such, exist equally whether isolated or socialized. The purpose of 
a legal system that does not see beyond the social, but nonetheless depends 
conceptually on—indeed has its raison d’etre in—the existence of an 
independent human nature, is to safeguard that essential nature of the human 
being through acute attention to observable conduct.  
 Although intention can distinguish between the substances of acts that appear 
on the surface to be the same, as it did in judging culpability of the cart driver, 
many everyday acts are not so readily distinguished. Proper conduct in routine 
matters, for example, may obviate scrutiny of behavior by conforming to 
expectation. A goal in greeting someone properly, or dressing in a seemly way, 
or speaking within ones social station, is to ruffle no feathers on account of those 
behaviors; or ideally perhaps, to be considered exemplary, an instantiation of 
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ideal behavior whose social significance was determined far in advance by 
tradition and convention. In such cases where acts conform to convention, there 
seems little practical difference between proper intention, and thus virtuous 
conduct, residing below appearances on one hand, and the appearance of 
propriety possessing a virtue of its own on the other. Treating appearances as if 
they are virtuous blends seamlessly into them actually possessing virtue, and 
either case loads enormous weight onto proper conduct and its observation by 
others. 
 A risk in this discussion of Blackstone is that complexity of his ideas can hide 
whole forests behind trees, or get misrepresented (as perhaps here) in attempts to 
simplify. The gist, though, is that his view of English law, and thus of anyone 
depending on him, adds an exclamation point to the importance of observing 
conduct, and opens another node of resonance with stress on observation 
elsewhere in society, beyond the technical musings of a legal scholar. This helps 
give substance to obsessions over appearance in the discussion to follow on 
notions of conduct, ideas of domesticity, centrality of the dwelling house, and 
dueling. It also helps anticipate Chapter 5 by foreshadowing a key aspect of the 
crime of burglary: it thwarts observation by taking place at night when the eyes 
of society are closed. This places the culprit—as indeed our culprit, Josiah Cutan, 
will be placed—completely outside the bounds of human society, and thus also 
beyond the redemptive possibilities of law. 
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2.2  Practice… 
 As a baseline for understanding a practice approach, I follow Ortner’s 
(1989:96ff) response to critics of her 1984 paper, Theory in Anthropology since the 
1960s, and her 2006 update on practice theory. Although Bourdieu, noted below, 
is usually credited with outlining the theory as such, Ortner has the advantage of 
equal brilliance combined with greater clarity, and in her deployment of history, 
also greater finesse.  
 I thus take “practice” to denote a genre of social analysis having several key 
features. First, it sees asymmetry in political and social relations as axiomatic, 
and thus exposes its machinery as a basic part of analysis. Instead of presuming 
balance and stability in the operation of structure, action, actor or history, and 
thus hiding mechanisms by which they might be transformed or their balance 
shifted, the presumption of asymmetry makes constraints on runaway instability 
the thing to explain. Given dissonance, difference, conflicts of interest and bodies 
that simply move further apart—and these happen, in no small part, because 
feedback enters the system—a practice approach also offers insight into both 
impulses toward transformation and where to look for them.  
 Second, practice theory views structure as inextricable from action, and 
especially given the presumption of asymmetry and imbalance, this changes the 
meaning of each term from their isolated (or at least isolable) versions. The 
liability of isolable structure is not so much that it doesn’t interact with other 
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dimensions, including function or action or agents, or that intimations of 
structure can’t be traced historically, but that isolation grants structure ontology 
prior to the interactions being analyzed. By separating its being from its 
interactions, a static “being” emerges, a realm apart from and impervious to the 
dynamism of actions, agency, events, as well as more nebulous dynamics 
conveyed by notions of momentum or inertia. Movements thus become kinetic, 
like a clash of billiard balls, precisely because the existence of balls in the first 
place is a separate and untheorized issue. Severed from dynamism beyond 
kinetics, isolated structure is no help in explaining how structures themselves 
change; it merely poses change as a conundrum. Ortner emphasizes how 
structure in practice theory differs from its counterpart in structuralism by 
“containing an active assumption” (102), exampled in Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus. On one hand, as Bourdieu’s own parsing of oppositions in a Kabyle 
house shows, habitus is structure a la structuralism; without explanations, 
Bourdieu’s diagram would be perfectly at home alongside those of Levi-Strauss. 
Ortner stresses, though, that habitus is doubly practiced: “it is both lived in, in the 
sense of being a public world of ordered forms, and embodied, in the sense of 
being an enduring framework of dispositions that are stamped in and on actors’ 
beings” (102). The result of this dynamic embedding of actors and connection of 
scales is not that the issue of prior ontology is circumvented, as if one might do 
an end run around existence, but that recognizing prior ontology as well as its 
potentialities for change become the point; it is what the reconfiguration of 
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familiar terms in practice theory (sometimes conjoined through neologisms) 
attempts to parse. 
 “Action” suggests a similar contrast: “action” that somehow exists 
independently of structural constraints and potentialities has different basic 
parameters from action whose very being depends upon and emerges through 
those structural forces. The puzzle in this case would be, if action, conceived as 
independent, is studied for its effects on or through structure, this presumes that 
“action” is brought to the engagement with structure. From where? From what? 
In what sense is action, abstracted free of all worldly entanglements, even 
measurable in the sense one must presume in a kinetic model of interaction? As 
I’ll elaborate in the next section, this radical sense of free agency is not only 
challenged by practice theory, but has been having a rough time of it recently 
through much of the intellectual world, which dwells increasingly on 
connections among things previously viewed in isolation. In practice theory, 
linking action radically to structure—to its constraints as well as potentialities—
are among the key forces through which “free” impulses come into being in the 
first place. Action conceived in isolation, which thus evades this sense of 
freedom, is different in kind from action conceived as practice.  
 Third, this complex of asymmetries, emergent in a mutually entailing nexus of 
structure and action, gets sedimented in concrete particulars that manifest over 
time as inertia. Analysts may notice and assemble some of these particulars as 
details of place, people, standpoint, environment, choice, occurrences, moments 
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and so on, always retroactively perceived, into chronological assemblages known 
broadly as “history”. In this sedimentation resides the overall conservative 
tendency of structured action, evident in how many details appear patterned and 
acquire limited predictive power. Although one can describe certain principles in 
the abstract, as Bourdieu did in Outline of a Theory of Practice, such abstractions 
can serve as anthropological analysis only to the extent that they are viewed in 
their messy particularity, not simply as a discussion of principles that admit 
concrete examples only as long as they behave. Unlike preceding theories, such 
as structuralism or functionalism, or looser categories of analysis like 
voluntarism and transactionalism, whose interpretive stability before the fact 
rendered historical details tokens of a systematic type, concrete, accumulated 
detail in practice theory is supposed to generate the analysis.12 
 The fourth keystone of practice theory, in Ortner’s model, is the so-called actor, 
the physical and psychical bodies in and through whom all other elements are 
manifested. Answering critics of her 1984 theory paper, Ortner stresses that this 
actor is neither the unconstrained free agent just dismissed above, nor mere 
drones in the unfolding of structural constraint, historical momentum or 
                                                 
12 Bourdieu’s Outline illustrates this point. As abstraction, it does the work of portraying the theory in 
question, but because it engages historical particulars only as examples, and rarely at that, it does no real 
analysis of particulars in the world. On the surface, his unpacking of the Kabyle house seems an exception, 
in offering deep insight into the mutual reinforcement of everyday identification of things, people and 
spaces, related functional behavior, and an underlying cosmological blueprint that makes sense of it all. 
Even here, however, despite so much exactness detailing the geography of spaces, things and activities, 
there are still no bodies, and thus no embodied history or exposure of living encounters and their feedback 
effects that a practice approach now presumes. Indeed, Bourdieu’s analysis, though included as an 
appendix in The Logic of Practice, evokes a static notion of structure more akin to structuralism, and not 
the radical rethinking of structure that happens only when it gets yoked to embodied action, history and 
particular people. 
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biological programming. These poles “evade the problem of adequately 
theorizing the actor, and leaves the scene to reductionist theories in which people 
are either overly rationally calculating or overly propelled by biological and/or 
psychological drives” (104). Nor, I would argue, does the practice actor suggest  
limited freedom that might fall in between these two poles, both of which result 
from denying the radical dynamism of elements whose origin is mutual 
entanglement, not separation. Being radically dynamic instead, the actor in 
practice theory is therefore not part of the spectrum these two poles imply—
unconstrained free agency or pre-programmed drone—but a different trajectory 
altogether. 
 Before moving on to “frontier”, the third problem term in the dissertation title, 
it is worth pondering the radical sense of connectivity that practice theory 
entails. For although the expediency of explaining and rendering as discrete 
paragraphs means separating terms temporarily, and thus necessarily 
misconstruing them to a degree, it should already be obvious that their intended 
sense depends on the inseparability of all when taken together, rather than just a 
string of indivisible binaries. In this, practice theory reflects a much wider 
reverberation through the intellectual world, and arguably far beyond it too. As a 
way into this point, consider another distinction Ortner makes: practice theory, 
she says, always involves a subjectivist moment of logics spun by thinking and 
acting agents, and an objectivist moment constituted by logics beyond those 
people’s immediate perceptions (1989:112). While she says practice theory 
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always attends to these two moments, it attends most of all to “the ways in 
which it plays on the margins between them, examining those processes by 
which the one side is converted into the other. Thus we watch actors in real 
circumstances using their cultural frames to interpret and meaningfully act upon 
the world, converting it from a stubborn object to a knowable and manageable 
life-place” (113). This process goes both ways: “At the same time we watch the 
other edge of this process, as actors’ modes of engaging the world generate more 
stubborn objects (either the same or new ones) which escape their frames and, as 
it were, re-enter ours” (113). It is precisely this relationship, she concludes, that 
generates the interesting questions for practice theory. 
 Few terms and oppositions have seen the breadth of challenge sustained 
against the pairing of subjectivity and objectivity, and much of the difficulty has 
come from trying to figure out which was king of the hill. As on the playground, 
it is this premise of contest requiring a victor and a loser that precludes the 
alternative of mutual entailment that practice theory takes advantage of. 
Through much of the twentieth century, objectivism enjoyed the limelight 
through a broad stress on scientific procedures of deduction and 
experimentation which, despite contrary insights by the likes of Einstein, Godel 
and Heisenberg, sought its conclusions as if the observer didn’t matter, at least in 
principle: all s/he had to do was proceed carefully and get the facts right. If 
“objectivity” as a term was often limited by its abstractness to specialized 
audiences, “nature”, predicated on the same privileging of a world as it really is, 
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was far more congenial to lay audiences and thus gave the assumption a much 
wider circulation. Testifying to the truth of that assumption of an objective world 
was a vast, industrialized array of things it had produced: automobiles, 
airplanes, bridges, skyscrapers based on new understanding of materials, even 
trips to the moon. Subjective minds had long imagined such things, even written 
great stories about them, but it was a grasp of and commitment to objective 
principles and materials, to properties imagined as not depending on the 
presence, perception, experience or history of an observer, that actually achieved 
them. As part of this objectivist world, anthropology offered its own specialized 
insights into people-objects by measuring society and culture as objects, and 
generalizing about them in ways that yielded, not completeness, but at least 
accuracy as far as it went. The humility of this anthropology lay in human limits 
that keep completeness always out of range, and not in the inescapably 
subjective cast of observation per se. 
 Then the academic pendulum swung the other way with the emergence of a 
negative counterview, a dangerous Mr. Hyde lurking within the objectivist 
assumptions that seemed so congenial and productive before. In a strange 
reflexive light, cumulative understanding became the threat and fact of 
systematic misunderstanding, hidden agendas were seen lurking behind every 
statement as they acquired political loading, and seemingly innocuous 
institutional structures were revealed as engines of privilege and inequality. 
Anthropology’s take on this new reflexive emphasis was to stress how analytic 
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categories, and also styles of writing and presentation, relate to both disciplinary 
and personal history, as well as to persistent forces introduced by colonialism 
and capitalism.13 This general project of ending the myth of innocent, neutral 
observers and frameworks of analysis resonated, partly through disciplinary 
overlap and partly by drawing on similar theoretical source material, with 
broader intellectual impulses such as postcolonialism, deconstruction, 
feminisms, and practice theory. Indeed, overlap and resonance often makes it 
difficult, perhaps even wrongheaded, to distinguish among the strands of theory.  
 Although some early stages of (over)reaction to previous dismissal of 
subjectivity amounted to sinning in the opposite direction by limiting available 
horizons to ones navel, the enduring fallout from this shift has been heightened 
overall awareness of standpoint, including that of observers and how their 
perspectives as well as presence shapes both what gets noticed and the very 
process of observation. Even “nature” got recast in constructivist terms—by 
Haraway (2008:159), for example, who argues that “Nature cannot pre-exist its 
construction, its articulation in heterogeneous social encounters where all of the 
actors are not human and all of the humans are not ‘us’, however defined. 
Worlds are built from such articulations.” That is not to insist that trees in forests 
don’t fall or make sound if no one observes them, only that those hypothetical 
(non)events are completely unavailable to perception, never mind analysis: even 
                                                 
13 Canonical contributions to this effort include Clifford and Marcus (1986), Marcus and Fischer (1986), 
and for a complementary feminist view curiously absent from the first two, Behar and Gordon (1996). 
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proposing them in order to produce the familiar conundrum depends on 
conjuring a tree, a forest, and events of falling and sounding, all of which depend 
in turn on particular, historically and experientially loaded systems of 
understanding, however naturalized and invisible these may be. 
 Thinking has moved, in other words, in the direction of reintegrating subjects 
with the social, physical, geographical, historical, exteriorized worlds once 
viewed as an opposing pole. A basic axiom of practice—its necessary 
enganglement of subjectivist and objectivist moments is part of this integrationist 
shift. As with the other terms she parses, the product of this integration for 
Ortner is not the same subject and object as before, only brought together, which 
would simply return us to the kinetic world of pre-existing billiard balls. The 
condition of mutual entailment, and refusal to force sides of the contrast into a 
hierarchy, reconfigures what gets evoked. The takeaway point in all this is not to 
achieve a better, more defensible definition of subjective and objective, but to 
appreciate how far the integrationist view reaches, to hear some of its 
resonances. One main site for this in Ortner, in others who use practice theory, 
and in practitioners of other theoretical approaches, is how one side of a contrast 
is made to play descriptively off the other in order to evoke a more profound 
dynamic. Ortner calls for examination of processes by which one side is 
converted into the other; she infers a reciprocal process of actors using their 
cultural frames to interpret and act meaningfully upon the world on one hand, 
while at the same time, also sees these modes of engagement generate more 
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stubborn objects. She sees dispositions stamped “in and on actors’ beings”. The 
writer/analyst, Ortner stresses, is not exempt from this emergence of a new 
product out of multiple presences. Pondering who shapes texts produced in the 
intersection of sahibs, sherpas and ethnographer, Ortner (1990:19) says, 
When we read sahibs’ characterizations of the Sherpas, we are aware of 
the degree to which those characterizations are conditioned by both the 
social position of the writer and the discourses within which the writer is 
writing. At the same time I have argued that it would be absurd to 
suppose that what is written is unaffected by the actual characteristics of 
the people being written about, or to turn the point around, that the 
people being written about are unable to affect what is written about 
them. 
 Looking beyond Ortner, a similar dynamic shapes the established language of 
practice theory though constant reminders of mutual entanglement, the 
reciprocity of being shaped and shaping, constrained and constraining, 
constituted and constituting. Most famously perhaps, Bourdieu renders practice 
as the immanence of “structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures” (1972:72), a phrase whose force lies in binding together in 
a single dynamic moment already-structured forms and predispositions that 
carry their influence forward. This integrative moment is part of what Bourdieu 
captures with the term habitus, which succeeding decades shows has the 
advantage of dropping baggage that re-deployment of familiar words must deal 
with. 
 Not everyone viewed practice theory as a breakthrough. Maurice Bloch, who 
admits to playing a bit of devil’s advocate, sees the approach at best as a 
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reminder of what people including but not limited to anthropology have thought 
for a long time, and more cynically as just one more fashion, a simple 
repackaging in some new terms. “Marxist theory”, he writes, 
…has always been centrally concerned with the issue of practice and 
praxis…there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost in seeing 
“practice anthropology” as a new fashion. Of course this is not to say that 
it is not very useful to remind people of this old and central issue, but 
pretending that something dramatically new is being born runs the risk 
that we shall waste all the important work that has already been done in 
advancing and defining the issues and that we shall entangle ourselves in 
brambles which have already been cleared (1989:8). 
Indeed much would be lost in seeing practice anthropology as a new fashion, but 
not, I think, because it is one. If it is actually more, then viewing it as fashion 
would trivialize it, and contra Bloch, it does seem that something new is born in 
the approach. He cites Marx as a major precedent, specifically “his 
demonstration of the historical specificity of the idea of maximizing choice and 
of its unsoundness when it was separated from historical process” (9). He sees as 
the fundamental Marxist theoretical advance “the refusal to separate individual 
motivation from historical process” (10). Ortner (2006:8), too, stresses the 
importance of seeing the articulations of structures, action and agents as tied to 
specific historical moments. 
 But a few things differentiate Marx’s work from practice theory. One is that 
Marx proposed a teleology where social forms, driven by class struggle, went 
through a series of modes of production culminating in communism. Practice in 
the more recent sense admits transformation because predispositions are never 
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total, and the new, non-conforming impulses are unpredictable. But such a 
scheme is not teleological, even granting the conservative inertia of habitus. 
Another difference is that Marx views society in terms of classes and their 
relations, in which individuals are analyzed mostly as tokens of those relations. 
As emphasis at least, they are collectivity writ small. As Marx put it, “Society 
does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the 
relation within which these individuals stand” (1865:265). Such a view follows 
from his political and especially reformist goals, and expresses his deep belief 
that in their essence humans are communal beings. The closest that practice 
theory gets to an actual emphasis on collectivity is recognition that the ordered 
forms of structures, which help constitute predispositions, are public. But 
practice theory—in the most astute forms at least—balances this insight with 
equal emphasis on particular bodies in and through which such forms emerge. 
And the relation between these two describes a more fundamental difference 
between Marx and practice theory, and that is the constitutive tension in the 
latter, which is missing in Marx. According to the third and fourth of his eleven 
Theses on Feuerbach: 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and 
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the 
educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, therefore, divide 
society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence 
of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can 
be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice. 
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Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the 
duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His 
work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. But 
that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself as an 
independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the inner strife 
and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must, 
therefore, itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized 
in practice. (Cited in Marx 1998[1845]:569-570) 
In the first passage, Marx’s second thesis, he stresses the capacity of people to act 
on their circumstances to produce change, to take their future in their own hands 
instead of leaving it with the other half of a divided society. This does go beyond 
the kinetics of billiard balls, which describes passive responders to untheorized 
action. One of Marx’s main points was to make people, especially among the 
proletariat, conscious of their own agency, to jolt them out of passivity. This is 
clear in the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity” 
(my emphasis), and also in the underlying philosophy of dialectical materialism, 
which weds Hegel’s view that meaning resides in oppositions, and the 
materialist’s view that everything, from action to thought, belongs to the material 
world of substance—no free-floating, abstracted ideals a la Hegel. As Marx says 
elsewhere, “industry is the real historical relationship of nature to man and 
therefore of the natural sciences to man” (1844:23).  
 Human agency is also evident in the second passage, the fourth thesis, in the 
“inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness” of the secular basis which, when 
ignored, leads to the alienation of spirit that gives religion its raison d’etre. 
Where Feuerbach argues that resolving the distinction between religious and 
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secular worlds would end estrangement, Marx goes the further step of locating 
the source of estrangement in secular, material conditions of inner strife and 
contradictoriness, glossed elsewhere as alienation. There could hardly be a more 
poignant image of individual agency than a grand theory about the inequalities, 
oppression and surrenders of power that follow from an individual’s loss of 
wholeness when labor gets isolated from its products, and humans isolated from 
each other in false communities of religion or state citizenship. 
 In practice theory, of course, there is no program for resolving the failure of 
predispositions to totalize, or of the capacity of individual actors to be 
unconstrained. Resolve this and you’re in a different theory altogether, for as 
Ortner (2006:2) notes, the relations of practice theory are dialectical, a set of 
mutual entailments, rather than a simpler opposition that imagines apriori things 
turning themselves to the task of opposing something. More critically, the 
contradictions, encounters, and (re)connections in Marx lack the immanence of 
predisposition and patterning that is simultaneously constraint and potential for 
something outside the pattern. They also lack the diachronic implications of this 
immanence, which practice theory gauges as both a conservative tendency and a 
capacity for transformation. Practice theory also provides an actual mechanism 
for observing connections between scales—between particular actors, for 
example, and a pervasive, public world of ordered forms. 
 But the core difference between these two positions, perhaps, is that practice 
theory offers a reconfigured “I”. It is not the formulaic “I” in Marx, where the 
34 
 
     
 
analyst has figured out in advance what “I” needs to focus on and do, and where 
that adjustment will lead. It is also not an “I” born out of oppositions per se—
“appositions”, which admit vectors that are oblique, might be closer. Most of all, 
being constituted in engagement, in the emergence of immanent tensions, 
renders “I” both more radically individuated and more radically social than in 
Marx. That is, what I just called immanent tensions is internal to the individual, 
which is what makes embodiment mean what it does. By comparison, Marx’s 
takes properly functioning individuals as wholes (and categorical ones at that): 
individual activity and recognition of self entails change, yes, and that gives 
them agency, but no complex of internal tensions is even hinted at which might 
take analysis below the individual’s skin, to a sense of creativity and emergence 
that suggests the first person. For all his talk of individuals, Marx’s work seems 
to contain individuals in the third person only, individual bodies one can point 
to and talk about. The refinements of individual and social are expression of 
practice theory’s profound emphasis on integration. Perhaps as further 
expression of all these points, the “I” in practice theory is also much harder to 
talk about, much harder to pinpoint and be precise about. 
 One shortcoming of the schematic of practice theory is the “actor”, usually 
noted in the singular. The category can be fleshed out and multiplied in actual 
analyses of course, but it seems important even at the schematic level to highlight 
how actors are present to each other, specifically. The lone actor is no more 
visible or analyzable than the tree in the forest that no one sees fall. Presence to 
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others is surely the primary node through/in which identity and value emerge as 
such, and what brings the internal dynamics into analytical view. Another 
liability, which might have been more of a strength than it was, is the re-
deployment of familiar oppositions and terms so that tension becomes 
constitutive rather than analytically antagonistic. The danger, which proved real 
and present, was that despite the rhetoric of tension, interpreters would default 
back into the same oppositions as before. Ortner laments exactly that in a 
response to critics of her 1984 theory paper, where she argues that even some of 
the top minds—Maurice Bloch among them—managed to miss this intended 
reconfiguration and criticize the terms of practice in their isolationist senses. As 
Ortner writes, 
The problem is that even the attempted syntheses in the current situation 
get heard as one or another pole of the opposition. Mention the actor, and 
get heard as another form of transactionalism. Mention the importance of 
the cultural construction of anything at all, and get heard as another form 
of "culturology" or "subjectivism". Mention the importance of theorizing 
anything at all and get heard as another form of objectivism (1989:106). 
This matter of distinguishing particular, especially new uses of a term, and 
connotations of prior usage that apparently come along for the ride, seems 
trickier than simply stating the problem would make it out to be. A further 
hindrance to broader application of practice theory concerned timing: about the 
same time practice theory gathered steam, postcolonialism, deconstruction and 
feminisms mounted challenges against anything that smacked of grand theory. 
Combined with the difficulty of taking the theory’s terms beyond isolationist 
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space, words like “actor”, “action”, “structure”, and “history”, however 
reconfigured in principle, started to sound like part of the problem, not a 
solution. 
 And yet, returning to the notion of resonance, practice theory is alive and 
well—more vital than ever, perhaps—if not taken whole the way it once was. Its 
terms, from specialized kinds like habitus to the keywords just noted to the word 
“practice” itself, pepper theoretical and ethnographic work across disciplines, 
topics, standpoints, genders and political persuasions. The playful tensions of 
language where terms pull against each other to evoke new analytic space are 
almost de rigeur across such wide swaths as postcolonialism, postmodernism, 
deconstruction, feminisms14, gender studies, cultural studies and film theory, 
and the list could surely be extended. Integrationism and a reconfigured “I”, in 
the senses produced through practice theory, have remained center-stage in the 
decades since, although forms and styles of getting at them have meandered.  
 Its critical emphasis on integration, and recognition of a genuine first person 
emergent in internal dynamic, also has much in common with Bakhtin’s notion 
of dialogue. Like practice theory, the starting point in dialogism is that people 
                                                 
14 Singling out feminism as another site of integrationist thinking and language risks engendering a false 
distinction. If feminism began as a relatively consistent stance against a monolithically perceived 
patriarchy, it didn’t stay that way long, and these days, a common criticism of feminism is that it represents 
no common cause at all, evident as much by the extent to which feminists argue with each other as by the 
myriad different trajectories they pursue and stances they take. Feminists also employ diverse theoretical 
tools, including bits of practice theory, dialogism, deconstruction, psychiatric theory, gaze theory, and 
others. Yet they deserve mention as an assemblage for two reasons: they have generally in common a focus 
on gender, particularly constructions of females (leaving that term un-deconstructed for present purposes), 
which are often ignored or under-represented in other work; and the sheer volume represented by a feminist 
assemblage, however internally diverse or argumentative, adds a great deal to the momentum of the 
integrationist tendency I am trying to describe. 
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are always already embedded in their worlds; abstracting them into an analytical 
cocoon where they can be studied like variables or controls in an experiment 
would miss the entire premise of dialogue, for it is only through that embedding 
that people are able to perceive, make choices, act and speak. Dialogism parses 
differently the balance between creative impulse and constraint, and between 
individual and collective: although practice theory, too, reveals internal 
dynamics within a single person, dialogism is more emphatic and precise in this. 
Indeed, in contrast to a more casual sense of dialogue as interaction between 
people, dialogism in Bakhtin’s sense focuses specifically on the echoes, double 
voicing, experiences, and linguistic encounters within a single person, with the 
definitive caveat that these internal dynamics depend utterly on multiple bodies 
that are simultaneously present to each other, for it is in those engagements that 
inner conditions are realized. As Holquist (2002:19) says, the dialogic self is first 
of all a relation; “in Bakhtinian scenarios, the simple yet all-important fact should 
be stressed again that [protagonists] always enact a drama containing more than 
one actor” (18—emphasis in original). Dialogism thus gives definitive emphasis to 
“I”, which is not merely a unique entity, or one that simply needs other people 
around in order to distinguish and talk about. The dialogic “I” is also not just the 
fact of two “I”s being simultaneously present to each other, although that is 
critical. In addition, each I is internally complex and dynamic, and these 
dynamics are what emerge through co-presence.   
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 Hanks (1996:207) notes that for Bakhtin, all speech is dialogic since it draws its 
value from the ideological horizons of society, and one might extend that 
observation far beyond speech as well. Ubiquity, of course, would mean that 
“dialogue” doesn’t say anything distinctive about an interaction; as we shall 
claim for the term “frontier”, problems of meaning are sure to crop up when an 
insight appropriate to specific conditions gets applied beyond them.15 But that 
push for a broad application of dialogism, however diluting of analysis some of 
it may be, certainly helps suggest the breadth and strength of recent commitment 
to integration and a radical sense of “I”. 
 These specific models of integration and “I” belong to a more general 
intellectual view that one is always embedded, and that embedding makes one 
partial in both senses of that word. Recognition of this manifests as a growing 
agnosticism about how, and how far, one’s actions ripple outward into a wider 
world. The view that individual actions and orientations are consequential, that 
they promote certain ideas by virtue of excluding others, that ideologies and 
their institutional structures are deeply imbricated within society, contingent 
upon and emergent in interaction, and that visible boundaries are therefore 
highly permeable, is incompatible with presumptions that society is reducible to 
elements, or that only certain relationships are relevant. A given analysis may 
choose—indeed must choose—to look only at certain things, but it cannot 
                                                 
15 For a specific discussion of this relevant to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue, see Bernstein (1989). 
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presume, in principle, that those it does not mention are irrelevant. The 
postmodern recognition of personal standpoint contradicts that very principle.16 
 Going further out on a limb, this general integrationist impulse may also 
register in non-intellectual practices such as the growth of interdisciplinary 
activity and interest in supporting it institutionally, the proliferation of new 
departments, increasing crosstalk between nation states, challenges against the 
idea of a nation state17, new security threats that are global in scale and 
unconstrained by national boundaries, increasing and immediate access to global 
events, instant communication around the world, and through it all perhaps, a 
growing sense that things happening over there actually do make a difference 
here, to me. The point is not to call all of these trajectories practice, of course, but 
to tune in to the profound stress on integration, and perhaps on a radicalized “I” 
(which might include its plural form, “we”) occurring today. With his usual flair, 
Sahlins once said of the long run that we are not just always dead, but always 
wrong too. A more congenial and perhaps illuminating way to say that is, ideas 
are important to the time(s) in which they arise, especially if they sound from so 
many different corners simultaneously. One misses everything about that 
importance and what the ideas are doing in the world by discarding them in 
advance to the dustbin of a long run. Integration, and perhaps the radical “I”, are 
profoundly significant, and the thing to figure out is how, and perhaps why. 
                                                 
16 This claim dovetails with the sense, offered by Marcus (1986:192), LaCapra (2001:21) and others, that 
postmodernity is rooted in indeterminacy and incompleteness. 
17 According to Swazo (2002), for example, given the compression of nations upon a finite globe, the 
traditional logic of statecraft becomes ever more of a hindrance, and increasingly dangerous. 
40 
 
     
 
Among the many threads of this larger idea, no single one constitutes a weak 
link which, if broken, drops the whole idea. Peirce says 
“to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the 
conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is 
no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so 
slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately 
connected.” (Collected papers, 5.264) 
 As a final point, the rigors of language, including the ordering of sentences and 
thoughts into discrete moments, is an inescapable liability in evoking the radical 
sense of integration being argued here. The basic problem, as Bakhtin noted with 
his view of an “event”, is that thinking, let alone writing, is always a 
crystallization after the fact. By the time we notice a thought or idea as such, the 
contingencies in which it emerged have already moved on. The study of events is 
therefore a study of trace fossils, of impressions that our emergently familiar 
predispositions allow us to make in sedimented moments. Like Bakhtin said of 
events, we cannot get at the heart of practice’s dynamism directly; even using 
words like “force”, “element”, “predisposition”, “person”, “body”, “individual”, 
and any others used in the preceding paragraphs, conjures the spectre of an 
unexamined prior ontology that frames the focus of analysis. The rhetorical 
solution when using these familiar terms has been to evoke a tension between 
opposites, to see that tension as primordial rather than a consequence of things 
supposedly brought together, and to look the other way when the words’ prior 
histories dirty the scene with prior, isolationist meanings. Such words dirty the 
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scene for the same reason we think to use them in a new way to begin with 
instead of inventing a new, arcane jargon: if new jargon has the dubious 
advantage of making a clean semantic break and thus allowing a fresh start, 
familiar terms have both the advantage and the liability of being easily 
understood already, which can be a powerful springboard into new territory 
when done well. Although it has been done better by some than others, the 
telling thing is the sheer number and breadth of people doing it. 
2.3  Frontier… 
 The most contentious of my three keywords, I choose “frontier” over 
alternatives because some of its baggage proves useful to my analytic purpose, 
and because no one needs another new term. In distinguishing my sense of 
frontier from prior usage, it will help to touch briefly on the latter, beginning 
with Fredrick Jackson Turner’s 1893 essay, The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History. This highly influential work almost singlehandedly brought 
“frontier” to the fore of American historiography, where it has since suffered on 
three fronts: challenges to the concept itself, disagreement over what Turner and 
others mean by the term, and vague or unreflective usage that obscures issues 
buried in the word. Some advocate continued use of the term after 
accommodating insights gathered through the fruitful century since Turner. 
Others, preferring terms such as border, borderline, borderland and contact 
zone, argue that “frontier” is inherently loaded in ways that make 
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accommodating it wrongheaded. Still others take up positions between these two 
poles, and differ in their kind and degree of accommodation. 
 Turner’s basic thesis is that a westward-moving frontier, along which 
settlement, increasing density of population and related shifts in ideals prevailed 
over a sparsely populated, unsettled wilderness, definitively shaped and 
produced the America of Turner’s day. According to Pierson (1942:49), who 
surveyed 106 people18—mainly established scholars and professionals in history 
or allied disciplines—Turner’s frontier is generally taken to be a zone rather than 
a line. “The effect of this zone was change, the change showing particularly in 
personal character, in the fostering of individualism, democracy, energy, 
optimism, inventiveness, coarseness, materialism, idealism, etc.” That is, “change 
in the character and attitudes of the people is more essential and noticeable than 
change in institutions” (50). In any case, this frontier contrasted sharply in kind 
with counterparts in Europe, which tended instead to consist of fortified borders 
running through more densely populated areas. Granting this modest agreement 
about what Turner said, respondents to the survey embodied a deep divide over 
the details and merits of the thesis; as Pierson notes, “fifty years after its 
formulation historians are still not agreed on either the contents or the validity of 
the celebrated frontier hypothesis” (48). Indeed, almost sixty years after Pierson’s 
essay, a special forum in The American Historical Review19 returned once again to 
                                                 
18 Pierson sent out 220 letters for the survey, but about half did not reply. 
19 Vol. 104, No. 3 (June 1999) 
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the larger issue of how to think and talk about cultural, geographical, 
demographical, economic and political conjunctures, beginning with a re-
appraisal of Turner’s model of a frontier.20  
 Without getting stuck in this debate, suffice to say here that the thesis was both 
wildly popular within and also beyond the academy21, and deeply problematic, 
and retains today a considerable capacity to generate discussion. Some argued 
that Turner’s obsession with an advancing frontier, mainly in terms of 
population density, geography and politics, while probably important, had 
blinded him to other influences on American development, notably ideas, 
traditions and arts. And even many of Turner’s own supporters22, observe 
Adelman and Aron (1999:814), acknowledge the imperialist suppositions of a 
thesis that cast the movement of American settlement and influence from east to 
west as a transition to civilization. Some scholars find Turner’s conception of a 
frontier too vague to be useful. Others are more pointedly critical. Wade (1959), 
for example, suggests that it was not farmer/pioneers at the edge of settlement 
                                                 
20 For a general review of the acceptance and influence of Turner’s thesis, see Billington (1971). For a 
discussion that puts Turner’s thesis in the context of broader developments in American historiography, see 
Bender (2002:129-153).  
21 Theodore Roosevelt, for example, used Turner’s work as a lens for appreciating the 1890 US Census. 
Roosevelt saw the declaration of a moribund frontier as reason, in effect, to seek new frontiers overseas. 
The term also became a general metaphor for seeking new horizons that would continue to push the 
envelope of American expression, as when John F. Kennedy promoted his political vision, which included 
exploration into space, as a New Frontier. 
22 Support, Pierson (41) observes, often tended to be emotional, a defense of the hypothesis as if Turner the 
man were under attack. This irrational loyalty, and opposing emotions ranging from irritation to outright 
hostility to the hypothesis, mark prejudice as a decisive obstacle to both understanding and fair assessment 
of Turner’s ideas and influence. Appropriately, Pierson devotes a separate section of his essay to “the 
obstacle of prejudice”. 
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that drove westward expansion, but urban centres such as Cincinnati, Pittsburgh 
and Louisville. In this view, Turner looked mostly in the wrong places.  
 Perhaps Turner’s sharpest critic is Limerick (1987), who doesn’t merely call 
Turner’s frontier notion “an unsubtle concept in a subtle world” (25), but stresses 
that the unsubtle point the term makes is exactly the wrong one. By agreeing 
with the 1890 census that the Western frontier had closed, she argues, Turner 
effectively blocked what he considered his discipline’s goal of “understanding 
what came into the present from the past…. For the present is simply the 
developing past” (Turner 1891, cited in Limerick 1987:17). What sounds in this 
quote like attention to continuity gets blocked, Limerick suggests, by the closure 
of a frontier that was deemed finished, whose process was based on limited-time 
openings and opportunity for some that came at the expense of contractions and 
closures for others. Such a scheme, she says, serves poorly as an explanation of 
change into present-day (circa 1893) American identity. A closure model 
downplays the complex mixing, syncretic adaptations and newly opened 
opportunities that tend to emerge in cross-cultural space. Limerick conceives 
instead of a West that, although changed, continues today, and where the 
analysis of myriad threads recognize multifaceted, complex regions rather than a 
homogenized, homogenizing “West”. 
 Some, such as Riley (1984) and Georgi-Findlay (1996), fault Turner’s thesis not 
for its imperialist aspect, but for how it promoted an exclusively male vision of 
westerly movement. Riley considers how women’s experience prior to that move 
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constituted a different experience of frontier, different kinds of relations there, 
and to a degree a different project than the unmarked “male” vision recognizes. 
Georgi-Findlay, drawing on private letters, diaries, memoirs and fiction by 
women who moved west, again stresses how these sources differ from the far 
more visible, and historiographically influential male-oriented view—and even 
subtly reshaped it sometimes—but also how, despite these differences, women 
nonetheless colluded in the civilizing process through commitments to spread 
Christianity and Christian-based morality. 
 Responding to Limerick in particular, Adelman and Aron (1999:815) caution 
that obsessing over continuity and adaptation can create blindness where radical 
transformation or attention to dissonance deserves the emphasis. As noted at the 
outset of this section, definitions and models should be assessed with respect to 
the analytic problems they are used to illuminate. Failure to do this results in a 
reified concept, which seems to attach directly to “facts on the ground” instead of 
to an act of problem solving undertaken by situated analysts. As Adelman and 
Aron point out, a continuity approach may be less sensitive than Turner’s 
frontier model—for all its shortcomings—to decisive transformations in the wake 
imperial expansion. Indeed, its general point was to stress how Europeans, 
migrating to eastern America and then westward across the country, were not 
thereby simply transplanted Europeans, but a new product created in the 
cauldron of place, people and circumstance. Granting that all products have 
roots that can be traced, there is potential value in marking the emergence of a 
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people and spirit that eventually commanded master narratives about the history 
of a country, regardless of the empirical credence of such narratives. 
Furthermore, if Turner’s particular stress on closures lacked subtlety, it doesn’t 
follow that decisive moments of transformation cannot be analyzed with greater 
finesse. Philips (2008), for example, shows how in the Pacific Northwest a 
hegemon, influenced by the cumulative creep of migration, changing 
circumstance and particular individual characters, may act decisively to set new 
precedents on communal behavior, thus transforming local society with the 
stroke of a pen.  
 The point is not that continuity in such moments fails: the problem is that 
everything may be described as continuous, whereby the word distinguishes 
nothing, including moments that may be the point of analysis to distinguish. If 
detaching a term from specific analytical issues and problems leads to reification 
of the concept, detaching it from concrete particulars on the ground leads to 
undue generalization23, either by leaving the term detached and apparently 
ubiquitous, or by misapplying it to different particulars where it fits badly. An 
emphasis on continuity may also be a sign of present analytical times. Noting, 
with Schmidt-Nowara (1999:1226), that “rivalries among empires, states, and 
peoples manifest themselves not only through trade and warfare but also 
through the interpretation of those struggles”, one might expand the statement 
                                                 
23 Overgeneralization is the main charge that Schmidt-Nowara (1999) and Haefeli (1999) level against 
Adelman and Aron, whose model of frontiers, borders and borderlands rely too much on American sources 
written in English, which could be readily challenged by examples from Latin America. 
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to include interpretations of something other than rivalry; a spirit of 
accommodation, for example, may manifest itself as an interpretive tendency 
toward continuity rather than disruption or power struggle.  
  One major trajectory of redress to the notion of a frontier has been to 
reformulate it more explicitly as a zone, either using the same term or by 
deploying others, most notably borderland. This alternative is more emphatic 
and intuitive than frontier in suggesting a three-dimensional expanse, an in-
between space that opens up possibilities for mixing, accommodation, creativity, 
and potential to shape emerging interactions in unpredictable, unsystematic 
ways. The main impulse for this shift was Bolton’s (1921; 1930) work on Spanish 
borderlands, which detailed the complexity of relations not only between 
American and Spanish forces, but also nuances of Spanish occupation as well as 
relationships with Native communities. Coupled with the wealth of archival 
detail Bolton mined, this borderlands approach opened the land up like an 
exploded diagram, revealing complexities and analytical possibilities not 
previously imagined. But neither Bolton’s own work, nor the fact of a more 
congenial term, make “borderland” inherently less susceptible to vague usage, or 
application to such drastically different situations that the use of a single cover 
term itself becomes misleading. One distinctive aspect of North America, Haefeli 
(1999:1224) observes, is that compared to most places in the world, its political 
edges were remarkably unstable and fluid: “In North America . . . forts, frontiers 
and boundaries rose, fell, and shifted drastically within the span of a single 
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lifetime”, which makes most of North America (excepting the Spanish 
borderlands in the Southwest, which proved more stable) a poor type specimen 
for identifying and talking about borderlands elsewhere. Or more to the point, it 
argues against any search for type specimens. 
  A further liability of borderland in Adelman and Aron’s model is what seems 
to be a sequence from frontier, which was “a meeting place of peoples in which 
geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined” (815); to “borderland”, 
referring to “contested area between colonial domains”; to “bordered land”, 
characterized by a “shift from inter-imperial struggle to international co-
existence” (815). The process is not cast as a manifest destiny, but one hears 
echoes of Turner’s imperialist teleology in this narrative about the emergence of 
colonies and then nation states: “Thus, as colonial borderlands gave way to 
national borders, fluid and ‘inclusive’ intercultural frontiers yielded to hardened 
and more ‘exclusive’ hierarchies” (816). The words “gave way to” and “yielded” 
imply struggles that produce winners and losers, those who gain at the expense 
of others. And putting the critical terms in the plural generalizes this march of 
some over others. As Haefeli (1999:1223) asks, “must a trajectory always be from 
borderlands to borders?”; and, “can a region not go from a frontier to a 
borderland and back again?” What of frontiers, as in Egypt, China, the Middle 
East, the Andes and Mesoamerica, and unlike most of North America, that form 
along harsh ecological boundaries and remain stable for centuries?  
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 Schmidt-Nowara also stresses that the trajectories of imperial expansion and 
interaction can look different depending not only on which empires one is 
talking about, but also on who is thinking about them. Cuban intellectuals, he 
notes, understood deep differences in the rationales and effects of Spanish versus 
British colonialism: although economic exploitation characterized them both, 
Spanish colonies pursued racial intermixing as a strategy—emphatically not the 
case for Britain. If religion was a key motivator for the Spanish, British colonists 
were driven more by commerce. Haefeli also disagrees with Adelman and Aron 
about the status of the Great Lakes region as a borderland in the centuries prior 
to the War of 1812; arrival of the British and thus emergence of a borderland, he 
contends, heralded an end to the complex negotiations that had characterized the 
region. Furthermore, Haefeli and Schmidt-Nowari both argue, Adelman and 
Aron make much of English language scholarship about America, and very little 
of scholarship in other languages about other regions, where articulations 
between peoples read and played out very differently.  
 For the regions bordering what would become Upper Canada, White (1991) is 
worth special mention as illustration of what a meticulous, region-sensitive 
unpacking of historical materials can produce, and of risks that attend 
specialized terms. Contra Turner, who envisioned a steadily advancing imperial 
frontier and an equally steady retreat on the other side, and thus the overall 
upperhand of empire, White argues that from 1650 until 1815, in the Great Lakes 
region of the pays d’en haut, there existed a particular situation between various 
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natives and European settlers in which no side could achieve a decisive 
advantage militarily or politically. On this leveled playing field involving 
peoples who were radically different in their cultural traditions, politics, 
language and senses of history, there emerged what White calls a “middle 
ground” of uneasy, often violent accommodation in order to achieve a common 
ground where productive interaction, especially trade, could occur. It was a zone 
where accident and contingency led to invention and convention, which in turn 
created new purposes, and so on. Also characteristic of this zone was a 
“willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions in terms of what 
they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises” (52), even to the point of 
advancing deliberate misunderstanding where this proved expedient. Such 
emergence depended substantially on new generations being born into this inter-
cultural conjuncture, who were thus not identical to any one side in isolation. 
The resulting space was complex, unpredictable and often contradictory; it 
expressed life lived from the ground up, and with only a bit of ground in view at 
any moment. An “advancing frontier”, in contrast, presumes to see both the 
wider country and where it is headed. Seeing “advance” isn’t merely teleological, 
of course, but depends for its teleology on looking backward from the imagined 
end point (as the inevitability of “bordered lands” also seems to do), and also on 
assuming that because the end point supposedly came to pass, things were 
always headed there. That, in turn, presumes a developmental and narrative 
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structure, and either fits on-the-ground contingencies, relations, and perceptions 
into that mould, or if they don’t fit, filters them out as noise. 
 If one follows Limerick’s view that frontier comes loaded with opposition, and 
openings for some that mark closings for others, then it is an awkward choice of 
term for the kind of unpacking White does. But a major lesson of White’s study is 
that analysis of any border zone—however called—must be grounded in time 
and place. White’s portrait of unfolding relations in the Ohio valley between 
1650 and 1815 is not intended as a template for understanding border zones 
elsewhere—a mistake by those who apply the term “middle ground” without 
acknowledging the grounded specificity of White’s argument.24 Looking at 
negotiators in Pennsylvania up till about 1750, for instance, Merrell (1997) 
demonstrates that frontier space was not everywhere marked by the same kinds 
of negotiation or the same ultimate goals. Where White’s middle ground was a 
place where negotiators looked past differences in order to eke out a common 
ground, Merrell portrays a space where natives used negotiation to maintain 
                                                 
24 Wagoner, for example, describes frontier settlement practices involving Lakotas in what is today Bennett 
County, and notes how recent ethnohistorical approaches to a middle ground have helped challenge models 
based on facile dichotomies between self and other. Such studies, she says, “locat[e] the field of analysis in 
fluid interstices” in which “processes of accommodation, assimilation and acculturation become salient”; 
the approaches “highlight moments when groups in early contact situations are forced into tenuous alliance 
through ‘a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings’” (1998:141). The problem is 
certainly not that White succeeded in inspiring challenges to previous analyses of cross cultural interaction 
over time, and recognition of fluid interstices, creativity and expediency pinpoints an aspect of White’s 
continuing relevance. But the term “middle ground” should be applied very carefully, especially when 
quoting White as Wagoner does. One should remain sensitive to the extraordinary historical specificity that 
locates his research in the Ohio valley and nowhere else, and which is a sublime achievement of that book. 
That sensitivity isn’t obvious, for instance, when applied to Lakota without any reference to White’s central 
proposition that the middle ground emerged in the absence of a military upperhand. 
    Another way of saying this, perhaps, is that there are two senses of the term “middle ground”: one that 
appreciates all the subtlety and specificity of the term as White conjured it, and another that is much looser, 
a cover word for whatever generalities may be gleaned from White. The problem with this second term is, 
it is not always obvious that this is the intended meaning, and if it is, those generalities are not enumerated. 
52 
 
     
 
distance from non-natives, and where the overall trajectory on the other side was 
not persistent misunderstanding of the “other”, but long run failure to overcome 
prejudices inherent in the “self”. 
 What any of these terms for emerging relations mean about a given region 
must also account for who is meaning it. White’s analysis, for example, is not 
only specific to the Ohio valley, but also a function of the specific—mostly 
written, largely colonial—materials he uses. As Trigger (1982:11) points out, 
analysis that relies on colonizer documents easily mobilizes the same biases 
inherent in those documents: the blind spots, the willful omissions and the 
exaggerations—a charge often enough leveled at Turner. Using different 
evidence, including substantial emphasis on Ojibwe oral traditions, Chute (1998) 
extends the notion of a middle ground in Sault St. Marie into the early twentieth 
century. Indeed, she argues that prior to 1830, a middle ground in White’s sense 
did not characterize the Sault. “Relatively untrammelled by external laws or 
social mores, it conformed poorly to modern frontier social models, for it fitted 
neither the image of an exclusively fur trading hunter-gatherer society, nor that 
of a cohesive multiethnic community similar to those identified by Richard 
White” (272:n1). Although Chute does observe a deterioration of supposedly 
equal relations between natives and non-natives during the nineteenth century, 
she also argues that from the Ojibwe standpoint, equality and respect were still 
understood to be the goal of negotiations; this was not lost with the dissolution 
of a middle ground. Kugel (1998:199) makes a similar point: 
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Unlike the American public, the employees of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and Christian missionaries and reformers, the Ojibwe at the 
century’s end did not contemplate their impending demise. They did not 
see themselves as vanishing. They did not see themselves as a conquered 
people . . . nor did they consider their culture and belief system as 
deficient to those of the Americans and in need of replacement. 
And the Ojibwe, Kugel goes on to observe, did not see their fundamental 
relationship with the Americans as having changed in the wake of shifting 
politics; such shifts “did not alter their insistence that they had created a 
reciprocal political relationship between equal partners” (1998:199). In this sense, 
White’s model of a middle ground, based on the disappearance of equal 
relations, under-represents a Native perspective. 
 Much more can be said about the language used to analyze border areas, 
however conceived. Two more brief points will suffice. First, just because current 
analytical sensibilities prefer to conceive of frontiers as zones of complexity 
rather than straightforward lines in the dirt, doesn’t make the line metaphor 
inappropriate. At certain times, notably the War of 1812, provincial boundaries 
hardened to a saber edge, one that slashed, retreated and lunged with the 
convulsions of battle. Lines don’t get any starker than when opposing armies 
face off across a river, where movement across that line defines invasion and the 
start of a war. Recognizing complex relations in the zones leading up to that river 
does not detract from the significance of the line as such or the act of crossing it. 
And whatever present-day preferences of terms and concepts might be, one 
should credit natives of an earlier society and time with a capacity to say what 
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they mean with a reason for meaning it, as when William Robertson writes to 
John Askin on March 26, 1792:  
“It is said that the Americans will insist upon the posts as the means of 
enabling them to chastise with effect the Indians; while on the other hand, 
there appears no disposition here to comply with such a requisition—at 
the same time a new line has been suggested for a frontier between the 
Indians and the Americans…” (Citied in Quaife 1928 vol.1:408). 
 The other point touches again on the issue of ubiquitous application of a term. 
Reacting to overemphasis on the divisive, isolating aspect of border, the current 
tendency is to stress permeability.25 Permeability, of course, like division and 
isolation, is a heuristic, a way of framing something in order to draw attention to 
particular features. Given that frame, one focuses on the ways in which no 
society is ever hermetically sealed against its neighbors, and that even aggression 
against intrusion is a form of contact. Stressing this point brings useful attention 
to the complex processes by which neighboring societies negotiate their co-
existence; it reveals, as critics of Turner have done, what gets hidden by 
imagining hard lines representing isolation, rejection of the “other”, or a line of 
advance of A over B. At the same time, categorical emphasis on permeability can 
obscure moments when exclusion and reduction to schematic simplicity are 
salient characteristics and even engines of change. The degree to which one 
might generalize permeability depends, again, on the particular problem being 
studied, and also on what historians have called scales of observation.26 Given 
                                                 
25 For the Great Lakes region see, for example, Bukowczyk, Faires, Smith and Widdis (2005). 
26 For discussion of this, see Revel (2010). 
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enough time depth or spatial expanse and a dedicated eye for cumulative 
evidence of crosstalk along a border, every border that ever existed shows 
abundant crosstalk. A different view, set of questions, evidence and conclusions 
may emerge by restricting to a much narrower scale.27 
 The liability of a term, in sum, does not reside in its limitations: definitive 
limitations on a term—particular configurations that hone meaning to a fine 
edge—are precisely what make the term useful. Liability arises, rather, in the 
quest for encompassing terms that pretend to slip their ties to context and 
concreteness and become general to a whole discipline. No term is perfect, or 
perfectly bad, for all cases. Even Turner’s sense of a moving line of opposition 
between settlement and wilderness, for all its anachronisms, its blinders to 
syncretic adaptation, accommodation and continuity, manages to capture 
something about the sheer presence and influence of imperial ambition. While 
one probably wants to deconstruct its implicit notions of “event” and 
“narrative”, the point is not to seek a retelling that avoids narratives and events, 
but to understand more about this unavoidably human mode of making sense, to 
shed light on previous narratives by making new ones that allow a deeper sense 
of what got said before, and why, and therefore—with a final nod to Turner—
where present ideas came from. 
                                                 
27 A good example of relating scales of observation is Tsing (2005), who shows how local economic affairs 
in Kalimantan, and Indonesia more broadly, emerge in the engagement—the grip—between local 
perspective and global ambitions, particularly those related to natural resource exploitation that gets tagged 
globally as development. This ethnographic stance, and the metaphor of friction itself, makes sense given a 
project of “refusing the lie that global power operates as a well oiled machine”. 
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 With that backdrop, this dissertation uses the term “frontier” to suggest the 
various media and moments in which core ideas, beliefs, practices and traditions 
relating to proper conduct, represented by Upper Canada’s new government, 
crystallized as part of a social and physical landscape. Wherever located 
geographically, on whichever side of a geopolitical border, frontiers in this sense 
are the moments when government officialdom pushed its standpoints and a 
world pushed back; as traction, such moments do not bring standpoint to the 
new scene, but are the very conditions of its emergence. Although the “media” 
just noted can in principle include anything—even the medium of a hangman’s 
noose, a last line of defense guarding society’s civilized edge—the present study 
focuses mainly on newspapers, advertisements and books; proclamations 
circulated through print and mandated to be read publicly; moralizing 
anecdotes, fiction and poetry; the creation of settlement land through the 
surveyor’s scribe; and legal court rooms, jails and instruments of punishment, 
through which the most basic fundamentals of social living emerged from the 
vague half-light of background assumption into the spotlight of intense public 
scrutiny and remembrance. 
 It is worth stressing that a frontier in the sense used here does not map in any 
direct, conformist way onto the geo-political boundaries (however defined) of a 
new province. To be sure, ideas and ideologies always occur in space, are always 
located in place, bodies, social contexts and the constraints of sedimented or 
fragmented history, but nothing beyond habit or kneejerk assumption fixes those 
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locations according to legal jurisdiction, survey grids or militarized borders. 
Thus we find vectors of Upper Canadian moral identity being inscribed in 
prospective emigrants from England, Ireland, Scotland, France and Germany 
who, guided by well-informed emigration guides, may collude in their 
moralizing stance about work ethic and courage, proper practices and risks for 
settler women, religious obligations toward others, implicit civilizing missions, 
and transformation of property as a basis for acquiring rights to it. We note 
Upper Canada’s vision of conduct in Loyalists south of the border, even those 
who never managed to migrate north; being Loyalist made them, in a sense, 
metonymical extensions of Upper Canada. Of course we also find the Upper 
Canadian vision of conduct inscribed in conduct literature printed in the Gazette, 
the source for which in most cases was newspapers from the States or overseas, 
or books, many of which were printed abroad. And we see Upper Canada’s core 
ideals of conduct recreated in criminal trials in England, whose discourse 
underwrote criminal categories and legal procedures in the colony. 
 What makes these unities of moment, media and context a frontier is the 
traction in which they emerge. Refusing once again the “billiard-ball” notion of 
interaction, we should not imagine moments of engagement as a meeting of 
“things” or even standpoints that become visible under certain circumstances, as 
if they somehow exist invisibly in nowhere space until that moment: moments of 
recognition are the scene where, in and through which the thing recognized gets 
created. Exemplars, a particular kind of recognition, take form through the grip 
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of contrast to alternatives, something like how lexical choices along a 
“metaphoric pole”, according to Jakobson (1960), depend for their meanings 
upon alternative words not chosen in that moment; without this implicit 
contrast, meaning would be impossible. Similarly, exemplars signify as such only 
through implicit contrast to other choices of conduct: meaning is the contrast. 
Witnessing the sentencing of Josiah Cutan for burglary is not just a 
condemnation of contemptible behavior, but a finely parsed delineation of what 
burglary was, how it was not robbery, or larceny. It was this fine parsing of the 
act that provided the sharp sense of society’s edges, and of what lurked beyond. 
Frontier, for all its loaded history, evokes a sense of this grip of difference that 
“borderland” does not. It also evokes a sense of edges, and thus the project of 
pushing and defending core ideas, of defining precisely where conduct 
transgresses the threshold between acceptable and not—a project that was both 
self-conscious and urgent in carving out a new province. Exemplars, in being 
conservative rather than radical, in contributing to inertia against change and 
experimentation, are one aspect of frontiers where collective representations get 
worked out. Such moments of traction, we noted, do not correspond in any 
simple way to geo-political borders, which is not to suggest that frontiers, 
otherwise defined, wouldn’t relate meaningfully to those borders. 
 Such a frontier, Tsing (1995:32) says, is not “a place or even a process but an 
imaginative project capable of molding both places and projects.” Exemplary 
conduct practices relating to Upper Canada do just that: as concept, they imagine 
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a limited suite of places relevant to settlement, with dwelling house as moral 
center and beasts of prey stalking the periphery. They also locate the concept 
geographically, sometimes by naming and describing the place called Upper 
Canada, as dedicated emigration guides do, or by evoking a sense of shared 
virtues among Upper Canadian communities. Exemplary practices also imagine 
and help shape projects, from creation of the Gazette as a government 
mouthpiece, conceived in the future Lieutenant-Governor’s moral vision for the 
new province; to failed projects such as the Queens Rangers, in whose imagined 
wake Simcoe envisioned the natural growth of settlement and moral structure. In 
each case, exemplary practices crystallize alongside the spectre of their shadow 
side, tokens of the disorder that administrators imagined as being kept at bay by 
frontiers of proper conduct. 
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Chapter 3 
Roads to Upper Canada 
 
 This chapter provides a snapshot of circumstances on the ground leading up to 
and during the earliest years of Upper Canada. The point is not to be 
comprehensive or even balanced, but to establish context for a discussion of 
certain institutions and events in subsequent chapters. Because we are concerned 
here mainly with British-derived notions of conduct, we likewise highlight 
British threads of influence in areas that would become Upper Canada. After 
noting a few canonical landmarks in this process, we briefly survey the criminal 
court system, which will set the stage for the burglary trial explored in Chapter 5. 
 The chapter then suggests a sense of how plans and unknowns might have 
looked to those who participated in forging the province. What ideas and 
practices did people arrive with, and how did these help constitute what they 
saw and shape what they did? How did this same legacy of practice help 
produce (rather than just recognize) obstacles and demand unforeseen and 
perhaps unwanted adjustments? I try to get at these issues in two ways. The first, 
based largely in the abstract, considers the socially and conceptually loaded idea 
of “empty land”, as settlers and administrators alike often imagined frontiers.  
 The second window onto these issues, grounded more in the concrete words 
and actions of early Upper Canadians, finds a gap between the province’s 
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frontiers (physical, demographic, institutional, ideological) as understood and 
enacted by government authorities on one hand, and by non-elite, more locally-
tuned settlers on the other. Drawing on insights from de Certeau, I suggest that 
the former, which one can imagine as power imposed from the top, owed much 
of its visibility and structure to misfit rather than a more straightforward 
capacity to impose. It was not just the subordination of ordinary settlers, or even 
their resistance, that crystallized the visible forms of social prescription, although 
these occurred too. More fundamentally and pervasively, prescriptions 
expressed unease, even jitteriness, about limits to how effectively or far the 
diverse momentums of a real population could be brought into alignment with 
the formal purity of Britain’s moral system and constitutive hierarchies. 
3.1  Road to Upper Canada 
 The new province of Upper Canada materialized through the Constitution Act 
of 1791, which divided what had been the province of Quebec into a lower and 
upper province, defined in terms of position relative to the headwaters of the St. 
Lawrence, with the Ottawa River serving as the east-west divide. In the creation 
of any new territory, of course, a great deal is not new, but expression of deeply-
rooted assumptions, cultural lenses and filters, articles of faith, habitual practices, 
and specific threads of intellectual lineage. One of the difficult and defining 
aspects of Upper Canada was that these various elements were diverse, not 
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homogeneous, despite enduring attempts by the new government to imagine it 
otherwise and to force that imagination into reality. 
 Starting points are always arbitrary, of course, but a convenient one for the 
story of Upper Canada is the Royal Proclamation of 1763.28 Its conditions helped 
shape the future province in several ways. First, it restricted the sale of Indian 
land so that only the Crown could buy and dispose of it. On one hand this 
inhibited (but did not actually prevent) sales between individuals, unmediated 
by the government. One supposes that had this inhibition not been in force, 
settlement in future Upper Canada might have looked quite different, and 
required some different measures to deal with, by the time the province came 
into being. At the same time, this condition gave the Crown the means for 
acquiring native land as needed, and a basis for negotiating Indian reserves, 
some of which would shape the landscape in Upper Canada. In other words, the 
proclamation’s decree on Indian land gave the Crown an instant monopoly.29 
 Put in geographic terms, the proclamation decreed that all land west of the 
Appalachians belonged to Indians, and was thus prohibited for settlement. One 
                                                 
28 Just to stress the arbitrariness of starting points, this proclamation only makes sense in light of the French 
and Indian War to which it serves as a culmination of sorts. That North American war, in turn, can only be 
understood in the context of conflicts overseas, not only between Britain and France, but also Austria, 
Sweden and Prussia. And so it goes, with each “event” an outcome of myriad prior and concurrent 
influences on one hand, and of an analyst’s narrative habits and choices on the other. 
29 Sir William Johnson, an Irish trader who was awarded a baronetcy for military services against the 
French, and who later married into Mohawk society, wrote in 1973 that “they were amused by both parties 
with stories of their upright intentions, and that they made War for the protection of the Indians rights, but 
that they plainly found, it was carried on, to see who would become masters of what was the property of 
neither the one nor the other.” Cited in Calloway (2006:48). An irony of Britain’s ostensible protection of 
Indian land, then, was that those supposedly protected saw it as a sham, and on top of that, the move 
angered masses of American settlers, many of whom had experienced Indian violence on the frontier 
during the French and Indian War and thought they were the ones deserving of protection. 
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notable effect of this condition, which sat poorly with settlers already deep into 
plans to migrate west and even more poorly among those already in place, was 
that it fueled the resentment against Britain that would eventually explode into 
revolution and then independence. That outcome, of course, would directly and 
profoundly affect the demographic and ideological make-up of the new province 
through waves of migrating Loyalists, whose loyalties then helped distinguish 
and shape attitudes and policies toward late Loyalists and others. More basically, 
the revolution also helped shape attitudes to Americans and the idea of 
democracy they represented. Errington (1987:36) suggests that “the best way to 
characterize colonial attitudes toward their southern neighbors is to describe 
them as ambivalent.” No doubt some were, but the problem with that claim is 
the blanket category of “colonial attitudes”, which ranged from staunchly pro-
American to exactly the opposite. Indeed, much of the clamoring about 
Americans was over this lack of a united front. 
 The prohibition against westward expansion, whose line in future Upper 
Canada ran from southern Lake Nipissing to a point on the St. Lawrence just 
west of Montreal, also helped create an internal division between west and east. 
As Douglas (2001:2) explains, existing posts in the western regions, including 
Detroit, had no provision for civil government since they were, literally, guests of 
the Indians according to the new provision. It was the job of military 
commanders to provide rule, both civil and military. Relative isolation of the 
west deepened after the new province’s inception—through the checkerboard 
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layout of crown and church reserves just east of the Detroit River, for example, 
which made communication with the east awkward.  The natural inclination of 
settlers facing road blocks to points east was to find their hub in Detroit instead.30 
Douglas (7) goes so far as to suggest that this inward-looking identity along the 
river and the southwest shore of Lake Erie persists among some communities 
even today. Suffice here to say that division of west and east was not incidental 
but a pattern that got reinforced on multiple levels, from royal decree to the 
social geography resulting from land surveys, which also combined to separate 
the western frontier politically from Loyalist heartlands to the east. 
 The Royal Proclamation also set boundaries for Quebec, which at that time 
included all of present-day Quebec as well as Ontario up to the western limit just 
noted. It was from this vast territory that Upper Canada would later be carved. 
Although the proclamation stipulated that English civil as well as criminal law 
should apply, a few timely visionaries including Attorney General Charles 
Yorke, Solicitor General William de Grey, and James Murray, the appointed 
governor of Quebec, realized that uprooting the present civil administration also 
meant uprooting the seigneurial system, the embedded social system, and also 
the Custom of Paris which governed property inheritance (Calloway 2006:119)—
in other words, wreaking social and political havoc and sowing widespread, 
grassroots resentment. Governor Murray, appointed to enforce a sweeping 
                                                 
30 The John Askin Papers, a major window onto economic and social life along the Detroit River up to 
1815, reveals a web of relations as people routinely worked, traded, socialized and married across the river, 
especially prior to the repossession of Detroit by an American garrison in 1796. 
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Anglicization of Quebec and initially committed to this task, deserves special 
mention for his advocacy of the French social cause, even against the stated 
interests of his own superiors. As Browne (2000)31 observes, Murray’s actions 
gave the succeeding governor, Guy Carleton, a precedent for ratifying the French 
civil system into law. So it was, in any case, that these French elements remained 
intact in Quebec, and would form a key contrast to Upper Canada when Quebec 
got divided a few decades later. 
 The next landmark on this fly-by tour, just alluded to, is the Quebec Act of 
1774, which was in large part an attempt at damage control following the Royal 
Proclamation. Some of that damage—the upheaval and resentment that would 
surely have followed from implementing the letter of the Royal Proclamation in 
Quebec—was averted thanks to the wisdom and determination of Governor 
Murray, as well as Charles Yorke and William de Grey. The Quebec Act simply 
made these moves official: the civil and social system remained French, while 
English law applied to the criminal sphere. The other element of damage control 
with this move—an ulterior motive behind concessions to the French way and 
people—again derived from the impending blow-up wrought by the Royal 
Proclamation: with the drums of war now sounding on the near horizon, British 
authorities feared the prospect of an internal French population siding with 
Americans, and therefore sought to appease them. The real goal though, 
                                                 
31 Cited online on 2 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2085&interval=15&&PHPSESSID=hpod4oehjlfl554kittjfnm4o6 
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suggested in a letter from Guy Carleton to General Gage on 4 February 1775, was 
not merely non-aggression from the French, but capacity to sign up their 
aggression for service against America. While the French seemed content with 
concessions made to them in the Act, Carleton reports that 
…the Gentry, well disposed, and heartily desirous as they are, to serve the 
Crown, and to serve it with Zeal, when formed into regular Corps, do not 
relish commanding a bare Militia, they never were used to that Service 
under the French Government…. as to the Habitants or Peasantry, ever 
since the Civil Authority has been introduced into the Province, the 
Government of it has hung so loose, and retained so little Power, they 
have in a Manner emancipated themselves, and it will require Time, and 
discreet Management likewise, to recall them to their ancient Habits of 
Obedience and Discipline. (Cited in Shortt and Doughty (1918:660).) 
Another fateful component of the Quebec Act, which stoked the ire of Americans 
and Indians alike, was its retraction of the Royal Proclamation’s promise to 
protect Indian land and rights to it. With this new act, the previous western 
boundary—beyond which supposedly lay Indian land—retreated all the way to 
the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, with the exception of patches around the Great 
Lakes. So much for protection, based either in word or in writing. American 
settlers, meanwhile, were incensed that Britain would unilaterally decree 
ownership of lands the settlers thought already belonged to them. As an act of 
granting concessions to an existing French settlement population—which 
dwarfed any British counterpart—the Quebec Act was astute. As an attempt at 
reversing some of the major problems with the Royal Proclamation, the Quebec 
Act could not have failed more massively. Indeed, that act would be named one 
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of the so-called Intolerable Acts, cited by Patriots as a basis for going to war 
against Britain. 
 Next, of course, came the Revolution itself. For present purposes, suffice to note 
its denouement in the Treaty of Paris in 1983. With this treaty, the western 
boundary of Quebec moved east again, this time to a line (the conceptual 
fuzziness of “lines” would generate quibbles and skirmishes over its exact 
location) running through the middle of Lakes Ontario, Erie and Huron, and 
through the navigable channels connecting them. It thus set what would become 
the western boundary of Upper Canada. The change of political scene south of 
the border also urged British Loyalists north in droves, which gave future Upper 
Canada most of its initial population and part of its political slant. Another 
condition in the treaty, noted in Article 5, was restoration of losses suffered by 
British Loyalists during the advance of Patriot causes: 
Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective 
states to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, 
which have been confiscated belonging to real British subjects; and also of 
the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the 
possession on his Majesty's arms and who have not borne arms against 
the said United States.32 
Earnest recommendation, however, apparently did not amount to an order, even 
when it came from Congress. When this restitution failed, Britain responded by 
holding onto ports it already occupied on the American side of the new border 
(Douglas 2001:3). These minor aggressions would help escalate relations once 
                                                 
32 Full text of Treaty of Paris cited online on 2 March 2011 at 
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/paris/text.html 
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again toward war in 1812, during which the international border migrated 
several more times. By the end, however, it settled back to the same place it 
began before the war: the boundary set by the Treaty of Paris. 
 In 1788, Lord Dorchester (Guy Carleton) issued a proclamation dividing the 
western part of Quebec into four districts, intended to facilitate administration of 
a far-flung population, which was growing from migrations following the 
revolution. With a largely French population concentrated in eastern Quebec and 
increasing concentrations of English-speaking Loyalists in the middle and 
western parts, the Constitution Act of 1791 took a further step toward effective 
administration by splitting Quebec into two provinces, with the Ottawa River as 
a divide between Lower Canada in the east and Upper Canada to the west. The 
act also held back from settlement a certain amount of land in every township, 
equal to two-sevenths of the total, for future sale by the Crown to raise money 
for the government and for the church (of England) (Douglas 2001:6). These 
reserves, so-called Crown and Clergy reserves, typically occupied a 
checkerboard pattern, except around more densely settled areas where they had 
to be clustered together in blocks on the township’s perimeter in order not to 
interfere with existing settlement. Ironically, given this apparent deference to 
settlement, the checkerboard pattern proved much worse for social cohesion by 
actually preventing it. Where the large blocks of an assembled block pattern 
avoided settlement by design, the checkerboard, being laid out in more sparsely 
settled areas, inhibited dense settlement from forming. Sparse settlement in turn 
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made communication among farms difficult. As noted earlier, the presence of 
checkerboard patters just east of the Detroit River helped isolate river settlements 
from the rest of Upper Canada, encouraging them instead to look to Detroit.  
 In the Constitution Act, one observes sedimented influences of the several 
landmarks just reviewed. The division of Quebec into large districts under Lord 
Dorchester was part of a larger recognition, also addressed in the formation of 
two provinces, that Quebec was both vast and internally complex, and on both 
counts difficult to administer. The Quebec Act’s recognition of French presence 
in what would become Lower Canada helped formalize distinctions with its 
Upper counterpart, where English models became the basis of both criminal and 
civil law; French settlers in what became Upper Canada, meanwhile, gave shape 
to social geography and attitudes, not least of all attitudes to the French. At the 
same time, that act was decisive in marching the American colonies to war, 
whose cataclysms were the birth pains of a new Quebec, and then of two 
provinces. If the Quebec Act thus served, in effect, as a declaration of war, all of 
these landmarks derived from conditions laid out in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. 
 Looking back on the Royal Proclamation from the view of what transpired, it 
would be tempting to say that it conceived a fatal discontent, recognition of a 
gulf so wide that only independence could redraw relations in a way that would 
allow the two powers to coexist as neighbors. But “fatal” would be a judgment 
not knowable at the time by those busy being angry and recalcitrant. Getting 
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pissed off comes long before getting massively organized about it. Humility 
about hindsight, of course, opens the door to subjunctive history: What if this 
had happened instead of that? What if Pontiac had won his rebellion? What if 
Prussia had been victorious overseas in the Seven Years War? What if, in 
achieving victories on both sides of the ocean, Britain hadn’t been so devastated 
economically that they had to impose heavy taxes to recover their wealth—
another major factor leading to the American Revolution? What if that revolution 
therefore hadn’t occurred? 
 Such questions, either asked outright or invited in identifying decisive 
landmarks of history, seem to be valued33 as a way of appreciating contingency 
and context, as assurance that the landmarks are genuine, or simply as a class 
activity.34 Another potential use of the subjunctive is drawing attention to what 
goes into making a landmark, which leads one to notice not just that the 
generative force of things lies in their being irreducibly concrete, but also to 
                                                 
33 A polemical Cambridge based group calling themselves “The Quadrangle”, on the other hand, calls the 
exercise foolish and pointless by wasting time on things that didn’t happen or are not the case, when more 
attention to things as they are would improve people’s engagement with the world. As a self-help attitude 
to everyday life, which is really where the article goes, that may be. The article also tries its best to be 
impudent and polemical, and manages to be patronizing on top of that, and is not a fair example of serious 
thinking. But it does ask a certain question that makes an unintended valuable point. “What if Obama 
weren’t black”, it asks in order to stress the pointlessness of the question in real life. But this question, like 
others in the subjunctive, is one way of asking something that is poignantly relevant to “this” world: what is 
it that causes us, today, to recognize Obama as black? How is blackness constructed, assigned and used in 
cases, like his, where ancestry is ambiguous according to metrics used by the mainstream? How does that 
mainstream choice, or perhaps sleight-of-hand, relate to other social practices in the news today, like 
raising obstacles to gay rights? The subjunctive thus has great potential to raise questions about how we see 
things, and how we choose what questions to ask. 
34 A google search on subjunctive history, for example, brings up several outlines for questions appropriate 
to class activities in a history class. Separate, more serious consideration of subjunctive questions also takes 
place in philosophy, especially in work on modal logic, for which a key recent figure is Saul Kripke. 
Specialization of the discipline and its language, however, makes much of that work inaccessible to lay 
readers, who would probably not think to look for it in any case. 
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wonder about the possibility of making a different narrative out of the same 
concrete data. Narrative itself comes under scrutiny. On both counts, intimations 
of the subjunctive should humble anyone who seems too sure about their grasp 
of historical forces that connect the dots of data. Like the exaggerated wobbliness 
when balancing a stick held the wrong way around, slight adjustments can bring 
massive change—the more so when a narrative lines up a whole string of these 
hyper-finicky conditions so that each amplifies the next. The point, though, is not 
that what we see as having occurred is unthinkably unlikely, but that issues of 
likelihood evade a better insight about what concreteness means. This insight is 
not some algorithm for calculating chance or ranking material articulations by 
their importance, but recognition of infinitesimally minute connectedness whose 
totality would super-saturate narrative beyond all recognition. Such musings 
invite one to ponder the mystical processes of attention, recognition, exclusion 
and habit by which this elemental traction gets cast as narrative. We hear of 
Brock’s fall at Queenston Heights, but rarely consider, compared to today’s 
weapons, the crude targeting capacity represented by a musket ball, even in a 
case where parties aren’t charging, on a hill, in the adrenalin frenzy of battle. The 
question “What if the musket ball had missed Brock?” is, in this discussion, not 
an invitation to wonder what else he might have accomplished in the War of 
1812 had he lived, but the barest flash of a hint that coalescing so much minute 
detail into a coarse aggregate must come at a cost to understanding nuances. If 
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nothing else, the obscurity of those minute connections can discourage reading 
backward with a comforting sense of inevitability.35  
3.2  Framing the wilderness 
 Although much was new to those who moved into the region of Upper 
Canada, comprehension always depends upon, and to a large degree reproduces 
the standpoints and inertia of whatever background brought the traveler to that 
circumstance. Indeed, it is engagement with difference—in this case, exigencies 
on the ground that fail to satisfy expectations and perceptions based in another 
place—that crystallizes as awareness of self. Such encounters helped guide, force, 
and grow the colony, sometimes grudgingly, into its own thing.   
 To say it differently, there is no such thing as territorium nullius, to use the 
phrase deployed by Chief Justice Marshall in several key US Supreme Court 
decisions, notably in 1823 and 1832.36 This was first, as Marshall notes, because 
the land in the so-called New World was not empty of people prior to the arrival 
of Europeans, or even empty of people who mattered, but had been long 
inhabited by people with original rights to the land. Rights of so-called 
(European) discovery, or in our case, formation and settlement of a new province 
                                                 
35 In the spirit of not over-valuing boundaries, I recall a cogent remark by Martin Pearlman, artistic director 
of the Boston Baroque period orchestra. In his introduction just before performing Beethoven’s 2nd 
symphony, Pearlman noted that at that time, this was Beethoven’s last symphony: he was not leading 
inevitably toward anything, let alone the radical stylistic innovation represented (in hindsight) by the next 
symphony, which ushered in the Classical style. One can only truly understand what creativity even is by 
appreciating that locus in time; a narrative of development overwrites—precludes—the radical creativity 
needed to achieve. 
36 These cases were Johnson and Graham’s Lessee vs. McIntosh, and Worcester vs. Georgia, respectively. 
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in only broadly charted territory37, do not annul rights that pre-existed those of 
the newcomers. More abstractly though, territorium nullius is also an impossible 
idea, a paradox of sorts, a victim of logic similar to the famous phrase, “this 
sentence is false.” To imagine the land at all is to imagine it in specific ways, 
informed by particular notions of land, nature, wilderness, their relation to 
human society, their capacity to spark wonder and focus ambitions, their 
ramifications through metaphor, our own individual and familial history, our 
sense of and position within class structures, the broader history of our 
homeland, and countless other elements that constitute our perceptions, most of 
them below any threshold of awareness. In this sense, territorium nullius is a 
specific expression, or rendering, of lands that are brimming with history, people 
and conventions; the pre-figuring required to conceive of “empty” land is 
impressive indeed. 
 And yet, something about this or any “new” land is empty, of the newcomer at 
least, until the moment she enters. Or better to say, it consists of things beyond 
whatever experience had shaped her up till then, and “new”, if one wishes to 
keep the word, refers to moments of running into those things that are beyond. 
In a climate of deconstructive criticism, too much is sometimes made of 
difficulties in describing these encounters, of the futile compulsion to circumvent 
radical subjectivity by postulating a truly independent object, or worse, the 
                                                 
37 As Slattery (2005:50) notes, the effects of Marshall’s rulings rippled across the border into Canada, and 
indeed through and beyond the Commonwealth. 
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“real”. Perhaps one can simply grant that subjectivity can never be escaped, as a 
first step to accepting that it can be transformed, and that words like “real” and 
“objective” may usefully describe forces evidenced by the transformations they 
produce. Such forces are evident regardless of—or perhaps because of—our 
partiality when describing or understanding them. As noted in Chapter 1, we 
want to avoid proposing “reality” that is simply there, ready for newcomers to 
run into. A tenable sense of “real” is dialectical rather than ontological. It 
describes the capacity we have to discover that when we push the world, it 
pushes back, in large part because our partiality enables circumstances to 
overflow it. We run into things that alter our trajectories and raise bruises. A 
winning approach to those moments is not to think the bruises away by focusing 
sufficiently hard on navels or other distractions, but to adapt our subjectivities so 
that bruising gets reduced in the future. 
 This is the sense of real—of obstacles and bruising on one end, and sense of 
“power over” and “power to” on the other38—that I try to evoke in this 
dissertation. As far as possible, I speak not of kinetic obstacles that new 
                                                 
38 Wartenberg (1992) uses these intuitive terms to contrast a sense of power as authority and subjugation on 
one hand, and inner capacity to act on the other. (These terms align roughly with Foucault’s (1977) 
distinction between negative and positive power, respectively.) If both terms describe the active voice—
someone acting rather than being acted upon—they differ in that power over is overly relational and 
hierarchical; it entails a passive person in the same sense that a slave receives directives from the master. 
(Foucault’s insight, very close to Hegel’s on this particular point, is that even passivity is an active choice, 
and not a necessary one, which renders the authority figure critically dependent on those who are 
subjugated—something that authoritative regimes do all in their power to hide.) Power to, while also 
relational in the philosophical sense that everything must be, describes moments when individuals—
whether magistrates or poor tenant farmers—seize and use their own capacity to direct themselves. In the 
sentence leading to this footnote, both of these kinds of power, measured as evidence of shaping something 
according to plan, form a contrast to the unplanned, unwanted bruising that happens plans fail in their 
design, or fail to give advance notice of obstacles. 
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immigrants, from lawmakers to fugitive Loyalists to opportunistic American 
settlers, bump into and bounce off of according to the constraints of prior 
experience. I imply real insofar as obstacles or other sensations of an outer world 
emerge through and as partiality of the subject. 
3.3  Walking on the frontier 
 In seeking an idea of what the early province was like, one plausible tack is to 
contrast the view from institutions and conditions of privilege on one hand, and 
views closer to the local, everyday ground of settlement and settlers on the other. 
A danger with this, perhaps reflected in a tendency to frame history too much in 
terms of landmarks of legislation, actions of politicians, bureaucrats, military 
commanders and other “notables”, is that anyone else gets seen, imagined or 
ignored, and in this sense ranked, relative to a specific model of achievement.39 
Ordinary settlers, unendowed with privilege, are harder to locate and hear, and 
when located, they serve mainly to flesh out a framework already laid out by 
canonical landmarks. They are the details that may get added to the basic survey 
grid of canonical narratives.  
 Too much emphasis on privilege also overlooks considerable unease about life 
on the ground that lurked behind the swagger and righteousness of some elites. 
Through the optics of that unease, the intensity and repetitiveness of rules about 
                                                 
39 In a study on criminal boundaries between Upper Canada and the United States, Murray (1996:341) 
notes that traditional histories of that border tended to be from the top down—the border as derivative of 
relations between states. A focus on the perspectives and agency of criminals upsets that top-down view by 
observing that criminals, no less than officials who were after them, used the border for their own ends, in 
their own ways. 
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moral conduct suggest a level of damage control, or at least of acting defensively 
rather than always adaptively—reactively rather than actively or even pro-
actively. They reflect limits to the capacity of hierarchal authority to impose its 
visions of/for the province, and show that forces bubbling up from street level 
also imposed on them. 
 I use “street” here in de Certeau’s (1984) sense that contrasts a view from high 
up a building40, whose products are large-scale planning, mapping and top-
down bureaucracy that exercises power to implement this vision, and a view 
from street level, which de Certeau (98) calls “a space of enunciation”. By this he 
doesn’t just mean agency relative to the designs and impositions of city planners, 
a capacity to react, resist, conform or defy. He evokes a more profound kind of 
subjectivity that is generative and original rather than a crystallization of top-
down structure. Walkers of the street cut across boulevards, follow intuitions 
through deflections and detours, pursue their own interests and relationships, 
and in doing so, create stories and places for themselves that don’t occur on any 
map. Crucially, this is not defiance or rebellion, although street-level acts can 
include those. Street level subjectivity does not reduce to an opposition with the 
city-as-object rendered on city plans. The power of street walking is its 
obliqueness to hierarchy, and the feedback-driven creation of unpredictable, 
                                                 
40 De Certeau’s inspiration for the contrast was a trip up New York City’s Empire State Building—a view 
infused, no doubt, with a priest’s sense of God looking down from above. 
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local-level places, relationships and narrative that follows. Mere resistance would 
not confound planning to nearly the same degree.  
 De Certeau’s point, of course, was that these two should be better integrated in 
planning a city, that planning should somehow harness the native subjectivities 
of walkers in the city. My point is that in early Upper Canada, the recurrence of 
official proclamations on proper conduct, the rapid growth of articles on conduct 
(especially female conduct) in the Gazette, obsession over the political loyalty of 
its printers, and the compulsion for magistrates to enforce laws beyond their 
local means to do so, suggest that official views of conduct and how to produce 
and enforce it were often out of touch with local lives. This view goes beyond 
mere opposition, the sort where presence and enforcement of law would point to 
violations and violators, or resistance, or laziness, or contempt for the law; all 
such imputations express the administrative view of non-compliance. The 
provocation for that view, though, was not opposition but obliqueness, and a 
tendency for it to be misconstrued as such through attempts to impose 
conformity. Like de Certeau’s street level, ground-level Upper Canada was 
enormously complex; exigent, adaptable, and opportunistic to a degree that 
stress on conformity filters out; driven by deflections and diversions of the 
moment; alive with lateral relationships; organized and re-organized by an 
accumulation of street-level narratives; and tactical where administrators were 
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strategic.41 In part, what drove engagement of these different spheres was 
incompatibility between their worldviews, coupled with asymmetries of access, 
resources and broad-scale power to implement those views. 
 With this basic contrast between views of the land in mind, we may consider a 
transplanted legal system along two categories of relation. One is tension 
between levels of authority, in particular between rules coming from the top and 
local-level practices, often contrary, bubbling outward and upward from the 
ground. The former includes top-down proclamations such as Simcoe’s 
“Proclamation for the Suppression of Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”, printed 
in the first several issues of the Gazette. This proclamation represented a long 
tradition of enforcing Christian piety and conduct, both in Upper Canada and in 
the British colonial administration that preceded it. Looking into the future, one 
finds the publication of similar proclamations, including the “Proclamation for 
the Encouragement of Piety and Virtue, and for the preventing and punishing of 
Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”, issued by King William IV and printed in the 
Gazette on September 23, 1830. Looking the other direction, a parallel stance on 
Christian conduct occurs in instructions to the new Governor of Quebec, James 
                                                 
41 For de Certeau, strategies presumed that things had their place, defined through institutions, locations, 
rules, hierarchies, and an underlying separation of the “other”. Relationships (business, social, 
governmental, etc.) are then defined in view of those proper places. Strategies also presumed a separation 
of subject (like a city) from its environment—insulation from sources of feedback that would soon threaten 
the order of things. Tactics, meanwhile, are highly sensitive to context and thus adaptable and 
opportunistic, and their localization exigent and fleeting rather than proper. Tactics also evade categorical 
“others”: its distinctions among people are porous, expedient and flexible. In a sense, tactics are what 
would follow from reconnection to environment: they are fundamentally about feedback. 
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Murray, on August 13, 1763;42 thirty years later, Simcoe would quote item forty 
of that instruction set almost verbatim in his inaugural proclamation in the 
Gazette. Such a durable government stance on Christian morality gets explained 
in another top-down source of law and order: Keele’s Magistrate’s Manual of 
1835, which states that “The Christian religion, according to high authority, is 
part and parcel of the law of England. To reproach or blaspheme it, therefore, is 
to speak in subversion of the law . . .” (387).43 Indeed, as the last chapter noted, 
Christian ideals wove society together not just in being wedded to law, but also 
through the grassroots role of teaching youngsters to read: because teaching 
materials were excerpts from Christian scripture, and ultimately the whole Bible, 
learning to read—and thereby achieving social and economic competence—
entailed becoming Christian. 
 This prescriptive stance on conduct, urged on magistrates, justices and even the 
lieutenant governors to enforce, could look quite different from ground level. 
Murray (2002:75ff) records a court deposition about a magistrate, one 
Bartholomew Tench who, out walking along the Welland Canal on Sabbath, saw 
a group of laborers working on a house and tried to put a stop to it. He was, to 
put it mildly, unsuccessful. Not only did the workers, especially an edgy fellow 
named Joel Skinner, flaunt Tench’s incapacity to enforce the rule of law and 
religion, but the latter’s attempt at a follow through—charging the workers with 
                                                 
42 For the complete text of these instructions, see Shortt and Doughty (1918:181-205). 
43 Accordingly, the MM (79) defines the crimes and corresponding punishments for blasphemy and 
profaneness, as well as breaking the Sabbath by working.. 
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violation of and contempt for the laws of Sabbath—did not result in prosecution 
at court, only a bond of fifty pounds for Skinner to keep peace with Tench for a 
year. As Murray (76) observes, “this must have been little compensation for the 
public ridicule Tench had endured”—especially, as this dissertation suggests, 
given the particular significance of appearances discussed in Chapter 2. 
 Worth noting is the political and religious background of the two men: Tench 
was Roman Catholic and Irish, while Skinner was Protestant and a United 
Empire Loyalist. Murray probably underplays this aspect of the confrontation in 
saying “there are undertones of religious and ethnic rivalry here” (76). The idea 
of undertones doesn’t capture the energizing, generative capacity such bitter 
historical rivalries can have, or their capacity to bubble up in myriad forms—so 
readily, indeed, that particular forms don’t explain their flexibility or their source 
in a much broader antagonism.44 The takeaway point of this example for the 
present discussion, though, is not the religious or political inclinations of two 
particular men, but the vulnerability of top-down law to forces that are 
multifaceted, oblique to hierarchy, and specific to a location, individual presence, 
and context. These forces might include differences of class, ethnicity or religion, 
individual personalities and rivalries, everyday economics, social connections, 
history of events specific to place, and so on. Such vulnerability is exactly what 
makes local practice messy rather than neat and categorical. 
                                                 
44 Friction between Ireland and Britain occurred further up the administrative hierarchy too, perhaps most 
notably between judge and politician Robert Thorpe and various English rivals in the government, 
including then Lieutenant-Governor Francis Gore, an Englishman of considerable peerage. See Patterson 
(2000). Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=37818.  
81 
 
     
 
 Conspicuous defiance of order imposed from the top, of course, was just one 
mode of negotiating everyday life on the ground. Heavyweight prescriptions in 
the Gazette, the tendency to appoint a king’s printer based on loyalty rather than 
training, the rapid blossoming of conduct articles (especially relating to female 
conduct) in the Gazette, and legal directives to enforce Sabbath and other conduct 
laws even when prospects for success were dim, evoke a rather black and white, 
all or nothing sense of loyalty to the British crown and the vision of proper 
conduct it entailed. From that vantage point, appreciation of American ways 
easily generated suspicion, and this brings us to the second kind of relation for 
considering a transplanted legal system: not as opposition between levels of 
hierarchy, but as obliqueness between them generated when those on top think 
oppositionally (as a spectrum between opposition and conformity) while those 
below are doing something else entirely much of the time. From that standpoint, 
the scene is complicated and messy, not non-conformist. It is messy and full of 
shifting, wayward impulses not out of uncertain loyalty, but out of settlers’ 
sensitivity to where and among whom they are, and to the need to adapt quickly 
and creatively when things got confusing. From street level they are not 
wayward but nuanced, perceptive and adaptable, skilled at thinking on the fly, 
able to embrace difference and contemplate ambiguity without resolving them 
into contradictions, at least to a point.  
 At street level, even political loyalty was not so exclusive: loyalty to Britain did 
not crystallize as homogeneous opposition to America and Americans, or even 
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necessarily wariness of them. As Errington (1994:35) notes, it would be 
oversimplification to characterize early Upper Canada as “a bastion of British 
conservatism and the home of virulent anti-Americanism.” That is, not everyone 
was a British conservative anyway, and being British conservative did not 
require that one be anti-American. As she explains, physical proximity to the 
United States, and a swelling American demographic in Upper Canada as waves 
of settlers (by no means limited to Loyalists or even late Loyalists) migrated 
north, makes a sweepingly oppositional view of relations difficult to sustain.  
 The moment of Britain’s defeat in the American Revolution was, to be sure, a 
tense one for many Loyalists suddenly stranded in the States, a state of mind 
suggested in part by their massive and headlong flight north. Being Loyalist 
south of the border at that moment must, for many, have been like waking up in 
a hostile eagle’s nest. Mackinnon (1995) relates the harrowing stories of New 
England Loyalist women in particular who, without husbands and some with 
children in tow, used their own wiles, devices, worldly wisdom and sometimes 
guns to run whatever gauntlets lay between them and the Upper Canadian 
frontier.45 Men could have it just as hard, as the father and family of Richard 
Cartwright, Sr. did at home in Albany when in 1777, his son Richard Jr. was 
discovered to be a Loyalist. Father negotiated for his son and niece to migrate 
                                                 
45 Worth noting, as a footnote for now, that these same women then acquiesced where needed, and against 
all evidence from their recent journeys, to prevailing models of conduct that associated women with 
domestic work and with a sensibility best suited to life at home. As Mackinnon notes, this conspicuous 
moment of agency, and the irony it held, was missed by British administrators and, until recently at least, 
by mainstream histories of the era. 
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north to British territory, where Richard Jr. became a leading entrepreneur, judge 
in the court of common pleas, and member of Upper Canada’s first legislative 
council. The taint to family left behind in Albany, however, soon resulted in 
personal abuse against them, violence against their property, and finally their 
removal under guard.46 It does not follow, though, that being Loyalist entailed a 
complete split from everything and everyone they had known, from relatives 
and friends to formative experiences in local, customary ways of life. It is worth 
stressing a sense, as Gourlay (1822:10) does, in which these migrants were 
“Americans who adhered to the royal cause” and “removed into Canada with 
their families” (emphasis mine). Connections worked in the other direction too, 
particularly in states that had adopted English common law as the basis of state 
law (214).47  
 Early travelers through the region confirm this sense of political and social 
complexity, and suggest not only that the province’s early population—the 
“fabric” of Upper Canada—was substantially American, but that this worked 
reasonably well overall. Traveling through Upper Canada in the mid to late 
                                                 
46 See Rawlyk and Potter (2000), cited online on Feb. 25, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-
e.php?&id_nbr=2315&&PHPSESSID=b0befejm13l846ufcflg1fg616.  
47 Patterson (2000) offers a contrasting picture of relations between Upper Canada and America. “At the 
ideological level,” he writes, “politics were therefore characterized by the noisy opposition of a rhetoric of 
republicanism and one of loyalty to government established by law, a conflict made the more intense by 
threat of war with the United States.” (Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-
119.01-e.php?BioId=37818.) The stress on politics, though, suggests that he talks mostly about opinions 
and debates in the government. Even there, opposition to America and Americans was far from universal or 
homogeneous in nature. In 1817, dissenters in the government of Francis Gore pushed to open the 
international border once again to American immigration, and in Wise’s (2000) view, would have 
succeeded if Gore hadn’t prorogued the legislative assembly at that moment. (Cited online on February 26, 
2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38587.)  
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1790s, Isaac Weld relates the strong presence of American settlers to availability 
of land: 
In the United States, at present, it is impossible to get land without paying 
for it; and in parts of the country where the soil is rich, and where some 
settlements are already made, a tract of land, sufficient for a modern farm, 
is scarcely to be procured under hundreds of dollars. In Canada, however, 
a man has only to make application to the government, and on his taking 
the oath of allegiance, he immediately gets one hundred acres of excellent 
uncleared land, in the neighborhood of other settlements, gratis; and if 
able to improve it directly, he can get even a larger quantity. (Weld 
1799:235)48 
Weld (loc. cit.) backs this up with at least a sense of statistics: “But it is a fact 
worthy of notice…that great numbers of people from the States actually emigrate 
to Canada annually, while none of the Canadians, who have it in their power to 
dispose of their property, emigrate into the United States…” Robert Gourlay 
supports this in his Statistical Account of Upper Canada. After estimating the total 
population of the province at 76,984 at time of writing,49 he adds, “I have no data 
for estimating the proportions of persons of different ages and sexes, or the exact 
ratio of increase,” the latter being “affected by accessions from Europe and the 
lower province, and still more from the United States.” As explanation for this 
                                                 
48 This impression of costly land in the United States, and the premium associated with better land, also 
comes across in Liancourt. Describing settlements along the road from Chippeway to New York, he writes: 
“The houses, entirely built with logs, are better constructed, and more cleanly than in most other parts of 
the United States.. The common price of land in this neighborhood is one pound, New York currency, or 
two dollars and half an acre…. Peculiar circumstances, a favorable situation, more extensive buildings, etc., 
enhance the price.” (1799:224)  
49 Gourlay adds that this number should not be relied upon as exact but can suffice as general information. 
A footnote to that disclaimer adds that in 1806 one Mr. Heriot (probably George Heriot the artist and travel 
writer) estimated the total population at 80,000. 
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flux he evokes a sense of sheer opportunity awaiting anyone who decides to 
emigrate: 
A fair understanding of the real state of the country in respect to climate 
and soil, the cheapness of land, the security of titles, the value of labour, 
the lightness of taxes, and the protection of property, will, under the 
continuance of a wise and liberal policy toward settlers, promote 
emigrations, and accelerate the progress of population. (1822:140) 
 As to attitudes toward Americans, it depended on who got asked, and when, 
but attitudes overall would be more hidden than revealed by an image of 
rejection, bitter rivalry or other oppositional model. These had their moments, 
particularly during cataclysms like during the War of 1812, and to a lesser extent 
the rebellion of 1837. In the wake of war, provincial administration under 
Lieutenant-Governor Gore supported an imperial ban on land grants to 
Americans. But soon after the war, dissenters in the same administration thought 
the ban should be lifted, and Gore had to prorogue the legislative assembly to 
prevent it happening and also dismiss a legislative councilor who was granting 
oaths of allegiance to prospective American settlers. In these examples and many 
others, conflict over views of American attitudes was remote from the ground of 
ordinary settlement: they occurred among the social elite in halls of government, 
and they trafficked in ideology rather than individuals. Gore’s rigidity about 
American settlers, Mealing (2000)50 observes, depended on a Toryism that was 
                                                 
50 Cited online on March 1, 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38063.  
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“conventional and unimaginative” in its utter incapacity to see any form of 
dissent as legitimate. 
 Given Gore’s heavy-handedness here and the absolutism that drove it, Richard 
Cartwright, Jr. offers a telling contrast case. As with Gore, Cartwright’s loyalty to 
British government was immovable bedrock. Compared to Cartwright, though, 
Gore’s loyalism seemed impervious to, and in that sense detached from people, 
events and consequences on the ground. And maintaining that loyalty was a 
practice that justified what could otherwise be considered shady means, as when 
he intercepted mail of apparent dissenter Robert Thorpe and even bribed the 
postmaster to pull this off (Mealing 2000).51 Cartwright, on the other hand, was 
not merely connected to the world of people, places, geography, economics and 
demographics, but thought primarily in terms of these. It didn’t make his 
loyalism any less strict, but it allowed his thinking and politics to reflect specific 
characteristics of Upper Canada, especially its contrast to the homeland overseas. 
In a letter to Isaac Todd dated 1 October 1794, Cartwright reacts to charges by 
colleagues in the legislative assembly that his opposition to the Marriage Act and 
the Judicature Bill showed his disloyalty to Britain. In indignant but careful 
language, he explains how Upper Canada’s demographics, scarce population, 
vast territory, religious diversity52 and rudimentary infrastructure simply can’t 
                                                 
51 Cited online on 1 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=38063.  
52 One source of insinuation about Cartwright’s disloyalty was his criticism of the extensive privileges, 
including better access to land grants, enjoyed by Anglicans (notably those constituting the Family 
Compact) given a majority population committed to other faiths. Cartwright’s views would prove well 
founded a few decades later, however, as resentment against the Compact grew violent. Although the 
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support everything that was possible or sensible in Britain, and that merely 
copying the homeland in every respect would only hurt the colony (1876:56-64). 
His loyalism, as ardent as anyone’s, differed from Gore’s in being empirically 
based, and thus in grasping that the best way to serve Britain’s plan for a sound 
colony was to understand their differences. In a 16 June 1794 speech responding 
directly to the Judicature Bill, he notes that the British parliament also expressly 
condoned such understanding: 
There is no maxim more incontestable in politics than that a government 
should be formed for a country, and not a country strained and distorted 
for the accommodation of a preconceived or speculative scheme of 
government; that in all the several departments of it the arrangements 
should be calculated for performing the business of the department in a 
manner the least tedious and embarrassing to the public, rather than for 
conferring splendour and emolument upon individuals…. And as the 
British Legislature has left us unrestrained in everything that does not 
militate with the constitution they have given us, I apprehend we are at 
perfect liberty, in the present instance, to pursue this principle to its full 
extent. (1876:67) 
On the matter of American presence, however, even Cartwright, grounded and 
empirical as he is, ends up tripping over his own prejudice. The following 
excerpt comes from a letter, dated 23 August 1799, in which Cartwright explains 
to the new Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, Peter Hunter, the problem 
with American immigration to Upper Canada. First setting the scene, Cartwright 
                                                                                                                                                 
immediate causes of the 1837 Rebellion were complex, including economic hardship brought on by bad 
harvests a few years earlier, and the cumulative immediacy of democratic ideals not only across the border 
but within Upper Canada’s population, the discontent over second-class citizenry assigned to other 
religions was one site where factions crystallized. It was no coincidence that one of the main fomenters of 
the rebellion, William Lyon MacKenzie, was Scottish Presbyterian, a group that was not only among the 
religiously disaffected, but whose principles included commitment to the separation of church and state. 
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observes that while originally immigration was limited to proclaimed Loyalists, 
Dorchester in 1788 opened this up to include “persons, who, although they had 
not joined the Royal standard, were, however, well affected to the British 
Government.” (1876:94). As a result, 
…a great portion of the population of that part of the Province which extends 
from the head of the Bay of Kenty upwards is composed of persons who have 
evidently no claim to the appellation of Loyalists. I will not disguise from your 
Excellency the opinion which I have always entertained, and on every proper 
occasion expressed, that this ought never to have been permitted. (95) 
But Cartwright finds plenty to admire about Americans.  
It must be admitted that the Americans understood the mode of agriculture proper 
for a new country better than any other people, and being, from necessity, in the 
habit of providing with their own hands many things which in other countries the 
artizan is always at hand to supply, they possess resources in themselves which 
other people are usually strangers to; and boldly began their operations in a 
wilderness, when the dreary novelty of the situation would appal an European.” 
(96). 
“But”, he goes on, “their political notions in general are as exceptionable as their 
intelligence and hardihood are deserving of praise.” This is political, not 
individual, he stresses: “I am not, however, inclined to impute to such of them as 
emigrate to this Province either hostile or treacherous views.” That is, he will 
impute it to ideas, but not to actual people: “It would be cruel and invidious to 
point this to individual instances.” But then he calls this problem “a radical 
disease which it would have been easier to prevent than it will be to cure.” Ideas 
like pure loyalty can live in the abstract. So can a disease, perhaps, but only after 
being identified—not just speculated about—in the flesh. Even an abstract 
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disease first needs bodies to ravage—in this case, real disloyal Americans, not 
just the idea of them (derived, ironically, from real people deserving of 
substantial praise for their settlement practices). In any case, his solution to this 
crisis of emigration, this disease-ridden exodus from the south, was to settle tried 
and true Loyalists among these Americans, to have at hand proper sorts “who 
have been bred up in habits of subordination, in sufficient numbers to 
discountenance that affectation of equality so discernible in the manner of those 
who come to us from the American republic.” (97)53 
 Cartwright’s unflinching loyalty to Britain, combined with his sensitivity to an 
empirical ground ignored or perhaps invisible to some of his elite 
contemporaries, makes him a telling figure here. He reveals the extent to which 
even a fair minded, scrupulously honest, profoundly Loyalist (in a visionary 
rather than merely stubborn sense), widely read, deeply principled, empirically 
driven politician can nonetheless depend on ideas that blind him to awareness of 
attitudes and distinctions within a settler population. This made it hard even for 
him to judge settlers on their own merits and identities.  
 A basic difficulty for Cartwright, and also for analysts looking back from the 
perspectives of today, is to find a workable balance between grounding in the 
local and particular on one hand, and capacity to generalize in a way that 
                                                 
53 The Scottish doctor and writer, John Howison, levels a similar blast against apparent dilution of British 
hierarchy and order. “Many of the emigrants I saw had been on shore a few hours only, during their 
passage between Montreal and Kingston, yet they had already acquired those absurd notions of 
independence and equality, which are so deeply engrafted in the minds of the lowest individuals of the 
American nation.” (1822:46-7) 
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accounts for that particularity and grounding. In Cartwright’s case, a key 
generalization was loyalty to British forms, ideals and principles, which he 
imagined as necessary templates for a successful colony. For the colony to be 
successful, however, templates and ideas needed the reality tests of exposure to 
life on the ground in Upper Canada. They needed the local world to push back, 
to bestow bruises, and thus teach administrators about differences between the 
homeland and the colony.  
 One imagines a similar challenge for today’s analyst, who must find plausible 
space between a narrative framed by canonical moments—acts of legislation, 
dazzling political figures, decisive battles led by inspiring commanders, etc.—
and one where flow and coherence get hijacked by detail. Take abstraction and 
generalization too far and particularity becomes token detail in the 
implementation of analytical types, a fault leveled at anthropological theories 
such as functionalism, structuralism, and in at least some of its incarnations, 
practice theory as well. The charge might apply equally to the stubbornness of a 
top down colonial administration whose vision of social and legal order, in being 
cultivated abroad and also embedded in privilege, could be particularly resistant 
to alternatives.54 Resist generalization too much, though, and description loses 
                                                 
54 This was particularly true of the legislative council, whose seats were appointed by the Lieutenant-
Governor, for life, and inheritable to eldest sons—an ideal recipe for durable structures of privilege. Indeed, 
this very structure of appointments to the legislative council, in duplicating various members also appointed 
to the executive council, foreshadowed the Family Compact, a close-knit, York-based Tory oligarchy that 
matured after the War of 1812. Note that not all scholars use the term, or even see it as viable. See Akenson 
(1984) for a rigorous assessment of the term’s usefulness for the discipline of history. Among its problems 
is disparate and confusing usage, and also its questionable explanatory power; as Akenson suggests, a 
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itself in a kind of junkyard particularity, a flea market of observations whose 
only organizing element is the physicality of the page they all end up on.55 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
useful term is not easily replaceable by another. The notion of family may also mislead, given that most 
members of the Compact were not related by blood or marriage. On the other hand, these slippages of 
meaning also make the term suggestive rather than precise, which might have its own uses—in evoking 
centers rather than boundaries, rules and formal structures. There was a closeness among the eastern elite, 
and also a compactness to the society even without a formal compact. Faulting the term for lack of 
literalness would miss these more suggestive, figurative possibilities. For a look at how the term evolved, 
see Brode (1984), especially 142ff. 
55 Neither extreme is pure, of course. Even the grandest abstraction bumps into a world beyond, 
in the sense used above—through readers and audiences, through increasing stresses of shifting 
sensibilities about the world and ways of theorizing about it, and so on. On the other end, to the 
degree that language itself is always metaphorical, a set of connections to words and ideas 
beyond the immediate, particularity is never absolute. 
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Chapter 4 
Provincial Guide Lines 
 
 Having devoted Chapter 3 to a selective historical overview of Upper Canada’s 
formation, this chapter considers how its authorities imposed grids of social 
order over the new province. Looking first at the Gazette56, we note some of its 
strategies for regulating conduct among its audience, particularly given its status 
as the province’s first newspaper and its role as official mouthpiece of the new 
administration. In addition to frequent deployment of official proclamations, 
moralizing anecdotes, and bits of prose and poetry on the theme of proper 
behavior, the paper also regulated conduct indirectly through government 
interventions that shaped its political slant and chose managing personnel, both 
of which mobilized an assumption that proper conduct would follow from being 
properly British. These strategies targeted a broad range of conduct, but we focus 
here on three aspects: Christian morality, loyalty to Britain, and associations 
between female conduct and domesticity, all of which become significant later in 
appreciating a dwelling house.  
 Next, we consider land surveys, whose grid lines, largely insensitive to 
physical geography, did not describe land but established a conceptual and 
physical frame for the unfolding of settlers’ everyday lives. Thus was 
                                                 
56 In 1807, the new printer, James Cameron, changed the name of the newspaper to York Gazette, which 
lasted until a subsequent printer, Robert Charles Home, changed the name back in 1817. For more detail on 
name changes, see Tobin (1993:25). 
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reproduced, first in the abstract and then as immigrating bodies and social 
relationships, a view of land as passive, something to shape, fill, improve, and 
thereby own.  
 What I attempt throughout this chapter is, first, to evoke a sense that while the 
organizing frameworks of prescriptions in the Gazette, and of survey and 
boundary lines did not directly impose a notion of dwelling, they did reinforce 
the ideological substrate on which dwelling was practiced. Recognizing this 
substrate will help establish dwelling as a core moral practice, and the dwelling 
house as a core moral place. Second, I build further toward a sense of 
prescription and imposition as emergent contingencies of the moment rather 
than the more straightforward, top-down forces that administrative agencies 
apparently took them to be. Their worlds of prescription took shape against a 
world beyond the prescriptive view, one that pushed back when pushed and 
which thus gave the coherent structure of prescription its raison d’etre. Such 
moments were among the frontiers noted in Chapter 2:  As suggested in the 
previous chapter, this “pushing back” ran oblique to formal order rather than 
simply against it, which made success in organizing (against) it fragile and often 
misguided rather than durable.  
 In part, these limits to control resulted from misperception: to the extent that a 
prescriptive view of order, based in loyalty to Britain, tended to register 
alternatives to that order as disloyalty (we saw this last chapter with charges of 
disloyalty against Richard Cartwright), it missed many nuances about locality 
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and, indeed, about the demographic constitution of the new province, which 
featured diverse backgrounds, sensibilities, skills and loyalties. The complex 
feedback this misperception produced helps illuminate a sense, suggested 
earlier, in which inertia is movement. If the inertia of English traditions and ideas 
was a kind of bedrock in setting up the new province, it is worth loading that 
metaphor with the dynamism of its literal half: as always in motion, sometimes 
explosively, through articulation along its myriad frontiers.57 
4.1  Interrogating the Gazette 
 The task of measuring any aspect of the Gazette’s influence seems particularly 
daunting. Administrative machinery of the new province, the particular 
geometries rendered through survey, the mix of migrants that inhabited those 
spaces, their diverse reasons for coming and staying, the presence of politically 
contentious neighbors to the south, and the unpredictable, emergent, real world 
traction between strong personalities (not least Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe), 
were all uncharted waters, and chartable only as trace fossils. How does one 
gauge the influence of a single entity amidst such profound sea change? The 
present task is far more limited, fortunately. Beyond making a case for the 
                                                 
57 This admittedly cheap attempt to haul a title word into the conversation does help expose the limited 
capacity of metaphor to excite new insights. In this case, “bedrock”, “articulation” and “frontier” all 
conjure a sense of boundary that is a fact of analysis, not of nature. Zoom in closely and it becomes unclear 
where the rock ends and interface begins; zoom in still further and a whole new domain opens up that 
makes previous versions of boundary fuzzy and then wrongheaded. Defined in terms of boundary, bedrock 
is thus a consequence of resolution. As with bedrock, one needs a coarser level of resolution to see English 
traditions as having unambiguous edges—the level of a social class, for example, or a government 
legislative institution, or a court system, or even an individual who gets stereotyped as a monolith incapable 
of internal contradiction or capacity to adapt. 
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pervasive reach of the paper in early Upper Canada, my purpose is simply to 
glimpse the kind of inertia just mentioned: moments when tradition and 
prescription emerge as traction between divergent standpoints, habits, impulses 
and interests, with consequences to all parties. It is in such moments of traction, 
collected in these chapters and considered in aggregate, that the harmonics of 
dwelling are constituted. 
 A benefit of focusing on early issues of the paper is relative visibility of 
governmental purpose: through proclamations, speeches, official notices, 
statements of laws and other government business, early issues of this 
government publication were front-loaded with official standpoint about what 
society was and how it was to be achieved. These basic legal, social and moral 
building blocks would be especially clear in early issues for the same reason 
structure is most obvious in the building stages of any endeavor, when not yet 
obscured by facades, refinements and the blinding effects of established routines. 
An example of this clarity, which we’ll study shortly, is Simcoe’s proclamation in 
the inaugural issue, which charges the new population to uphold proper 
conduct, and to be vigorous in addressing those who don’t. In view of this clarity 
and urgent sense of moral purpose, the words in these issues are hardly what 
Kesterton (1967:9), looking at the emergence of early newspapers in Canada, 
characterizes as “a pallid, neutral, harmless sheet without any vital role to play in 
the social and political life of the community.” 
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 Conspicuous lack of rival local papers no doubt enhanced this clarity of 
purpose. Not only was the Gazette the first newspaper in Upper Canada, it 
remained so until the appearance of the Kingston Gazette in 1810. Compared to 
later years, especially the newspaper boom time starting in the 1920s, absence of 
rivals ought to have translated into greater readership. It does not follow, of 
course, that everyone was reading or even talking about this newspaper. There 
were rivals—papers from Quebec, Albany, Philadelphia, Boston, and through 
these, excerpts from papers overseas—but none of them were local.58 
4.1.1  Assessing audience 
 A defining aspect of any paper, of course, is its audience. In the absence of 
subscription lists, which might indicate names of subscribers and perhaps some 
clue about their occupations or other demographic details, guesswork and 
generalization become overextended in suggesting concretely whom the paper 
reached in its early years.59 For the present purpose, however, which is to show a 
serious attempt by the new government to reach a wide audience with its 
moralizing publication, a good starting metric would be level of literacy at the 
time. Although contents would not be limited to readers in an oral-based society, 
                                                 
58 Ironically, what early issues of the Gazette were particularly short on was local news. And for news from 
elsewhere, it depended almost entirely on other newspapers. 
59 Even if one had a full list of subscribers, of course, it would not reflect actual numbers of people who 
accessed the newspaper, since a single copy would disguise differences in sizes of household, and also a 
practice, perhaps common, of passing copies among friends or acquaintances. Such a list would provide 
merely a minimum number which actual readership could be assumed to exceed. 
97 
 
     
 
literacy at least estimates the size of conduit through which literary contents 
entered society. 
 Scholarship on colonial North America distinguishes two basic prongs of 
literacy, namely reading and writing. As Monaghan (2006) observes, the two 
were not merely different, but helped distinguish both gender and class given 
that writing was usually taught only to boys, that it involved a substantial 
apprenticeship (unlike reading, which could be taught at home), and that it thus 
selected for gender in filling some of the most publicly respectable jobs. More 
basically, notes Monaghan (404), it was a job-related skill whose gender-based 
teaching supported a pervasive idea that girls were to be groomed for life at 
home rather than out in public. Materials to teach writing, she adds (408), were 
also relatively expensive and hard to find, which would have further entrenched 
a gender divide where expensive resources in materials and tutelage for public 
vocations were largely reserved for males.60 Monaghan and Saul (1987:88) point 
out, moreover, that writing was really about penmanship rather than anything to 
do with composition, which also sets it apart from notions of the “printed” word, 
as one reads coming off the press at the office of the Gazette. So we must be clear, 
first, that as far as perusing pages of the Gazette is concerned—as far as assessing 
its “audience”—writing is irrelevant. 
                                                 
60 Monaghan further notes (406) that tutelage in writing sometimes, and increasingly into the 1700s, 
included girls as well, but that gender distinction remained obvious. Also see Koehler (1980) for a general 
discussion of associations between responsibility and power on one hand, and gender on the other, in 1600s 
New England. Even given a rise in the admission of girls into some town schools, differentiation of schools 
themselves helped resist change to the underlying gender role status quo. Schools that boasted tutelage in 
Latin, which Monaghan calls the true hallmark of a grammar school, were tightly restricted to boys. 
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 Regarding reading literacy, several basic difficulties challenge the use of 
signatures and marks as measures of literacy and illiteracy, respectively. The 
assumed importance of the signature in assessing capacity to read follows from 
sequence of instruction: reading was always taught before writing, so it is argued 
that any amount of writing, including a signature, presumes a fair grasp of 
reading.61 With the mark, one senses that lack of more definite evidence relating 
to reading ability has sometimes lead to hopeful over-interpretation. One 
indication that the relation is at least uneven, and possibly quite misleading, is 
that different studies that examine the use of marks for overlapping geographical 
area come up with dramatically different results. Looking at a sample of three 
thousand wills signed in colonial New England, Lockridge (1974) estimates that 
from the mid 1600s to the late 1700s, male literacy rose from 60% to around 90%, 
while female literacy, always lower, rose from 31% to only 46%. A study by 
Auwers (1980) focuses more narrowly on Windsor, Connecticut but expands 
source material to include deeds as well as wills, and shows that female literacy 
during the same interval rose from 27% to about 90%--on a par with men. Brown 
(1989:12), also looking at colonial New England, goes even further (though 
without reference to hard numbers) in suggesting that by the late 1700s, virtually 
all the Anglo-American population—men and women—were literate; by the 
early nineteenth century, he says, “difference between male and female literacy 
                                                 
61 For an overview of argument for and against the validity of signatures as measures of reading ability, see 
Kaestle (1985). 
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rates became negligible”. Such discrepancy shows that estimates may depend 
closely on the specific population being sampled, and also on the kind of 
documents used: if wills may be skewed by loss of a steady hand with which to 
write or by making the will before literacy got acquired later in life, deeds may 
be skewed in the other direction if regular prosecution of deeds encourages 
some, as Magnuson (1992:103) suggests may have been true of merchants and 
craftspeople in Quebec, to learn rudimentary writing for purely business reasons. 
Transacting a narrow bit of business, especially if routine, may not have required 
or motivated full literacy, either reading or writing. There is a further danger, 
suggested by the generalities of Brown’s language on one hand and the 
concentrated availability of data in urban centers such as Boston on the other, 
that urban data gets used to represent much broader areas, including hinterlands 
that had far fewer schools and, as a result, fewer opportunities for girls in 
particular.62 Boston, by comparison, would have been ahead of most curves in 
New England. 
 Another challenge to using the mark as indicator of reading literacy, 
demonstrated for England of the seventeenth century by Spufford (1981) and of 
the eighteenth century by Nueberg (1971), is that many women who made their 
mark (or chose to) could, indeed, read—popular fiction at any rate. This raises 
yet another issue with estimating literacy. As Davidson (1986:59) observes, one 
                                                 
62 In Boston, for example, private tutors were readily available to teach writing to girls after usual business 
hours. Such opportunity, Monaghan (409) notes, would have been far less common or absent altogether in 
the hinterland, where even elevated social class could not have pulled a tutor from a hat. 
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must understand reading literacy not as something one has or lacks, but as 
something that can be acquired to many different degrees: being competent 
enough to read community postings about events, sales and runaways, or even 
popular fiction, does not mean the average person could read the treatises of 
John Locke. 
 Beyond these general problems in estimating literacy are problems specific to 
populating a new province with migrants from multiple directions. One major 
source of influx to the region, especially after the American Revolution, were 
Loyalists from New England, for which previously mentioned estimates, if 
vague, are at least germane. Another population source, invited in modest 
droves during the first years of the new province, was areas of Quebec that 
became Lower Canada. Literacy estimates once again depend heavily on urban 
data, mainly the use of signatures or marks in marriage registers. From that data, 
Magnuson (1992) suggests that by 1750, with few exceptions, all professionals, 
administrators, civil servants and military officers were literate; that artisan 
classes, for whom literacy was less critical, measured over 50%; and that the 
lowest classes—“commoners” is his word, which he associates mostly with rural 
parishes—had almost no ability to read or write. He notes that literacy varied 
also by gender—a detail that goes unelaborated in his study but is reflected, 
perhaps, in the singling out of “male” occupations for literacy tests.  
 Another source of immigration to Upper Canada was Ireland, heavier in the 
later 1700s, and especially after the 1798 uprising. On one hand, Fallon (2005) 
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notes an explosion of printing presses and publications in Ireland after 1750, and 
a concomitant rise in general literacy. Once again, however, literacy was uneven 
between urban and rural areas and between classes, and the political hardship, 
food shortages and high rents that many immigrants left behind, as well as the 
loathsomely poor conditions and oppression they assumed at the other end, 
suggests that immigrants during this time may have represented the lower end 
of a general literacy statistic. 
 Reading literacy between and among waves of immigration to Upper Canada, 
then, potentially varied to extremes. This adds to the difficulty of attempting 
hard estimates of literacy in any place, which soon founder on intervening 
uncertainties, from how to interpret a signature or mark, to questions about how 
specific waves connected back to educational circumstances and opportunities 
back home. But the discussion is sufficient nonetheless to grant that literacy, 
while varied, was both considerable and on the rise, particularly in larger 
population areas that the Gazette would have targeted. It must have been above 
the province-wide average in the early years in both York and Newark, the early 
homes of the Gazette printing office: not only were these the two main urban 
centers, but there was a predominance, Hulse (1993:v) notes, of government and 
military officers and their families to precisely these towns. We have seen that 
such people were likely literate, no matter where they came from. 
 Another aspect of reception, noted in passing earlier, distinguishes between 
readership, narrowly taken to mean those who are literate and read the paper, 
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and audience, which includes those who read but also those who received 
contents by word of mouth. A community where illiteracy may still have been 
common, and which in the early years probably had limited access to printed 
materials, would have depended significantly on the oral transmission of 
information.63 And yet, perhaps Stabile (2002:11) overstates this in her attempt to 
put early newspapers in perspective:  
Such colonial towns were characterized by a strong oral culture. 
Information was shared in face-to-face encounters at common meeting 
places, such as assemblies, the market, the church, and the courts. In such 
an environment, the newspaper was of marginal importance for the 
transmission of information. 
Perhaps the relationship between orality and early issues of the Gazette was more 
synergistic than this passage portrays. Mandate as government mouthpiece was 
one aspect of this synergism: the paper existed to reach as wide an audience as 
possible, and especially in a strongly oral society64 this would not have been 
restricted to the literate, but passed along through established networks of 
information exchange. Indeed, the inaugural proclamation makes explicit use of 
such networks in commanding  
…that this Proclamation be publickly read in all Courts of Justice, on the 
first day of every Session to be held in the course of the present year, and 
                                                 
63 For discussions of oral culture legacies, see Brown (1989) and Stabile (2002). On cognitive shifts 
entailed in the acquisition of literacy and writing in particular, see Ong (1997), Havelock (1963), Chartier 
(1989), and Eisenstein (2006). 
64 The underlying assumption is that oral habits do not end with arrival of printed content and a capacity to 
read it, any more than residential pattern gets fixed by removal to so-called sedentary land. (Will cite 
Darnell’s accordion model—reference in a binder elsewhere this moment.) Aligning with the latter 
example, I would suggest that apparent emphasis on written forms in our own mainstream society gets 
dramatically overplayed. 
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more especially in such of His Majesty’s Courts, as have the Cognizance of 
Crimes and Offences; recommending the same, to all Christian Ministers 
of every denomination, to cause the same Proclamation to be read four 
times in the said year, immediately after Divine Service, in all places of 
Public Worship… (Gazette, April 18, 1793) 
Illiteracy was not a bar: illiterate members of every congregation would hear the 
document read multiple times from the pulpit, as would anyone attending court.  
 With limited choices for reading material beyond a Bible,65 a new newspaper 
was gold to the literate, both for its content (apart from government notices, it 
became a main source of intelligence about events overseas) and for the sheer 
pleasure that savoring written words could indulge. As Stabile observes 
(2002:86;90-91), eagerness for news tended to prompt close reading from the first 
word of a newspaper to the last. Monaghan (2006:410) echoes this view: “we 
should not underestimate the pleasure that even a limited reading ability can 
bring.”66 But the sudden appearance of a first newspaper would not rewrite 
overnight the social conventions of a time-tried orality; surely, the contents of a 
first newspaper became topics of everyday conversation too, to an extent not 
strictly or even closely tied to literacy. 
                                                 
65 Chief among these were the hornbook (a flat piece of wood covered with a page showing the alphabet, 
elementary syllables, and often a prayer, covered in turn by a transparent sheet of protective horn), and a 
psaltery (book of psalms), which were studied in that order on the way to reading literacy. After the 
psaltery, one studied the New Testament, and finally the entire Bible. Where this sequence of readings 
formed the core of reading instruction, one must understand reading as inseparable from religious 
education: to be a literate reader meant to be versed in Scripture. This inseparability of reading and religion 
puts the emphasis on Christian virtue in Simcoe’s Proclamation into perspective. 
66 She stresses this for colonial women in particular: “reading must have provided one of the very few 
sources of satisfaction that was not dependent upon others.” In most of her roles, Monaghan argues, a 
woman’s role was to look out for the welfare of others. 
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 And that is the main point here: although hard numbers on literacy are 
speculative to the point of irrelevance, it seems fair to conclude that reading 
literacy in early Upper Canada was considerable, for men and women, 
particularly in urban centers such as Newark and York; that it was on the rise; 
and that contents in the gazette spread well beyond the literate in any case. As a 
venue for solidifying a unifying, coherent notion of proper conduct at the front 
lines of diversity and difference, the Gazette had the promise of considerable 
reach into the population. 
4.1.2  Overview of the Gazette 
 With only a few gaps in publication, most notably during the War of 1812 
when American forces occupied York, the Gazette ran from 18 April 1793, when it 
first came off the press in Newark, until 7 April 1849, when the last printer, 
Robert Watson, died in a Toronto fire while trying to rescue type from the 
printing office.67 Soon-to-be Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe first stated 
his plans for the paper in a letter to Henry Dundas of the colonial office, in which 
he laid out seventeen requirements for his upcoming duties in the new colony. 
Establishing a king’s printer was number ten: 
                                                 
67 For a physical description of the newspaper, including size, pages, type face, format, and a general 
survey of contents by placement in the paper and percentage of space it occupied, see Stabile (2002:82ff). 
Generally meticulous in her details, Stabile suggests that one quirk in the paper was the location of local 
news, which she says comes early in the paper, immediately after the second masthead. At the paper’s 
inception and generally for the first few years, local news came near the end immediately following a 
heading called “Niagara”. Occasionally though, it moves earlier in the paper, and this oscillation is never 
explained by the editor. Placement at the end, as well as the relatively small size allotted to local affairs, 
may be another hint at the depth of oral practice: in a society that privileged face-to-face, local news would 
be old by the time it hit print. Appropriately, it was news from further afield, beyond the expedience of talk, 
that occupied most of the news. 
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The Office of Printer seems to be of the utmost importance. It has been 
suggested to me that by annexing the Office of Post Master to that of 
Printer a sufficient Salary may be annexed to induce some person to 
expatriate ... But a printer is indispensably necessary; and tho' many may 
be found to rush into crowded cities, 1 see no likelihood that any Person 
will venture into a Wilderness and yet in the Infancy of this Establishment 
He will be found to be of the utmost Utility.68 
One of the primary duties of such a printer would be circulation of an official 
newspaper through which the new administration would publicize laws, notices, 
proclamations and other government business.69 But the full original title of the 
newspaper, the Upper Canada Gazette, or American Oracle, reflects a paper that did 
double duty as a source of non-government news as well, which got printed at 
the government-supervised discretion of the printer. In a nutshell, other news 
could be printed if there was room after providing for government needs, and if 
it was not anti-British. An introduction from Louis Roy, the first of many printers 
for the newspaper, gives a sense of this scope in a column on the last page of the 
inaugural issue:  
 The Editor of this News Paper, respectfully informs the Public, that the 
flattering prospect which he has of an extensive sale for his new 
undertaking, has enabled him to augment the size originally proposed 
from a Demy Quarto to a Folio. 
                                                 
68 Letter from John Graves Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 12 August 1791. In Cruikshank, The Correspondence 
of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe 1:43, 48. 
69 This official function of the Upper Canada Gazette continues today as the Official Notices Publication 
Act, which authorizes The Ontario Gazette as the official and mandatory mouthpiece for “a) all 
proclamations issued by the Lieutenant Governor; b) all notices, orders, regulations and other documents 
relating to matters within the authority of the Legislature that requires publication; and c) all 
advertisements, notices and publications that are required to be given by the Crown or by any ministry of 
the Government of Ontario, or by any public authority, or by any officer or person. R.S.O 1990, c.0.3, s.2” 
Cited online 1 August 2010 at: http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90o03_e.htm 
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 The encouragement he has met, will call forth every exertion he is 
master of, so as to render the paper useful entertaining and instructive, he 
will be very happy in being favoured with such communications as may 
contribute to the information of the public, from those who shall be 
disposed to assist him, and in particular shall be highly flattered in 
becoming the Vehicle of Intelligence in this growing Province, of whatever 
may tend to its internal benefit and common advantage. In order to 
preserve the Veracity of his paper, which will be the first object of his 
attention, it will be requisite that all transactions of a domestic nature, 
such as Deaths, Marriages, &c. be communicated under real signatures  
This sounds fairly open, but we’ll see momentarily what happens when the 
intelligence this paper flatters itself to report casts the slightest aspersion on 
anything British. 
 Before turning to more specific issues of conduct, it is worth a pause to 
contemplate the movement of news at the time, so tough to imagine from the 
view of getting impatient when an internet link takes an extra few seconds to 
load. But then, they were actually used to letters and news taking a month or 
three to cross the Atlantic, plus extra time to go overland, plus still more time to 
set a printer and produce copies before spending even more time to deliver 
them. Just to put that general image into hard numbers, the following list 
compares the date of publication for an issue of the Gazette, and the original date 
of publication for news borrowed and reprinted from another newspaper. 
Gazette publication date                                    Source publication date 
May 2 February 23, Philadelphia 
 February 15, New York 
 March 2, Virginia 
 March 28, Quebec 
May 16 December 17, London 
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 February 7, London 
 November 19, London 
June 13 May 20, Philadelphia 
 May 7, Philadelphia 
 March 16, London 
 May 16, Quebec 
July 4 June 13, Albany 
 April 1-6, unsourced 
 April 4, letter from “Lisle” 
These are typical delays for news from afar: news from south of the border takes 
a month or more on average, and never much less, while news from overseas 
adds at least a month. These delays are often compounded, of course, as the 
paper one borrows from borrowed it in turn from a previous source. One article 
in the May 16 issue of the Gazette credits an extract from a New York paper of 
April 8, which dates the story in turn back to January 22. The May 2 issue credits 
a New York paper dated February 15, for a story first put into print on December 
15. And so on. The surface-level surprise with timing is local news, which is 
almost always dated the same day as publication of the current Gazette. This 
seems to be merely conventional, however, and not a measure of how quickly a 
printer could speed through the laborious process of type-setting. 
4.1.3  Matters of conduct 
 Returning now to the explicit, government-sanctioned purpose of the Gazette, a 
key function of the paper was to provide guidance in Christian morality. 
Inaugural readers could have no doubt of this, given the “Proclamation for the 
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Suppression of Vice, Profaneness and Immorality”70 which covered half of the 
first page of the first issue (and several issues following). The proclamation, and 
by extension the paper, intended to set the bar for moral conduct in the province 
by 
causing all Laws made against Blasphemy, Profaneness, Adultery, 
Fornication, Polygamy, Incest, Profanation of the Lords Day, Swearing 
and Drunkeness, to be strictly put in Execution in every part of the 
Province. 
Only by having in mind the Manual’s (387) declaration that Christianity is part 
and parcel of the law of England, and also the interdependence of Christian texts 
and literacy, does one appreciate the force of this statement. Breaking these laws 
of the land was also an assault against God, whether one was literate or not. The 
web of connections between secular acts, religious overtones and English laws 
would seem to be reinforced by figuring in the religious rigors of acquiring 
literacy through Christian texts. To the extent that readers would relish every 
single word, as Stabile suggests, enunciation of these violations may have 
sounded more like warnings than prescriptions.  
 Those enforcing these laws, moreover, while not themselves pretenders to 
divinity, become agents of God when human law acquires both God’s 
endorsement and alignment with God’s purpose. This heady combination of 
God’s purpose and God’s agents ought to manifest as minimal violations of the 
law, or failing that, as efficient material and governmental force that violations 
                                                 
70 See full document in Appendix B. 
109 
 
     
 
would mobilize. But in Chapter 3 we saw it manifest as Bartholomew Tench 
instead, who could hardly have been less effective at imposing anything, or even 
at communicating across differences of status, official role, religion, and the 
pesky legacy of English-Irish relations. Apart from status, which enforcement 
was supposed to enable, not inhibit, none of these elements were scripted to have 
anything to do with doing one’s job as magistrate, which suggests a serious 
oversight with the script. Basically, it ran into a real world, and that world 
pushed back. And for all real-world people, from Tench to Joel Skinner to the 
higher-ups forced into damage control, this was frontier morality. On the 
frontiers between different people—in the traction one might describe, always 
slightly after the fact, as issues, quarrels, obstinacy, confusion, or even moments 
of agreement—morality (or other dimensions of conduct) isn’t the stable, 
impervious, safe space of an abstracted system of thought, but its confrontations 
with people and situations that upset perfection enough for one to notice. 
Morality is struggle, not complacence. What deflected the struggle between 
Tench and Skinner the way it unfolded was not merely the bald fact of 
concreteness, though, but the tenacity with which Tench in particular stuck to his 
idealized model and overlooked contingency. That is to say, Tench’s was also an 
impossible task, a consequence of sending a real person out to do an ideal 
person’s job. Ideals never account for messiness, the kind of messy, street-level 
differences Tench ran into. As long as he stuck to that ideal job, he was bound to 
fail.  
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 To take another example of conduct, this one more directly about loyalty to 
Britain,71 consider again the introduction by Louis Roy, the first printer at the 
Gazette office, in the inaugural issue. Specifically, he states his hope that the 
paper may become “the Vehicle of Intelligence in this growing Province, of 
whatever may tend to its internal benefit and common advantage.” Internal 
benefit and common advantage, read through the government eyes monitoring 
this paper, meant loyal to Britain or at least in no way disparaging of it. This 
implicit mandate is evident on one hand in letters from the lieutenant-governor’s 
office to subsequent printers who strayed, and also, when push frequently came 
to shove, in preferring an untrained printer who was loyal over a trained one 
whose loyalties were suspect. An example of the former is a letter to Gazette 
printer Gideon Tiffany from E. A. Littlehales, Simcoe’s secretary, expressing 
concern for the paper’s political tone. Tiffany is therein advised that “your own 
good sense and discretion in a variety of intelligence would induce you to prefer 
that, if it appears to be true, which is most favorable to the British government.” 
In case that hint was missed, Littlehales adds, “You may depend upon it that 
while you act uprightly and industriously, you will meet with His Excellency’s 
support”.72 Working relations only got worse,73 and Tiffany received further 
                                                 
71 Everything overlaps not far below the surfaces of difference, though. 
72 Littlehales to Tiffany, April 1795. In Cruikshank, Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves 
Simcoe, vol.3, p.346. 
73 On December 14, 1796, Tiffany inaugurated the “letter to the editor”, where he lamented how travelers 
through Upper Canada found its roads “the worst in the world”. And in the November 9, 1796 issue, while 
it was not directly anti-British, Tiffany’s enthusiasm for American settlement progress, and Upper 
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reprimands until 1797 when, perhaps serendipitously, he got removed after a 
court conviction rendered him ineligible for public office. Frustrated with a 
printer playing too loose with the paper’s mandate and its role as a vehicle for 
Upper Canada, the lieutenant governor hired one Titus Simons, who could claim 
no experience but whose loyalty could be trusted because he was a trained 
soldier and the son of a Loyalist. Tobin (1993:9) notes, as a further preventative 
measure in wake of the Tiffanys, the Executive Council seized more direct 
control of how government content got presented, notably by moving 
proclamations and other issuances from the lieutenant-governor’s office back to 
the first page, where it had been in the early issues. 
 As with the blowup between Tench and Skinner, the way to understand these 
confrontations between the Tiffanys and the Lieutenant-Governor’s office is that 
loyalty, as anything measurable or perceptible, was the traction of individuals in 
the midst of argument. It didn’t have to be argument, of course, but it was, and it 
had to be something noticeable. Loyalty is decisiveness, not blandness or the 
invisibility of someone so consonant with a canon that no one sees. Loyalty, as an 
issue, had to be made issue of, one way or other. Also as with Tench versus 
Skinner, what propelled this issue of loyalty along was misperception of one side 
by the other. In Littlehales’ 1796 letter to Gideon Tiffany, reprimanding him for 
even thinking of starting up a second, monthly paper on his own—for being 
                                                                                                                                                 
Canada’s status as “an infant settlement” by comparison, is just the kind of slant that put hives of bees in 
the bonnets of British officials. 
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independent minded—one cannot escape a sense that Tiffany had meant the 
proposal very differently than Littlehales heard it.  
In reply to your request relative to the publication of a Monthly Magazine, I am to 
observe it of the greatest importance that the Provincial Statutes should be printed 
and promulgated; in consequence of which, your whole attention is to be devoted 
to this most necessary object in conformity to the instructions of the 12th of 
November delivered to you by Mr. Clark…. His Excellency is much surprised in 
seeing an advertisement in the late Gazette you published respecting the scarcity 
of paper in Albany. I am therefore to signify to you, that in future, you must 
procure paper from Montreal, as you will not be permitted to get it from the 
United States.74 
Given that Tiffany thought to write and ask about the project before proceeding, 
he does not appear secretive or scheming against his bosses, whether one defines 
them as individuals named Simcoe and Littlehales or the abstract institutions of 
British colonialism. Neither, judging from his ad in the Gazette, was he secretive 
about where he procured paper. He was apparently being pragmatic at a local 
level, and creative with his energy, which got understood as some willfulness 
against the colonial project. This grip between individuals skew to each other, 
what Sahlins might have called a poorly working misunderstanding, was the 
dynamic that drove matters onward, and eventually, as Tiffany started to dig in, 
toward his dismissal from the job. 
4.2  On female conduct 
 Discussions have already shown that prescriptions about conduct, such as a 
proclamation about the suppression of vice and immorality or the feeble 
                                                 
74 Littlehales to Tiffany, 15 February, 1796. In Cruikshank, Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John 
Graves Simcoe, vol.4, p.196. 
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enforcements of a magistrate intent on stopping work on the Sabbath, point to a 
much wider, messier world than imagined in the tidy ideas of a self-serving elite 
class. This disparity between neat models and a complex and often unruly world 
finds no exception in constructions of gender: on one hand, female gender was in 
the midst of reconfiguration as part of a new delineation of public versus private, 
and as part of this shift, women also found themselves granted innate moral 
superiority that must be protected—in no small part by the walls of a dwelling 
house. On the other hand, a bounty of evidence in the Gazette, from notices of 
elopement to outcry over a widow remarrying too soon to daring jokes about 
prostitution, make it impossible to imagine a society of well-heeled Sunday-
school girls and matrons. The paper’s prescriptive wisdom spoke for some 
women and to others, some of whom apparently had better things to do than 
listen. 
 Morgan (1996:8-11) says much the same in carving out her study of gendered 
language in Upper Canada. Notions of male and female, she notes, were neither 
monolithic nor static but actively and unevenly contested. But it should also not 
be dismissed as merely political. The collected tropes of separate spheres, for all 
their monolithic hegemony, “were not just intriguing literary devices but were 
instead strategies whereby relations of power were produced” (10). To assign 
fault to inherent gender asymmetries in those relations of power would be to 
ignore “men and women of particular socioeconomic, religious, racial and ethnic 
backgrounds . . . division of society along the lines of public and private was an 
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important conceptual framework” (10). For many men and women, in other 
words, relatively monolithic division of society into public and private made 
sense, gave a baseline for everyday life. 
 Using a few examples from the Gazette, my point is to note the prominence of 
that view, and to note that while it was strategic rhetoric of power, it also 
genuinely informed the lives of many. At the same time, it smacks of wayward 
presences that gave the push to conformity traction, made it visible and 
necessary. 
 On the well-heeled side, the December 14, 1796 issue laments the passing of a 
true exemplar of conduct, one Mrs. Hamilton who possessed qualities that 
marked her “a patron to her sex, endeared her as a wife, a mother, daughter, 
sister, friend; and all to whom she was thus relate, knew well the affection and 
diligence with which she discharged their several duties.” Two weeks earlier, on 
November 30, a poem targets the younger woman for whom Mrs. Hamilton 
served as an ideal. Charting a course into the future, the poem compares 
morality and purity to images of lilies and roses, and their loss to decay, 
repulsion and debasement. The image comes as a nice supplement to October of 
that year, where a separate section on “Subjects for the consideration of ladies” 
stresses delicacy of comportment, and also bashfulness—especially potent when 
leavened with modesty. 
 Consistent with the rise during this time of conduct literature devoted to 
women, and the eclipsing of counterparts aimed at men, the Gazette has precious 
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few entries on male conduct specifically. The following advice, from the April 5, 
1797 issue, is characteristic of those that do: “Military skill and prowess have 
their honor, as well as use, and the laurels, gathered in the field of battle, have 
been thought to compose the fairest crown that can adorn the head of man.” The 
author goes on to celebrate the true greatness of self-command, calling it 
…a road to glory that lies open to all. For tho’ it be not in every one’s 
power to ascent the slippery steep of honor, and reach the summit of a 
statesman’s or a hero’s fame; yet all may figure in the less splendid, but 
more substantial virtues of the Christian, and the man who cannot rule 
another’s spirit, may secure the far nobler attainment of the two, I mean, 
that of ruling his own 
The passage, perhaps having a little cake and eating it too, simultaneously exalts 
the place of a public statesman and a brave, violent hero through reference to 
laurels, fairest crowns and slippery steeps, while calling self-mastery the greatest 
virtue of all. This mastery is not embroidered with fine distinctions like delicacy, 
bashfulness, modesty, never mind lilies or roses, which perhaps fits the 
encompassing role of that mastery as head of a household too. It is in another 
address to women, dated March 24, 1798, that refinements of male character get 
spelled out: 
The Young Lady’s Choice 
 
Let the bold youth, who aims to win me, know, 
I hate a fool, a clown, a sot, a beau: 
I loath a sloven, I despise a cit, 
I scorn a coxcomb, and I fear a wit. 
 
Let him be gentle, brave, good-humored, gay; 
Let him, in smaller things, with pride obey; 
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Yet wise enough in great ones to command— 
Produce me but the youth, and here’s my hand. 
She is thus channeled toward her ideal event of marriage by identifying ideals in 
a man. A gendered difference of implicature is telling: he gets told what to do if 
he wants her hand; it is merely assumed, as the unsaid (and unquestioned) 
foundation of what does get said, that she is to marry. This difference of voice, 
the one active, the other passive, is perhaps augmented further given that the 
author of the poem is male. 
 Counter examples are striking both as glaring presences when they occur, and 
for the consistency of their negative image. In notices of elopement, it is difficult 
to fathom just how the words were read in the day—perhaps it reads too much 
into a vastly different society to judge both parties as coming off badly. Surely 
though, given the explicit moral mandate of the newspaper, one does not find a 
‘patron to her sex’ in reading, 
Elopement! Whereas Deborah my wife, eloped from my bed and board, 
and improperly resides with Charles Wilson, of this town inn-keeper, and 
refuses to return to the duties of her family; all persons are therefore 
strictly forbidden harboring or trusting her, as I will pay no debt that she 
may contract or occasion. Signed, Daniel Buchner 
These notices—and they abound—occur in the advertising section of the paper, 
so they are not mandate in the same sense that body text might be. But we 
observed in the exchanges between Tiffany and Littlehales that the government 
did monitor content closely, including Tiffany’s ad for paper from the wrong 
source. 
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 These few examples, which can be supplemented by others throughout the 
early Gazette, are sufficient to show the basic tone behind constructions of proper 
female conduct. They existed, in positive and negative forms, as advice, anecdote 
and poetry, for the same reason Simcoe’s proclamation did: it was needed, not 
because that is how women consistently were, but in an effort to make them that 
way. 
4.3  Survey as settlement 
 Inscribing survey lines on the land did not, directly at least, make someone 
Christian, or moral, or female or male, or define their activity as domestic or 
public. They did not condemn burglars to the gallows or equate women with the 
home. But the deeper point of this chapter is that organizing frames intended for 
one narrow purpose resonate elsewhere, and thus help solidify categories of 
thought shared among different social activities and spaces. Or as Morgan 
(1996:11) notes about gender, “Even when . . . concepts of power are not 
‘literally’ about gender, as in the areas of politics, diplomacy, and the military, 
notions of masculinity and femininity structure perceptions and become 
‘implicated in the conception and construction of power itself’.” Boundary lines 
delimiting a settlement ghost onto the boundary separating society from 
wilderness and human from beast. The logic of containment implicit in survey 
lines, which first delimit and then subdivide, thus facilitate contrasts between 
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public and private, inner and outer, own lot versus other, home district versus 
others, and home province and nation versus foreign. 
4.3.1  David Smyth 
 Turning to surveys themselves, the following map was produced in 1799 by 
David Smyth, the first Surveyor General of Upper Canada.  
 
A Map of the Province of Upper Canada, David Smyth, 1800 
 
Figure 1. Map of the province of Upper Canada, David Smith, 1800 
Cited online on 17 April 2011 at: 
http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/detail/RUMSEY~8~1~4040~330018:A-Map-of-the-
Province-of-Upper-Cana. 
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 One salient feature of this map is the array of straight lines and ninety-degree 
angles, two things not found in any natural landscape. By definition, therefore, 
these lines neither describe nor respond to the physical features a surveyor 
encounters. As with ink on paper, they impose structure on the blank canvas of 
geographical space, within which places have yet to be eked out. It is abstraction, 
not geography on the ground, which has agency. This assignment of agency is 
even more overt in the written description that accompanied the map, Smyth’s A 
Short Topographical Description of His Majesty’s Province of Upper Canada in North 
America (hereafter Topographical Description). The work opens with a quote from 
the Constitution Act of 1791, which set boundaries for the new province of 
Upper Canada by establishing 
…the following line of division…To commence at a stone boundary on the 
north bank of the lake St. Francis, at the cove west of Pointe au Bodêt, in 
the limit between the township of Lancaster and the seigneury of New 
Longueiul, running along the said limit in the direction of north 34 
degrees west, to the westernmost angle of the said seigneury of New 
Longueiul; then along the north-western boundary of the siegneury of 
Vaudreïul, running north 25 degrees east, until it strikes the boundary line 
of Hudson’s Bay, including all the territory to the westward and 
southward of the said line… (Smyth 1799:1-2) 
It is the abstract line, not the landscape, which gets the active voice throughout. 
The line runs, and runs along, and even more emphatically, strikes. Indeed, the 
thing it strikes—which thus acquires the ontology needed to receive a strike—is 
another abstract boundary line. This pattern of animating geometrical abstraction 
continues in Smyth’s own words as he describes a new province 
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bounded to the eastward by the United States of America; that is, by a line 
from the 45th degree of north latitude, along the middle of the river 
Iroquois or Cataraqui, into lake Ontario; through the middle likewise, 
until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake 
Erie; thence along the middle of the communication into lake Erie; 
through the middle of that lake, until it arrives at the water 
communication between it and lake Huron… (1799:2-3) 
So the description goes, continuing beyond this quoted passage until the 
province is fully bounded. In the above quote, the expanse of land and landscape 
defining the new province is once again passive, bounded by a line whose active 
voice continues through the various lakes and rivers, striking and arriving as it 
goes. Where in the previous quotation this line struck another line, here it strikes 
a communication by water—a laborious phrase for river. In this moment, a 
specified, located physical feature of landscape gets identified through its 
subjugation to abstraction, which uses not only a juxtaposition of passive and 
active voice, but also, again, the force of the word strike. 
 Where these boundary lines do not strike, meet or arrive at lakes, rivers or 
Hudson’s Bay, they extend overland with utter disregard for features on the 
ground. To the north, for example, the province is bounded by “the 49th parallel 
of north latitude, extending due west, indefinitely” (3). The category of 
indefiniteness, no less than the formal purity of a line of latitude, treats landscape 
as a blank, like a piece of paper. Tellingly, the only spot on this definitive 
circumnavigation of the province where the surveyor’s abstractions do bow to 
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local overland features is when they run into seigneuries near Pointe au Bodêt. 
Describing and acquiescing to previous settlement logic, Smyth observes: 
The object of dividing the province of Quebec at a stone boundary, in the 
cove, west of this point, was apparently in order that the seigniorial 
grants, under French tenure, should be comprehended in the province of 
Lower Canada, and that the new seigniories or townships, which were 
laid out for the loyalists, should be within the province of Upper Canada; 
the said stone boundary being the limit between the uppermost French 
seigniory (Mr. De Longueiul’s) n the river St. Lawrence, and the lower 
new seigniory of Lancaster… (1799:6) 
Consistent with the logic of settlement and laws of property based on 
improvement, it is not wilderness, but transformation of landscape through 
human labor, that produces a capacity for land to push back. Here, it pushes to 
the point of sending a survey marker out into the cove. 
 Perhaps one shouldn’t make too much of these metaphors, for surely even 
surveyors, to say nothing of those toiling to carve settlement from a wilderness 
lot, would bump up against the physical conditions of a landscape. Settlers and 
administrators may be driven by ideology, but that doesn’t mean blind: no one 
following a line would fail to notice themselves walking into a marsh, or off a 
cliff and into Hudson’s Bay. In this sense the land does push back; indeed, 
several of these “lines”, such as the banks of a lake or edges of a bay, do 
correspond to the landscape. But these metaphors that animate the abstract do 
deserve notice. First, this pattern of rendering abstraction active and landscape 
passive is part of a deployment of resources, including everything from people, 
money and institutions to writing materials and language, specifically intended 
122 
 
     
 
to make and administer land as property. If theoretical strains of the last few 
decades have generally debunked any notion of innocent language, the point is 
especially clear when patterns of language overtly mimic the logic underlying 
settlement and property: a basic argument of this dissertation is that ideology 
gets entrenched as much through harmonics as by institutional formulations and 
their administration. 
 Another aspect of this description and the acts of surveying and settling it 
implicates is its stress on containment. The new province was constructed, 
literally, from the outside in. The Constitution Act of 1791 begins by setting the 
boundaries of Upper Canada before addressing internal divisions. Further 
divisions, such as the renaming of districts and creation of counties in 1792, were 
later developments. Smyth’s topographical description, as we saw, mirrors this 
chronology by setting the frame first and then moving to internal features. In 
volume 1 of his Statistical Account of Upper Canada, Gourlay presumes the same 
frame by insisting: “In sketching the Geography of the province, the first object is 
to ascertain its Boundaries” (1822:17). Natural as may seem this idea of 
establishing a perimeter (of a place, of a discussion, of an artistic canvas) before 
getting into details, it is certainly not the only way to imagine or encounter land, 
or to manage coexistence among different societies. Native groups had done 
without these abstract divisions for centuries, and even today, land negotiations 
between Native groups and the mainstream government often run aground on 
precisely this issue of how land is framed: as a blank sheet to be overlain with a 
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conceptual grid imported from somewhere else, and then transformed into 
something useful and valuable; or as something where decisions about land use 
derive from accumulated experience in and stories about that (rather than any 
other) place. A corollary, appropriate to the present discussion about early 
surveys in Upper Canada, is that even land that is imagined and constructed as 
empty, or as wilderness whose value resides in transforming it, is first of all 
made, and made in place. Although vitally connected to a legacy of experience 
overseas and in other colonies, Emptiness, and the abstractions—survey lines, 
lines of latitude, ninety-degree angles, rectangles, arpents, feet, lots, townships, 
districts—used to define, bound, and then fill a blank sheet is not a contrast to 
place but a specific practice of place. It is the concrete engagements of and in land 
that activate, make manifest, and to a degree reproduce the prior experience of 
land for the newcomers.  
4.4  Preliminary sense of domestic 
 As a segue into the next chapter, it will help to gain a basic sense of what 
domesticity means. Despite careful parsing of a dwelling house in the Manual’s 
definition of burglary, which we visit in the next chapter, that source offers only 
a fuzzy notion of “domestic”, and it must be inferred rather than read more 
directly. But the resulting approximation of physical and social space is a place to 
start: it provides something to expand later through a look at conduct literature.  
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 In defining a dwelling house for the crime of burglary, the Manual uses the 
word “domestic” (the only variation of the word) just once, stating that 
“…though a person actually sleep in the house for the purpose of protecting it, if 
such person forms no part of the domestic family of the owner” (1835:85), then it 
is not a dwelling house. We saw last chapter that sleeping in a house or room 
had the capacity to transform it from a space that is merely owned or rented into 
a dwelling house. But this passage says that only family members (not defined) 
have this transformative capacity. This clarification in the Manual is part of a 
scenario where the owner of a house has moved in furniture with the intention of 
residing there, and has even taken meals and conducted “all the purposes of his 
business” there. It remains just a house, however, and not a dwelling house, as 
long as “neither he nor any of his family ever sleep there” (85). Domestic is thus 
aligned squarely with family, at least the sense of family relevant to the space of 
a dwelling house. The strictures about sleeping and family also apply to rented 
spaces. A rented shop, not connected internally to the owner’s dwelling space, 
does not become the dwelling house of the tenant “when neither he nor any of 
his family sleep there.” 
 A striking aspect of this domestic family space of dwelling, just observed in 
repeated stress on the absence of internal communication, is how completely the 
Manual severs it from surrounding spaces. The crime of burglary, crucial here 
because its careful description of dwelling is what defines the crime, does not 
apply to a rented shop that is attached to the owner’s dwelling house as long as 
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“there is any internal communication” between the two, “though there may be a 
separate entrance from without to the part let off; as where the communication 
was formed by means of a trap-door and a ladder, which were seldom used, but 
the trap door was never fastened.” And when the owner of a house rents out 
rooms in a house but “continues to sleep in it, no part of it then can be so severed 
by being let off to a tenant or a lodger, as to become a separate mansion-house.75 
But tenants do get to claim a dwelling house when “that which was one house 
originally comes to be divided completely into two separate tenements, and 
there is a distinct outer door to each, without any internal communication” (84). 
 This isolation of dwelling and domesticity from surrounding spaces recalls 
Blackstone’s distinction between relative and absolute duties, which consigns the 
latter to the realm of individual (internal) governance because they are beyond 
the observation by anyone else. “Let a man be ever so abandoned in his 
principles”, he wrote, “or vitious in his practice, provided he keep his 
wickedness to himself” (I, I, 120). This limiting of law to what is publicly 
observable simultaneously removes private spaces—individual conscience and 
private dwellings alike—from direct legal scrutiny and adjudication. In Chapter 
2  I also suggested, extrapolating from Blackstone’s distinction between 
individual rights and duties, that the purpose of a legal system that does not see 
beyond the social, but nonetheless depends conceptually on the existence of 
                                                 
75 This is a synonym for dwelling house. Except in some uses where mansion seems to allude to the 
considerable size of a house (not the case in this passage from the MM), the two terms are completely 
interchangeable. 
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independent human nature, is to safeguard that essential but invisible nature of 
the human being through acute attention to what can be observed—public 
conduct, in other words. 
 A powerful symmetry emerges when this invisibility of private space, its 
coincidence with domestic space, invisibility of intention and conscience (these 
can only be inferred), and invisible human nature converge on a dwelling house. 
Symmetry only grows by adding notions of female to this mix, for in addition to 
a widely reproduced social alignment between gender, domestic space and a 
canon of domestic duties specific to women, there lurked a perceived natural 
alignment too. On one hand, a view of female “sensibility” that was promoted in 
philosophy and also through medical science’s theory of nerves, held that 
women were more fragile, excitable, and susceptible to deflection, and thus unfit 
for public offices. At the same time, women were believed to possess elevated 
morality that made them ideal guides in the raising of children. Ignoring the 
contradiction of a mind at once pure and overly susceptible to wayward impulse, 
this twin view of women as unfit for public roles and as naturals in child raising 
lodges them rhetorically in domestic space both through stated roles, and also 
because these roles were supposedly “natural”. Women thus endured a double 
naturalization as domestic beings: domestic space mirrored the invisibility of 
human nature, as protected through an emphasis on visible conduct; and 
women, as marked beings, were naturally suited for domestic space and duty in 
ways men were not.
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Chapter 5 
Of Beasts and Burglars 
 
 In 1792, a black slave in Detroit was convicted and executed for burglary. By 
various eyewitness accounts and his own admission, Josiah Cutan had broken 
into a private dwelling during the night and tried to make off with some smoked 
skins, rum and pelts. As noted previously, British law governed criminal cases in 
Upper Canada, and by its terms burglary carried the death penalty without the 
benefit of clergy.76 To the extent that necessary facts were evident and that Cutan 
confessed to the crime before justices of the peace, the case was open and shut. 
 This chapter explores the outcome of the Cutan trial and specific words used to 
express its verdict, and more fundamentally, the conceptual framing required to 
understand them. In doing so, it revives overtones sounded in previous chapters, 
especially those related to prescriptive practices in the Gazette, to land surveys, to 
literature on conduct, and to ambiguous overlap between domesticity as family, 
as nation, and as woman. This resonance with other practices in other social 
arenas adds social depth to a charge of burglary, and in particular to words 
uttered during sentencing that did more than just end a life.  
                                                 
76 Benefit of clergy was originally a privilege by which clergymen, insisting that secular courts had no 
jurisdiction, could be tried for certain crimes by the more lenient ecclesiastical courts instead. Over time 
this benefit transformed into more general leniency for certain first-time offences. Especially heinous 
crimes, including burglary, never enjoyed this benefit: clergy were not granted exemption from secular 
courts, and the later sense of leniency for first offenders did not apply. For a general history of the benefit 
of clergy, see Baker (2002) and Briggs (1996). 
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 If a guilty verdict on any high crime might be unusually visible against the 
humdrum of everyday legal process, two (probably related) features make this 
trial particularly apt as an exemplar. Cutan’s conviction produced the first 
execution in newly minted Upper Canada; and where most cases are hard to 
extract as anything but brief summaries that name the accused, the charge, 
whether it was returned guilty or not and if so, the sentence, this one is readily 
available in full transcript form today, which suggests that its potential 
significance was both understood at the time and maintained since. 
 This case thus offers an extraordinary window on the inscription of proper 
conduct in and by legal institutions in the new province. The trial inscribed 
conduct “in” legal institutions by entering the case as precedent, as something 
that helped comprise the larger text of legal procedure where it could then be 
accessed, reviewed and applied in subsequent cases. It was an inscription “by” 
legal institutions in two senses. First is the straightforward sense that legal 
understandings of crimes and culpability, what counted as evidence, what got 
heard or not, and how a trial proceeded from its opening before a judge through 
to conviction, sentencing and execution, had real force as expressed in grounded 
social life. In the language of a previous chapter, this response to a specific crime 
by means of a trial, and its culmination in the pronouncement and execution of a 
death sentence, revealed a world that pushes back. This pushing also exposes 
some of the stark asymmetries upon which social order was predicated. If 
asymmetry is generally presumed as an engine of both inertia and 
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transformation in practice theory, the asymmetry between the compelling force 
of law and those being compelled to the gallows is extreme by any measure. A 
second, more elusive sense of law’s “agency” emerges during the verdict and 
sentencing. The event becomes precedent for the future, but it is also an act of 
interpreting backward, of retroactively condoning a specific interpretation of 
everything that led up to that moment. In that condoning, previous trouble 
spots—inconsistencies, unanswered questions, alternative interpretations, doubts 
about particular bits of evidence—are brought into line with the fateful narrative, 
not by resolving them, but by overruling them. 
5.1  The transcript 
 Before jumping into the case itself, it is worth pondering for a moment what 
may get lost across distances of time and context, and through elisions or 
inaccuracies between the full detail of a trial and what ends up in a court 
transcript we read today, even a full one.  
 One filter in transcripts from the court of Oyer and Terminer (hereafter O&T), 
where Cutan was tried, is pervasive use of the third person. There is no first 
person pronoun, even in the reported speech of witnesses. To take just one 
example, the witness Ralph Pilon, after being sworn in, conveyed “That about 
the eighteenth day of October last he resided at Mr. Robert McDougall’s”, and 
that after being called upon to assist in catching a thief, “he went up into the 
garret of M. Joseph Campeau’s store”, and that “on his way to the said house he 
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observed a bag lying on the road.” (Cited in Riddell (1926:350-351). If it weren’t 
already clear that Robert’s “I”s are being transformed into “he” and “his”, the 
“said house” would confirm that even a complete transcript does not mean 
verbatim quotation: all original words, including points of reference, have 
experienced the purifying, objectifying rigors of court language. The second 
person (you) occurs in three spaces: when the court asks a witness what “you” 
saw, heard, etc.; when the judge, charging the jury to go and deliberate, reminds 
them that the conditions of burglary “have been proved to you”; and at the very 
end, when the judge tells Cutan, “you have been found guilty by the Verdict of 
twelve impartial men”. The complete absence of “I”—even in the judge’s 
sentence, which gives all agency to “the Court” and “the Law”—evokes the 
instrumentality of the court system, and the role of individuals, however notable 
in name, as place holders in that system.  
 Looking beyond this transcript and case to other charges and verdicts in the 
O&T court, correlations between a given crime and its sentence are flexible to the 
point of seeming haphazard. Crimes also attach to various, sometimes competing 
descriptions, as when petit larceny is the charge even though the amount stolen 
exceeds the threshold of grand larceny, or vice versa. Perhaps sloppy record 
keeping is a culprit here, which Holloway (2009:PC) suggests was common in the 
early days. Or it may be, as Philips (1992:258) notes for evidenciary standards in 
a modern courtroom, that sometimes “fact finders do arrive at rather different 
decisions regarding guilt from those reached by others who have access to 
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different information and who are unconstrained by the interpretive principles 
imposed on the jury.”77 In any case, a problem for modern interpretation is that 
reasons for all this variance in O&T transcripts tend to go unstated. And when 
real detail comes along, as it does in Cutan’s trial, it entices partly because lack of 
comparative cases make it provocatively hard to see in context. And perhaps, as 
Stoler (2009:1) shows for other archives, hazy associations also suggest that tight 
order and coherence were something of a conceit anyway. It would be a conceit 
on the part of early Upper Canadians whose faith in the social order they arrived 
with blinded them to local difference and a need to adapt; and perhaps a conceit 
on the part of someone looking back on the early province without an 
appreciation for the extent to which the administration did adapt, or try to, even 
if those efforts sometimes backfired. Without access to greater detail, there is 
little way to distinguish among these possibilities.78 
 What I hope to suggest is that while consistency in sentencing remains elusive, 
and so too an algorithm for the legal implementation of proper conduct, Cutan’s 
                                                 
77 A myth of the legal system, in other words, seems to be that having access to the same information ought 
to produce a consistent verdict. In this trial, before sending them off to deliberate, William Roe reminds the 
jury of all the facts in the case, and stresses that they are both unambiguous and sufficient for a guilty 
verdict. Thus instructed, he tells them to “consider of the evidence under this view of the Offence, and 
discharge your consciences”. This myth of facts speaking only one way, of course, ignores any sense in 
which facts are made rather than found, and can be made differently given different social, cultural, 
historical, personal backgrounds. 
78 For further description of such adjustments to the laws of England, see various acts in the Upper Canada 
Statutes, including: Fourth Session of the Second Provincial Parliament, Chapter I, p.86ff: An Act for the 
further introduction of the Criminal Law of England into this Province, and for the more effectual 
Punishment of certain offenders; and First Session of the Third Provincial Parliament, Chapter IX, p.95: An 
Act the better to adapt the establishment of the Court of King’s Bench to the present situation of this 
Province. This fine-tuning of criminal procedure to suit Upper Canada, of course, reflected the more 
general purpose of statutes in Upper Canada, which reacted to what worked and what didn’t, and adjusted 
to perceived trajectories of change. On the emergence of separate identity in Upper Canada relative to 
British colonies more generally, see Esten (1836). On the specific adaptation of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries to the situation in Upper Canada, see Leith (1864). 
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trial and especially sentencing nonetheless give an indelible sense of society’s 
edges and also its core, an image that remains consistent even when—perhaps 
especially when—people sometimes get away with murder. 
5.2  The case 
 The basic facts of the case were not much disputed. Court Clerk William Roe, 
who administered this trial,79 sums them up in sending the jury off to reach its 
verdict: 
It is proved… that on the night of the 18th of October last the Prisoner 
about midnight was found in the road near Mr. Campeau’s house. That 
upon alarm of noise several persons assembled and found the Store of Mr. 
Jos. Campeau broke open. They found a Carpenter’s adze near it, the 
supposed instrument of the violence, and merchandise and liquors were 
found near the store, but not proved to have been the property of Mr. 
Campeau—but the Prisoner’s voluntary confession on examination before 
two Justices proved in evidence to you, shows beyond a doubt that he was 
guilty of the Burglary, that he forced the door with the adze, and took 
away the articles described. (Riddell 1926:352) 
Trial minutes report that Cutan attempted brief resistance but was quickly 
overcome, and cooperated thereafter, even giving his voluntary confession to 
two justices of the peace. 
 A few matters of procedure in the trial do raise questions. We have Cutan’s 
confession, but it seems slightly odd that the stolen items were not otherwise 
proved to have been the property of the store owner, who helped with the arrest 
                                                 
79 Until legislation in 1797 regulated the practice of law in Upper Canada, most advocates and judges in the 
court system were not trained lawyers but received their legal appointments based on social standing. At 
the time of Cutan’s trial there were but two trained lawyers in the entire Western District: William Dummer 
Powell, who officially presided in this court, and Walter Roe, who administered Cutan’s trial. 
133 
 
     
 
and was presumably available to identify his own goods. Cutan also did not 
speak French. Called upon to speak in his own defense in the courtroom, the trial 
minutes record Cutan’s response: “That true it is, Mr. Campeau took him 
prisoner; that he does not understand French, but that in answer to any questions 
he proposed to him, he may have said yes” (Riddell 1926:351-352).80 If he didn’t 
speak French, did he have a sure grasp of what he was saying yes to? What does 
it mean, in a court that seeks hard facts, that he “may” have said yes? Is it 
possible that a lone man, captured by foes, and also a black slave in the custody 
of angry white men, might say whatever was necessary to appear conciliatory in 
the moment? These questions are not even raised; indeed, there is no mention of 
what exact questions Cutan was asked by these speakers of French. Surely these 
are critical, commonsense things to be sure of, especially in light of Blackstone’s 
stress on the extreme care and caution required in assigning a death sentence.  
 The important thing, though, is not whether such matters, pressing as they may 
seem from the hindsight of today, were overlooked two hundred years ago, but 
whether the trial seemed fair in its day. Certainly the weight of evidence was 
against him. The stories of multiple witnesses who helped apprehend Cutan 
match well in their details. Most importantly, Cutan confessed, and in the judge’s 
summary of the trial that confession evidently trumped the curious lack of 
confirmation from the owner of the stolen objects that they belonged to him. The 
                                                 
80 This use of the third person to render what otherwise appear to be direct quotes is consistent throughout 
the transcript. Whether a conscious strategy or merely conventional, this practice helps evoke a realm of 
objectivity, and of law’s objectivity in particular. 
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objects were “not proved to have been the property of Mr. Campeau—but the 
Prisoner’s voluntary confession on examination before two Justices proved in 
evidence to you, shows beyond a doubt that he was guilty of the Burglary”.  
Perhaps this confession seemed even more secure given that one of the justices of 
the peace who obtained it was John Askin, a man widely known for his fairness 
and unimpeachable character. Askin declared under oath that the confession was 
“voluntarily taken before him, without any threats or menace being used to 
obtain the same” (cited in Riddell 1926:351). One can understand how a jury of 
the time supposed this evidence to be sound, especially when corralled toward a 
guilty verdict by the judge’s preamble. From that view, a different outcome 
becomes hard to imagine. 
 As for the charge, Roe reminds the jury that burglary was “a breaking of a 
dwelling house by night with intent to commit a felony.” This definition is 
echoed in the June 11, 1803 edition of the British American Register, in section 
XVI, which defines crimes against habitation (the other being arson). Burglary, it 
adds, is a felony without clergy: it permitted no leniency even in the case of a 
first-time offender. Roe goes on to clarify what is meant by a dwelling house: 
“…to give to every house the character of a dwelling house, it is enough that the 
owner or someone having charge of it, sleeps in the house usually, although he 
may board elsewhere” (cited in Riddell 1926:352). Campeau’s house, which was 
also his shop, clearly qualifies since he slept there usually. Given the hour of the 
deed, burglary it was. That leaves only the sentence, and in British law at the 
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time, conviction usually carried a death penalty, mitigating circumstances 
notwithstanding. There is also no sense in early O&T court records that slaves or 
other disenfranchised groups got slapped with more severe sentences, or that 
acquittals were less likely for them.81 Winks (1971:50-51) concurs, noting that 
three years later, in Powell’s court, a Negro slave was again convicted of 
burglary and sentenced to death, but that Powell then appealed to the 
Lieutenant-Governor for a reduced sentence owing to the slave’s tender age. 
Winks names further examples—two slaves of William Jarvis, the provincial 
secretary of Upper Canada, who stole gold and silver from his desk; a black 
woman who killed her husband by stabbing him in the temple with a fork—
where the consequence was not summary punishment but the process of a full 
and fair trial. 
 I do not, then, seek to explain why the trial went the direction in did in Cutan’s 
case: it apparently did so because in the eyes of the time, evidence took it there, 
and the conviction got a death sentence because burglary usually did.82 Rather, I 
                                                 
81 It is worth suggesting, of course, that social disenfranchisement may predispose an individual against the 
law to begin with in ways that social entitlement would not. Existing court transcripts from O&T, 
unfortunately, do not usually indicate the social station of the accused. Riddell (1923:252) points out that 
while the laws of England did not dictate lesser legal rights to the slave, the deeper problem is that English 
law at that time didn’t recognize the slave at all; there was no relevant category of person, which meant that 
even basic rights did not apply: right to marry, rights as a parent, rights to property, even the right to 
security and life. And yet, the fact of a trial by jury in Cutan’s and other cases and apparent even-
handedness in the judge’s interpretation of evidence suggests that whatever rights, or lack of them, may 
have been practiced off the legal stage, slaves—as humans if not slaves—were legal persons in the eyes of 
the law. 
82 Justice Powell’s appeals for leniency on a sentence, when they occurred, tended to come after the fact, in 
letters to the Lieutenant-Governor. Viewed in light of character sketches by Riddell (1924) and Mealing 
(2000), one understands Powell’s respect for his role as judge, which was not to sway the sympathies of a 
jury but to preside over a fair hearing. This did not preclude his own intercession afterward, however, 
where he believed he had access to information that warranted special consideration. By keeping these 
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want to look at the burglary and trial from the standpoint of the conviction and 
sentence as Roe handed them down. From a pragmatic point of view, this was 
the moment that retroactively defined what had gone on before, and the moment 
when Cutan, as exemplar, served social order and set legal precedent. 
5.3  The sentence 
 At the end of the trial, a guilty verdict now in hand, Roe asked Josiah Cutan if 
he knew any reason why the court’s sentence should not be carried out. Cutan 
said no, so Roe continued: 
Josiah Cutan, you have been found guilty by the verdict of twelve good 
and impartial men upon the plain evidence of your own voluntary 
confession in addition to other proof, of having committed on the 
eighteenth of October last a burglary in the house of Jos. Campeau. This 
crime is so much more atrocious and alarming to society as it is committed 
by night, when the world is at repose and that it cannot be guarded 
against without the same precautions which are used against the wild 
beasts of the forest who, like you, go prowling about by night for their 
prey. A member so hurtful to the peace of society, no good laws will 
permit to continue in it, and the Court in obedience to the law, has 
imposed upon it the painful duty of pronouncing its sentence, which is 
that you be taken from hence to the gaol, from whence you came, and 
from thence to the place of execution, where you are to be hanged by the 
neck until you are dead. And the Lord have mercy upon your soul. (Cited 
in Riddell 1926:354-355.) 
On the surface, this verdict assigns a sentence of death, according to law, and 
thus brings an end to Cutan’s life. But Cutan is not merely sentenced to death 
here. This summation of issues at stake in the trial could not be starker in its 
                                                                                                                                                 
actions separate from the trial, his intercession concerned the sentence, not the evidence in trial, which thus 
remained intact and unquestioned. This clarity supports Mealing’s suggestion that “Powell’s primary 
loyalty was always to English common law, not to the provincial administration of Upper Canada.” (Cited 
online on 4 March 2011 at http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?BioId=37202.  
137 
 
     
 
construction of a boundary between society and wilderness, and its distinction of 
inhabitants on either side. By conflating the nighttime hour of the deed and a 
moral/geographic space antithetical to society, and through liberal use of feral 
imagery, Cutan is banished to a savage world outside society where wild 
animals and burglars at night ranked the same. On the civilized side of the 
boundary is a particular sense of order, embodied in the productive trades of the 
jurors (armourer, trader, shoemaker, schoolmaster, innkeeper, tailor, cooper, 
joiner and blacksmith). Order also resided in the sense of fair procedure available 
to everyone including criminals, and the institutions of law and government that 
serve the interests of settlement. 
 This condemnation of Cutan appears in greater relief when compared to a 
second verdict in the early court. Jack York, another black slave, convicted in 
1800 of a burglary in the court of William Powell, also landed a death sentence, 
but the crimes of which he was convicted suggest a whole different level of 
threat, for in addition to forcible entry by night, the conviction included assault 
and rape of the home owner’s wife, itself a capital offense. The violence of York, 
in other words, far exceeded that of Cutan, who stole but attacked no one as part 
of the felony defining his actions as a burglary, and he cooperated fully leading 
up to and during the trial. He also did not “fly for it”, or flee, which Riddell 
(1926:457) notes carried formal punishment of its own: even if the accused is 
proved innocent and acquitted, having fled would mean he loses all his 
possessions. As a slave, of course, Cutan had no possessions anyway, but this 
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definition of flight and its consequences state formally that he did nothing to 
aggravate his situation in the eyes of the court. In one sense, a death sentence on 
both cases erases what seem like important differences about willingness to 
threaten someone’s life. Given English law’s basic protection of a person’s right 
to security, as explained by Blackstone, it is not surprising that the defining 
element of another capital crime, robbery, is fear, threat against a person’s sense 
of security. On the amount taken in a robbery, the Manual (401) notes that “The 
gist of the offense being the force and terror used by the offender, the value of 
the property stolen is quite immaterial.” Clarifying this relationship between fear 
and violence, the Manual goes on to explain: 
The principle of robbery being violence, some degree of force is therefore 
necessary to constitute the offence. But there may be a constructive, as well as an 
actual force, for where such terror is impressed on the mind as not to leave the 
party a free agent, and in order to get rid of that terror he delivers his money, this 
is a sufficient force in law. And where actual violence is used, there need not be 
actual fear, for the law will presume it. (402) 
Just this element of force, fear and duress, it turns out, define the crime of rape, 
of which Jack York was convicted. Defining rape as “carnal knowledge of a 
woman, forcibly and against her will, and above the age of ten years”, the 
Manual (374) stresses: “The offence of rape is in no way mitigated by shewing 
that the woman at last yielded to the violence, if such her consent was forced, by 
fear of death or of duress.”83 In a system where fear and terror have such 
                                                 
83 Rape of a girl under age ten bypasses the issue of consent since, “by reason of her tender years, she is 
incapable of judgment and discretion” (374). Issues of consent aside, the Manual adds that rape could be 
difficult to prosecute because “it is an accusation easily to be made, and hard to be proved, and harder to be 
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capacity to raise the punishable stakes of violence, it seems odd to punish Cutan 
and York equally. If one of these two sets of actions deserves condemnation as 
beastly, the perpetrator removed from society as an irredeemable menace, it 
would have to be Jack York. On the other hand, given a death sentence already in 
place for Cutan, there’s no way to kill Jack York more. The real question 
becomes, what was it about Cutan’s actions that required a death sentence? In 
what way does Roe’s extreme recasting of the event make sense? 
 Two threads of British tradition can help illuminate the specific feral metaphors 
Roe uses: the practice of dueling, represented in the early court of O&T by four 
cases, and the practice of game hunting. Both practices had deep histories 
overseas, and in certain important circles at least, were at least tolerated both 
socially and legally.  
5.4  Murder and other honorable pursuits 
 In early Upper Canada, killing someone deliberately without formal warrant 
(such as the execution of official duty) was murder. And killing doesn’t get more 
deliberate than in the practice of dueling where a challenge is planned, sent out, 
received, and responded to according to a strict set of protocols. In the eyes of the 
law, killing by a well-planned duel was therefore murder, plain and simple. The 
telling thing is how often the law had to make this point, which starts to sound 
                                                                                                                                                 
defended by the party accused” (375), even though the manual also calls rape “a most detestable crime”, 
one that “ought severely and impartially to be punished with death.” Even though these difficulties may 
have made some rapists more bold, the present point is not about success in prosecuting rape, but 
understanding the crime and its severity in principle. 
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very much like a twist on Schneider’s sign: “No Murdering”. One finds the sign 
sprinkled through court transcripts and repeated throughout the Manual, 
apparently necessary because this murdering was such a problem. And it was a 
problem, in part, because the law kept excusing it. 
 There is no mistaking the official letter of law on dueling. Under the category of 
murder, the Manual says, 
And the law so far abhors all dueling in cold blood, that not only the 
principal, who actually kills the other, but also his seconds, are guilty of 
murder, whether they fought or not; and the seconds of the party slain are 
likewise guilty, as accessories (224). 
Indeed, even to initiate a challenge to a duel was an indictable offense, and as the 
Manual makes clear, “it is no excuse that the challenge is given under 
provocation, for if one person were to kill another in a deliberate duel, though 
under provocation, it would be murder in him and his second” (99). 
Deliberateness is key in both cases, suggested in the first by use of the term “in 
cold blood”. For as the manual also states, 
If two fall out upon a sudden occasion, and agree to fight in such a field, 
and each of them go and fetch his weapon, and the one killeth the other—
this is no malice prepensed; for the fetching of the weapon and going out 
into the field, is but a continuance of the sudden falling out, and the blood 
was never cooled; but if there were deliberation—as, where they meet the 
next day,—nay, though it were the same day, if there were such a 
competent distance of time, that in common presumption, they had time 
to deliberate—then it is murder. 
We thus see, on one hand, the extreme care taken to delineate capital offenses, 
given what is at stake in the issue of human rights; and on the other, the 
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unambiguous legal stress on deliberate duels as a high crime. This position also 
finds support in Blackstone, who says 
…where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder, thinking it 
their duty as gentlemen, and claiming as their right to wanton with their 
own lives and those of their fellow creatures, without any warrant or 
authority from any power either divine or human, but in direct 
contradiction to the laws of God and man…the law has justly fixed the 
crime and punishment of murder on them and on their seconds also. 
(Commentaries vol. 4, p.199) 
This stance appears again in courtroom transcripts where the presiding judge 
advises the jury not to misunderstand the legal status of duels as murder. In the 
high-profile trial in 1817 of Samuel Peter Jarvis, who had killed John Ridout in a 
duel after Ridout issued a challenge, Chief Justice William Dummer Powell 
repeats the legal status of dueling as murder, and adds that the charge “was 
anything but indulgent to the prisoner and was so considered by most of the 
persons in Court” (Powell, cited in Riddell 1915:170). In another high profile trial 
of August 9, 1833, where John Wilson stood accused of killing Robert Lyon in a 
duel, Chief Justice Beverly Robinson again stresses the legal terms of the offense 
and the criminality of dueling.  
 At the same time, actual exercise of the law, where murder by duel is almost 
always acquitted, tells a different story, one not just apparently contrary to the 
letter of law but also, measured as outcomes, above it. As Chief Justice Robinson 
goes on to say, “The practice of private combat has its immediate origin in high 
example, even of Kings. Juries have not been known to convict when all was fair, 
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yielding to the practices of Society” (Robinson in Riddell 1915:175). One could 
hardly find bolder or more official encouragement to read between the lines of 
law. As with most cases of duel, returning an acquittal took only minutes. 
 This stress on fairness echoes another passage in the Manual, which warns that 
No breach of a man’s word or promise, no trespass either to lands or 
goods, no affront by bare words or gestures, however false or malicious or 
aggravating, will excuse him from being guilty of murder, who is so far 
transported thereby, as immediately to attack the person who offends 
him, in such a manner as manifestly endangers his life, without giving him 
time to put himself upon his guard, if he kills him in pursuance of such an 
assault, whether the person slain did at all fight in his defense or not (224, 
my emphasis). 
Read against both the preceding passage about a hot-blooded duel and the actual 
practice of acquitting cases of murder by duel, even those where the blood had 
time to cool, the above passage says two things: first, that despite the law’s letter, 
breaches of word or promise, trespasses on lands or goods, affronts by word or 
gesture, especially when false, malicious or aggravating, can fairly (if illegally) be 
responded to with violence as long as it is pursued correctly; and second, none of 
the unofficial legal exemptions about responding to an offense apply if you catch 
the opponent with his guard down. This core issue of honor and fairness 
continued centuries-long traditions and published codes of conduct relevant to 
dueling.84 From that perspective, the astonishing outcome would have been 
conviction. But what was it, exactly, that made this killing outside the law 
                                                 
84 See, for example, the 25 rules of the Code Duello, drawn up in Ireland in 1777 to govern the practice of 
dueling there. This code was adopted, with some variation, in England and continental Europe, and with 
greater variation in America. Also see The British Code of Duel: a reference to the laws of honor and the 
character of gentlemen, Knight and Lacey, 1824. 
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acceptable, while stealing some rum and a few furs nets a death penalty, even if 
it was at night? Any logic motivating the duel only looks more forceful to the 
extent that public resentment over duels was starting to smolder even in the 
earliest years of Upper Canada, and could only have made rationalizing 
exceptions to law increasingly difficult.85 
 Halliday (1999) explains this tendency in terms of class exceptionalism: the 
duel reproduced ideals of conduct among the aristocracy where it originated, 
and to protect the duel through legal attitudes and precedent meant to protect 
the class. Supporting that view, Halliday notes a conspicuous representation of 
both duelists and social elite among the judiciary where the matters related to 
dueling reached their legal outcomes. Perhaps it is not surprising that juries on 
                                                 
85 The Niagara Constitution, dated January 11, 1800, published unveiled disgust for a deadly duel that had 
occurred just eight days previous, in which John Small, Upper Canada’s first Attorney General, shot and 
killed John White, Clerk of the Executive Council. It could be, as Halliday (1999:47) observes, that Small’s 
subsequent failure to win two elective offices, and his wife’s isolation by the upper crust (it was she who 
charged John to defend her honor), went beyond coincidence. It may be, though, that at least some of the 
growing antipathy to dueling expressed a sense that its honor code—its sine qua non—was eroding and in 
some cases missing altogether, transforming the dueling field from a place of honor into a place for 
hotheads to blow off steam. What seems to have stoked public ire over the Small/White duel was, above 
all, a trivial Mrs. Small’s role in starting the feud by insulting Mrs. White at a public gathering in 1799, and 
then insisting her husband defend her honor when she received insults in return from John White. Even if 
duels of the day still proceeded according to a code, and had honor at their core, the genesis of this one in a 
pointless cheap shot may have made the whole affair appear base. Chamberlain (2009) suggests a broader 
foundation for this interpretation of the Small/White duel in looking at the entry of middle classes into a 
practice that had been reserved for gentry, and the shift from a practice of honor to one whose “honor” 
aligned with party politics and journalism. From the standpoint of the honor code, whether one really 
supported dueling or not, a rising generation of climbers, pretenders, opportunists and hotheads must have 
looked particularly vile. The problem with such pretenders, from a gentry point of view, is that they have 
the class-defining relationship between deed and character exactly backward. The presumption is that just 
as a gentlemanly character is inclined toward gentlemanly deeds, so gentlemanly deeds point to a 
gentlemanly character. From the perspective of higher status, the difference of where deed points in each 
case is between a character that is of a gentleman, and one that is of someone who would pretend. 
Gentleman status, although evidenced through actions, is fundamentally essentialist in its basis in heredity, 
or the “common law of GOOD BREEDING” as the Code of Duel (8) calls it. (Capitals in original.) One 
might speculate that this insistence on visible trappings of character that are independent of deeds, such as 
details of lineage summed up in “good breeding”, took aim at precisely this capacity of innate character to 
hide from view, and even to masquerade. 
144 
 
     
 
such trials were reasonably well stocked, though not exactly stacked, with social 
notables, at least judging from the honorific suffix “Esq.” on the jury list. Serving 
on a jury was a public duty, after all, one that included but was not actually 
about trials related to dueling.86 It is much less clear which, among that elite, 
actively supported the idea of duels in a climate of growing grassroots antipathy 
for the practice.87 A charge of protectionism by certain of the jury’s elite, while 
plausible, remains speculative without a record of who was inclined to vote 
which way, and how efforts at persuading dissenters on the road to a verdict 
might have played out. Without that evidence, it is too easy for suspicions of 
protectionism to transmogrify into implausibility of them being anything other, 
and thus to homogenize a class. Being elite doesn’t mean homogeneous: in 
Chapter three we noted significant dissentions among the governing elite over 
when to impose, adapt or abandon administrative and social practices imported 
from England. 
 In broad brush, though, there is undoubtedly correlation between dueling and 
class, even if imputation of motives to individuals in a courtroom remains hard. 
The British Code of Duel (hereafter Code of Duel), a formal codification of British-
derived dueling practices as of its publication in 1824, locates dueling in “the 
higher orders of society, including legislators”, among whom “it is indirectly 
                                                 
86 If specific appointments to a jury for cases of duel were intended to produce sympathy and an acquittal, 
that correlation is not revealed in O&T court records directly. 
87 William Dummer Powell, a steadfast opponent of dueling and the practice of excusing it, was notably 
absent from the trials of John Small and David Sutherland. Duty at the time may simply have fallen on a 
different judge for these trials, but it seems possible that protectionism, if it occurred, also extended to 
arranging for a more sympathetic judge. Regarding antipathy for dueling, see also footnote 10. 
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proclaimed contrary to law” (Code of Duel:4). It also observes that rules prohibit 
dueling across classes: “…if a gentleman (by blood, or coat armour) detracted 
from another the combat should be allowed; but if a clown, he was to take the 
remedy of legal action… a clown might not challenge a gentleman to combat 
because of the inequality of their condition” (1824:14). Chamberlain (2009:17) 
backs this up with mention of cases where a duel was refused because the 
challenger was not of the appropriate class. 
 The larger problem with an explanation of protectionism, though, is that it 
misses a deeper point about what kind of conduct dueling represented. 
Whatever kind of class collusion may have helped protect an unlawful practice 
after the fact of a duel, and no matter the class habits and expectations that may 
have helped stoke temper and indignation toward a duel, reducing it to the act of 
solidifying class ignores everything individual that made heads hot enough to 
fight and to risk being killed. By looking inward to the courage and stakes of 
individuals rather than outward to collective maintenance of class, one observes 
ideals that ramify well beyond the narrow circles of duelists or even aspiring 
duelists. Indeed, they help bring Cutan’s crime of burglary into sharper focus.  
 The Code of Duel (43) notes that in a previous age in England, swords were the 
weapon of choice among duelists. This detail receives mention “only to mark its 
evils” in a new age that boasted dueling pistols instead. Two of these evils—the 
severity of wounds from a sword cut and the absence of any natural pause in the 
action that might open a chance for reconciliation—clarify that dueling by the 
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British code, while a form of combat, was not about fighting. At core, it provided 
an unambiguous, socially meaningful and loaded means of recovering from an 
insult or engaging a challenge: through the process of duel, the society of peers88 
who counted the duelists among its members deemed a grievance settled. We see 
this pragmatic dimension of dueling again in the Code of Duel’s description of 
shots to be fired: “Three fires should be the ultimatum in any case; any further 
reduces duel to a conflict for blood, or must subject it to the ridicule of incapacity 
in arms” (50). 
 A third evil of swords, though, and the first mentioned in the Code of Duel, is 
perhaps the most telling: swordplay easily exposes and exploits differences of 
skill level, whereas the code of duel does just the opposite. Dueling pistols were 
notoriously inaccurate to begin with, a great equalizer in itself. Acknowledging 
that some pistols are nonetheless superior to others, dueling weapons were to be 
inspected to ensure that “the same degree of excellence…be used by both 
parties” (45). The ritual of duel progresses through a series of further equalizers, 
carried out by the seconds. Pistols are examined for condition to preclude misfire 
of one, and each pistol is then loaded in the presence of both parties. The ground 
for combat is inspected to ensure no advantages on one side, like obstacles, line 
of sight, or location of the sun. Distance along that ground is then measured by 
pace, to a distance not less than ten paces but otherwise at the discretion of 
                                                 
88 This sense of a society of peers has no relation to today’s notion of a jury of peers, where peerage 
presumes common ground among people that class systems try to keep stratified. Juries at the time of 
Cutan’s trial, though, were not described as peers, but as “honest and impartial men”, which at that time 
entailed at least modest class standing. 
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seconds. Parties then agree to a firing signal, commonly the movement of a 
handkerchief. By its suddenness, the signal “prevents that decisive aim, which 
might give one party the advantage over another, and is always to be avoided” 
(48).89  
 From this perspective of meticulously orchestrated equivalence, the dueling 
code brings to mind Geertz’s observation of the Balinese cockfight: the closer and 
more equivalent the match, the deeper the play—or here, the more honorable the 
contest and courageous its participants, and the purer, therefore, its restorative 
alchemy. This heady brew of fair play and ultimate risk deserve emphasis, on 
one hand for drawing attention to the poignant, irreducibly personal dimension 
of dueling that gets elided from arguments about reproducing class in the 
courtroom. The weight of insult, progress through failed attempts at 
reconciliation, and finally, the intense fortitude to look death in the eye at just a 
few paces, have no surrogates outside an agitated individual psyche: not in a 
social class of peers or in the machinery of law. On the other hand, it was 
precisely the urgency of proper standing in the eyes of others that drove men to 
duel in the first place. This sense of standing, Fischer (1989:396-7) suggests, 
                                                 
89 In the duel between John Ridout and Samuel Peter Jarvis, Ridout acted out of turn and tried to get a shot 
off first, but missed his mark. He was then ordered to give Jarvis a free shot, which mortally wounded him. 
Based on the wound, the coroner inferred that death was instant, but a rumor spread that Ridout stayed on 
his feet just long enough to shake Jarvis’s hand, thus ending the quarrel before he collapsed (Halliday 
1999:56). Whether true or not, but perhaps especially if it isn’t, the case illustrates the restorative potential 
of a duel to those who fight them, but only as long as rules are strictly followed. Just as Ridout’s earlier 
misconduct by acting out of turn had damaged his reputation, his apocryphal swansong restored it by 
conforming to the code: in the case of a mortal wound, the Code of Duel (50) states, parties should not 
separate without mutual forgiveness. The “rightness” of this moment, even if fictional, would not have 
been lost on any jurors who valued the honor codes embedded in the duel, no matter what they may have 
thought of dueling more narrowly. 
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meant social death if lost. Perhaps that overplays things slightly, given the 
potential for recovering from a fall from grace, but an appropriate notion of 
standing certainly went beyond superficialities like vanity or pretense; excepting 
fools, those would be the wrong words to describe someone whose principles 
stood tall while facing down a pistol. As the Code of Duel puts it, 
While honour and dignity are the reward of virtue, any lapse of it that 
may tend to affect the character of Gentleman, is punishable by formal 
degradation, expulsion from peculiar association, and, ultimately, with 
loss of privileges, from society in general. A Dignitary is bound by the 
most solemn oaths, the perpetuity of which is supposed to render that test 
unnecessary to Peers, where required in inferior orders. These declare 
only upon honour… (9-10) 
This threat of lapsed virtue, combined with the sheer mass of worth and 
expectation loaded onto words—meaning and keeping to what one says—
suggests an extreme need for vigilance about action and reaction, about 
rendering virtue as deed. Or to take it a bit further, honor depends crucially on 
deeds to make it visible to peers, and remains unproven, hypothetical and 
possibly even pretentious without them. Honor, in other words, is extremely 
fragile and must be guarded as such. 
 Pretenders and pretensions notwithstanding, this code of honor, crystallized in 
deeds that accept mortal individual risk rather than insult, has strong overtones 
in the broader notion of virtue outlined by Blackstone (see Chapter 2) as being 
foundational to English law. To this degree, anyone with respect for common 
law notions of human rights and duties, and especially the law’s coding of what 
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it meant to act properly in the eyes of others (recall that being vicious and drunk 
out of sight was not a legal sin), would find something to admire in the 
principles governing duel, even if that admiration be tempered by loathing for 
the practice more narrowly. Given the deep history and inertia of the dueling 
code in a politically influential stratum of English society, and its importation 
into Upper Canada’s upper administrative echelons as English gentlemen took 
up positions of authority (Riddell 1916:165), it is not surprising that the code 
maintained influence in the new province. Judging by the ubiquity of acquittals 
and their overt contrariness to the letter of law, the laws of honor were held by 
the consensus of juries to be above the laws of England. Indeed, the Code of Duel 
makes this very point: 
…it is evident, that propelled on one hand by opinion, and but negatively repelled 
on the other by legal power, the principle of duel retains its full force, and while 
holden to be without the pale of law, possesses the most positive laws (5). 
 Beyond providing a sense of what the code of duel looked like “from the 
inside”, so to speak, two takeaway points in this discussion are, first, that the 
code held considerable sway at the legal level. From a practice perspective, the 
collusion of juries in producing acquittals (or negligible fines) for what the law 
calls murder does not suggest contrariness to and defeat of law, but the capacity 
of law, when implemented by living bodies rather than placeholders, to help 
constitute the place of duel and its embedded code of honor. In this sense, law 
did not, contrary to the Code of Duel, “negatively repel” the practice of duel. 
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Rather, by providing on one hand an official legal stance on a “crime” and set of 
legal rituals through its letter, and on the other hand, the fact of a jury whose 
power to deliberate in closed session and produce a verdict potentially at odds 
with that letter, introduced flexibility that enabled the exceptionalism regarding 
duels. This enabling was according to the scripts of all concerned, from juries to 
judges, with the possible notable exception of William Dummer Powell, whose 
opposition to the duel seemed more fervent and genuine than most. 
 The second takeaway point is that, while the practices of honor described in the 
Code of Duel relate to duel and duelists specifically, they have ringing overtones 
in notions of virtue and integrity that extend to society generally. And this brings 
us back to the sentencing of Josiah Cutan for a crime “so much more atrocious 
and alarming to society as it is committed by night, when the world is at repose.” 
The world does not repose: people do. This simple switch of referent reframes a 
crime against a person as a crime against civilization; or perhaps, limits the view 
of civilization so that violence against a person means everything. In the codes of 
duel and legal attitudes to it, we’ve just seen that attacking the person fairly lets 
you get away with murder, so it’s hardly surprising that attacking where and 
when they should be horizontal in bed with eyes closed won’t help the attacker 
in court. As in the duel, honor comes down to deeds. 
 The violence of intrusion by night emerges even more clearly in William Roe’s 
descriptions of a dwelling house as he sent the jury off to reach a verdict: 
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It remains only for the court to inform you that by a dwelling house alone 
being the subject of the aggravated offence of burglary, the law meant to 
secure to the subject the peaceable indulgence of rest by night, and that to 
give to every house the character of a dwelling house, it is enough that the 
owner or someone having charge of it, sleeps in the house usually, 
although he may board elsewhere. The being absent from the house on the 
night of the burglary does not diminish the offence, if you shall be 
satisfied that it was not abandoned…. You will consider the evidence 
under this view of the offence and discharge your consciences. (Cited in 
Riddell 1926:352-353) 
A dwelling house is thus more than just a place, a private residence. In the 
context of burglary, it is a constellation of place, ownership, and time of day, 
which together represent the circumstances of greatest vulnerability. To attack 
that would be to violate both deeply ingrained sensibilities about fair conduct, 
and the most basic conditions of a successful and safe society, both of which a 
proper duel upholds. 
5.5  Hunting and prowling 
 This fatal breach of honor is then linked to a wild beast of the forest prowling 
for prey, and each of these words suggest clear contrasts to the idea of a hunt, 
another strictly codified and honorable mode of killing. In British tradition90, 
from deer and boar hunting and then fox hunting after that, each possible object, 
subject and action are precisely defined and given its own special term. In the 
example of fox hunting, by this time replacing deer hunting abroad and also on 
the rise in North America, the action of “hunting” itself gets broken down: 
                                                 
90 Comparison to British hunting tradition is most directly relevant since we’re talking about British justice, 
but highly codified traditions of hunt had long histories through much of Europe by this time. 
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hunters “cast”, “draw” and “head” as their “hounds” (never “dogs”) “feather”, 
then finally “open” to give “tongue” to a “line”, trying not to “blank”, “heel” or 
“riot” meanwhile.91 On the receiving end of all this code and ritual is the fox, 
who is not prey, but “quarry”. Unless this quarry has luck, it will be driven to 
“covert” and ultimately “accounted for”, a privilege-driven euphemism for 
ripped apart by dogs. In the trial, the words “beast”, “prowl” and “prey” are 
merely used as quoted, not explained, so perhaps one shouldn’t overplay this 
comparison to a hunt. But three particular differences between the two deserve 
mention. First, precise terminology specific to a highly codified activity like the 
hunt creates its own conceptual territory that rules out substitute words: the 
“quarry” in a hunt is never “prey”, and the rich vocabulary of ways a huntsman 
can hunt do not include “prowl”. Given the previous discussion of honor, call 
the huntsman a “beast” and you have a duel on your hands. 
 Second, the relation between “wild”, “beast”, “forest”, “prowl” and “prey” on 
one hand, and membership in society on the other, is both mutually exclusive 
and starkly hierarchical. The very existence of the court, never mind Cutan’s 
death sentence, demonstrated that society stood in control and judgment of the 
beast. The two sides are also asymmetrical, with one side richly described 
through various trades among jurors, a complex court system, classes of 
building, multiple languages, unique personalities with their own names and so 
                                                 
91 See Ridley (1990), and Cannon (2002). For an anthropological view of fox hunting as ritual in England, 
see Howe (1981). For parallel terms used for hunting other kinds of game, see Cox (1928). 
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on. The other side is singular, “the wild beasts of the forest”. The plural on 
“beasts” only makes them generic when preceded by the article, “the”, which 
stresses that they’re all the same, that they must all be “guarded against” with 
the same set of precautions. This opposition, of course, resonates with a notion of 
progress that motivated the overseas journey and then settlement, with all its 
prejudices about what civilization entailed, what had to be done or changed to 
achieve it, and what the vision excluded. Settlement brought order and law to 
wildness, created contingently safe, productive space out of forests, and tamed 
the beast. Conversely, any member of society convicted of turning into beast got 
his membership revoked.92  
 Third, just as the duel was a practice of privileged classes, so the vocabulary of 
a proper hunt would reproduce a sense of class since the hunt was historically a 
class based activity. If that vocabulary was not itself used in the trial, I have 
suggested that awareness of it would have helped give the feral metaphors 
leveled at Cutan the oppositional force they had. It would be simplistic to say 
that even an implied opposition to hunting was about class protectionism, that it 
reproduced a ruling class in any simple sense. The noble classes among which 
the hunt first emerged as a distinguishing sport are not the same classes one 
                                                 
92 It is tempting to imagine this implied boundary between society’s inside and outside as a kind of 
markedness relation, specifically in a semiotic sense that Waugh (1982) distinguishes from the 
phonological approach first proposed by Trubetskoy and Jakobson. As with markedness relations, the term 
defined as “other” (in our case the beast) becomes internally undifferentiated: there is only one kind of 
beast, but many kinds of membership in society. Markedness relations are also hierarchical, and as Waugh 
points out, linguistic markedness does not exist in a social, political or conceptual vacuum, but in a world 
where all these elements resonate with and reinforce each other. For a general discussion of markedness in 
linguistics, see Battistella (1990). On semiotic and social ramifications of linguistic markedness, see 
Waugh (1982). 
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finds centuries later in a different country, where both the structure of rule and 
the emerging exigencies that needed ruling were different. Even in Britain, 
hunting eventually came to include many rungs below the royalty and 
aristocracy where it began, so dynamism of the acting subject would have to be 
accounted for in any case. On the other hand, if the specific identity of class 
structure and how it got shaped by new exigencies and players makes the 
reproduction of a specific class a complicated matter on the frontier of Upper 
Canada, perhaps the hunt and the duel resonate with a sense of class more 
abstractly. As Howe (1981:296) argues for the case of fox hunting in Britain, 
support for the sport among various classes, even those who could not directly 
participate but who could at least “agree” to have the chase run over their land, 
suggests at least a grudging consensus about class itself, much the way people 
across the social hierarchy might be persuaded to believe in a monarchy. In this 
view, what got reproduced in Roe’s words, as also in acquittals for the duel, was 
at the very least a sense that not all people, as measured by their current 
situations, are actually equal. 
5.6  Order and good government  
 Two underlying patterns of thinking further raised the stakes of assaulting the 
dwelling house. One, alluded to earlier, was a Lockean ideal of progress such 
that rights and ownership of property—indeed its emergence as property—
connected to the work of transforming wildness and savagery into civilization 
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and settlement, and thus chaos into order. This ideal, which motivated both a 
journey overseas to a new continent and a pervasive push westward, was also 
epitomized in the dwelling house, the safe and hard-won retreat from all the 
dangers that civilizing effort and property making entailed. Just as the beast lies 
outside society, so the dwelling house, as safe haven, was a symbol par 
excellence of social order. To attack it meant to attack society’s raison d-etre.  
 Another force that repelled and would have been repulsed by the chaos of a 
nighttime home invasion was the superimposition of religion and state. In Upper 
Canada, in contrast to emerging republican democracy in America, recognition 
of divine order in the universe and submission to laws and government were 
ultimately one and the same. As the Manual (387) says, “The Christian religion, 
according to high authority, is part and parcel of the law of England.” An attack 
on social order was thus an attack on God.93 The honor code embedded in 
dueling made a similar claim, as one might assume given any genuine 
commitment to Christianity among the social elite. Addressing the possibility of 
“Deity” taking offense at a duel, the Code of Duel (50) says, “…parties may be 
reminded that humanity is identified with honour, and that the qualities of a true 
Christian, are the same as those essential to form the character of a gentleman.” 
                                                 
93 Clark (2001:54) suggests that many people took the identity of church and state to the point of 
seeing Upper Canadians as a chosen people. 
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5.7  Beastly metaphors 
 Josiah Cutan’s death sentence should now appear in a deeper light. Gone, one 
hopes, is any question of why the theft of mere goods, even when measurable at 
the level of grand larceny, should translate into such an extreme punishment and 
condemnation from the judge. We have seen, for one thing, that burglary is not 
about theft even if it occurs: it is about intention to commit a felony, which can be 
larceny or any other felonious crime. And crucially, it is about when the assault 
occurs, and that the assault is against a dwelling house, a place ultimately 
sanctified through this specific, extreme punishment against its aggressors. Even 
stealing from a church ranked lower than stealing from a dwelling house at 
night. Defining “sacrilege” as theft of items from and belonging to a church, 
Manual (404) notes that while the crime used to be punishable by death without 
benefit of clergy, a tightening of cases for which death sentences should apply (in 
accordance with Blackstone) rendered sacrilege—unlike burglary—no longer 
capital. More to the point, the clamor of overtones as burglary ramifies through 
all of society shows how deep a burglary strikes. The fact of rum and furs, never 
mind calculation of their measure, completely misses this, the real measure of the 
crime.  
 Gone, too, is suspicion of inconsistency in laws on the books, where murdering 
by duel is excused even though technically murder, while thieves in the night 
suffer death as well as demotion from the human race. Not only does sense of 
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honor serve as common denominator in both cases, but as practice, the letters of 
law that define duels as murder and require their punishment as such, actually 
provide a place for exceptionalism, which is what class is about. The “ism” here 
is attested to by the ubiquity of acquittals in cases of duel. Noting this 
reproduction of class, however, is not to reduce dueling itself to this 
reproduction. Indeed, it is the particularity and inward intensity of the stakes 
raised in duel that underwrite all of the honor in the code: the understanding of 
code, its definition and exposure in moments of insult, the progress from seeking 
reconciliation by other means to ultimate showdown in a duel, and the refusal to 
flinch even when staring down a loaded barrel, locate individual psyches or they 
locate nothing.  
 Given resonance between burglars and beasts in resolving the boundaries of 
society, and resonance also between violating formal codes of honor and 
attacking a person/place in their state of greatest vulnerability, Cutan’s sentence 
was about the very emergence of society on the frontier of western expansion, 
which was simultaneously a frontier between civilization and wildness, order 
and chaos, light and dark, right and wrong, and in a world where government 
and Christianity were one, between good and evil. This doesn’t mean that the 
trial couldn’t have gone Cutan’s way, or that we must blink with non-
comprehension when another burglar gets sentenced more mildly. A good deal 
about the local implantation of legal procedure remains veiled by sketchy 
records, which otherwise might help explain the wide and unexplained latitude 
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in naming, describing and sentencing crimes. It does mean, though, that no 
milder sentence would use the metaphors applied to Cutan, which make sense of 
nothing less than execution, and do so by linking Cutan’s act to social values in 
specific ways. The dwelling house is linked to society’s core by opposing it to 
darkness, beastliness, chaos, wildness and mortal danger to all. The actions of a 
prowling beast also suggest clear contrasts to honorable modes of hunting 
animals for sport which, like the duel, had the interpretive momentum both of a 
deep history and entrenchment in privileged, politically influential classes in 
particular.  
 Through this linking to the feral world, Cutan didn’t attack a house but the 
heart of civilization and the very notion of progress—a heinous crime indeed, 
viewed that way and at that time. And it’s all in the viewing; links don’t reflect 
standpoint: they create it, are it. If this case and its deployment of damning 
metaphors confirms anything, it is that standpoint does not exist apart from its 
emergence in particulars, which are viewed by specific people and spoken about 
in certain ways. Standpoint is not ontologically prior, somehow apart from or 
above concreteness: concreteness is the very scene where it gets produced at all 
and the groundwork for its posterity laid.  
 To that end, crucial metaphors, the heavy artillery of the sentence, were leveled 
against Cutan, not so that people looking would recognize who he was, but to 
make him that person. Without these metaphors and their overtones with social 
order, and looking only at his actions including his cooperation, a different 
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sleight of hand might have been required for posterity to find him beyond 
redemption. Finding him beyond redemption and ranking him among the beasts 
were not, of course, done for Cutan’s sake, even though the sentence is spoken to 
him. Now a short walk to the hangman’s noose, nothing in society is for his sake 
any longer. To have any pragmatic value, the words must thread back into 
society, not out of it. They did so in two directions. As a revisionist summation of 
the trial, Roe’s words acted backward on the proceedings to reframe them: 
however those attending the trial may have construed events during the 
questioning of witnesses and unfolding of evidence, or harbored unresolved 
questions based on that evidence, the final word was now in; there was but one 
way to understand what had transpired. As the moment when legal precedent 
gets set and words are recorded for posterity, Roe’s words also acted forward in 
time. Precedent, of course, constrains the interpretation of similar cases in the 
future. But the extreme feral metaphors were not part of that precedent in any 
formal sense, because being a beast was not a formal legal charge, or even a 
possible one. What gets reproduced in that moment, superimposed on the 
sentence, is a reminder of what society was and was about, where its edges lay, 
and what it meant to be on either side of that edge. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
 Check the back page of any issue of the Gazette, or most other newspapers of 
the time, and chances are you’ll find ads listing dwelling houses for sale. 
Unremarkable in their ubiquity, mundane and routine in their associations, there 
is little surface hint of the moral gravity that anchors this unassuming space to 
the social firmament of early Upper Canadian society. Contrary to this easy 
impression, this study has found that the dwelling house was not merely 
important beyond casual impressions, but figured as no less than the moral core 
of society. Understood in the context of human rights, codes of honor, visions of 
social progress and ideas of property, each of which ramified widely in society, 
one grasps why the dwelling house was protected even more fiercely than a 
house of god. 
 The measure of that protection, the subject of Chapter 5, was the crime of 
burglary, among the most heinous of crimes and specific to the dwelling house. 
Indeed, it is through a definition of that crime that the dwelling house gets 
rendered as a precise idea. But legal definition alone does not account for the 
extreme metaphors leveled at Josiah Cutan during his sentencing, which did 
more than simply condemn him to death: they first stripped him of membership 
in human society, and drew their power for this from the deep toll of a resonant 
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social fabric beyond the realms of burglary, crime, and law. In making an 
example of Cutan, this resonance with other realms, which included gendered 
understandings of conduct and space, geographical surveying, fighting duels, 
hunting game, and managing political loyalty, was deeply constitutive. In that 
sense, resonance is itself the exemplary thing, that which renders a symbol or 
idea indelible to all. To isolate a discrete moment of dazzle is to miss what 
energizes it. This study has tried to give voice to some of the resonances that 
energized a burglary sentence. 
 The baseline resonance in the case of burglary was a peculiar notion of honor, 
so deeply entrenched that the legal system routinely forgave honorable murder, 
contrary to the explicit letter of law and its repetition to juries about to deliberate 
on such cases. In Chapter 5, however, I suggested that this opposition was really 
a kind of collusion, whether quite intended or not, at least in the early years of 
the province (and genuine opponents to the honor law nothwithstanding). On 
the one hand, murder by duel was not exempt from the legal system itself; at the 
level of forcing such events to trial and submitting evidence to a jury, the system 
did what it was there for: to subordinate evident transgressions to the rigors of 
legal procedure and judgment. In this sense, none of the actions heard and 
judged by a court system were outside the law. Indeed, by forcing proper 
procedure, the system in effect created the legal space for everything it judged 
according to protocol. A key part of that machinery was the distinction between 
the law’s letter, and the relevance and power of a jury, which produced dramatic 
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potential for flexibility of outcome—the one a judgment of law on the books, the 
other a judgment of peers, both equally constitutive of the legal system. Thus, 
when a jury returns a verdict that excuses duelists of murder, either acquitting or 
assigning a token fine, the judgment is legal in every sense. So it was that space 
for dueling was protected by the very law that presented itself as threatening it 
with a death sentence. 
 Although usually reckoned as a deterrent to crime, especially extreme kinds 
such as burglary, law as just described is also what made burglary literally 
possible, the difference being that with burglary, jury and laws on the books 
usually aligned well. Socially harmful breakings, enterings and robberies by 
night did not, of course, depend on law to happen, nor did the social opprobrium 
that attached to them. But the thing called burglary, its definition as precise as its 
overtones were rich, depended on a specific legal code because that code was 
what it expressed. In the tendency of its verdicts and its overtones with a view of 
honor, burglary stood at the opposite pole from a duel: an attack against 
someone who was not merely down and asleep, but in the space above all 
designed to protect a person (and society) in that state. Attack against that space 
amounted to an attack against the ordained order of things. 
 Crucially, honor did not itself help define dwelling or a dwelling house. 
Indeed, honor per se was not directly regulated by law. What got regulated, 
going back to Blackstone, were measurable acts from which intentions would be 
inferred. Honor, once further removed, was a specific judgment about those 
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intentions. John Ridout’s pre-emptive shot at Samuel Peter Jarvis got read as 
intention to win the duel at any cost, and thus as willingness to put survival 
above honor, which led to the remedial, restorative decision among the parties 
regulating protocols of honor to give Jarvis a free shot. This, in turn, ended up 
killing Ridout. Such preoccupation with honor informed burglary no less than 
the duel. But it got its force in law from implication rather than definition, and 
instrumentally, in the Cutan case, from allusions of metaphor that extended 
relevance the other realms of society where a prowling beast on the loose would 
entail a threat. This, of course, meant all of society, whose essence as 
improvement from a wild state pitted civilization against the uncivilized 
wilderness and human against beast. Such oppositions would have been even 
starker in a society built on a marriage of god and law, where industriousness 
addressed obligations not just to society but also to god; industry was a form of 
piety. Informed by faith, the axes along which work got measured, with 
society/civilization at one pole and nature/wildness at the other, acquired the 
further, austere judgmentalism of light vs. dark and good vs. evil. These 
overlapping contrasts mapped densely onto the dwelling house as a legal and 
social entity. 
 The deeper point in all this is that legal definitions, however explicit and 
detailed and however solemnized by the prospect of a death sentence for 
transgressors, demonstrate but do not themselves account for the importance of 
dwelling as a practice or the dwelling house as a place. To grasp that importance, 
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one must appreciate overlap among ideas and social spaces, understand notions 
of dwelling as surfaces on which multiple ideals coalesce, which gives dwelling a 
rich dimensionality not explained by any surface in isolation. This capacity for 
occurrences in one realm to sound overtones in/of another illustrates what 
Chapter 2 calls the integrationist aspect of practice theory. We noted there that a 
core element of practice is the use of special terms (most famously habitus) or 
combinations of ordinary words that evoke the emergent simultaneity and 
inseparability of “things” that analysis separates in order to see, things like 
structure, action, agent, predisposition, and so on. Even habitus, and “practice” 
for that matter, derive their specific meanings from a sense that conservative 
predisposing structures, accumulated individual experiences, deflections of the 
moment, and the choices these inform, have mutual constitution as their 
dynamic. As practice, the multiple overtones of a settlement plan, a notion of 
wilderness and wildness, gendered space, honor codes and the implications of 
burglary are separable only as analysis, and then only given a clear sense that 
what one tries to see are consequences of inseparability. With the right categories 
and analytic machinery one can identify distinct overtones in a given note, but 
the mistake would be to forget that if isolated from the note and moment of its 
sounding, they no longer exist. 
 Another integrating aspect of exemplars, also noted in the discussion of 
practice in Chapter 2, is their acute stress on first-person interaction. This is not 
the generic first person of merely named individuals who, for all their 
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distinctions of detail, nonetheless depend on a generic “being” that is presumed, 
brought to a place, into engagement with other named individuals, who then 
push and pull each other in ways that leave traces in archives and historical 
narratives. Such individuals are generic in being kinetic rather than truly 
emergent and mutually constituting. One can think of them as third-person “I”s. 
The individual of practice, in contrast, exists (if one wishes to keep the word) in 
terms of her traction with others, who simultaneously exist as traction that 
pushes, pulls, compels and otherwise engages her. In a moment considered in 
Chapter 3, magistrate Bartholomew Tench was his contentious engagement with 
Joel Skinner, which crystallized Tench’s sense of duty as a magistrate, his resolve 
in spite of what he no doubt foresaw as a hard sell of his authority, perhaps his 
sense of class difference, and quite likely, his sense of self as Irish Catholic in the 
company of an English Protestant. He was not, as the generic sense of individual 
would make him, a vessel in whom these things were brought to Skinner, who in 
turn brought his own predispositions and experiences. He was no mere vessel, 
named or not, in whom government authority traveled to Skinner by way of 
Tench’s prior experiences and connections to certain institutions: Tench’s 
humiliation revealed as a brittle fiction the idea that tokens of authority pointed 
to some mystically presiding force of order. The only sense of institution relevant 
to that moment was humiliating mismatch between the formality of vested 
authority and the expectations that come with it, and utter disregard for these, 
plus all the angst, bewilderment, anger and resolve this mismatch generated. 
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Perhaps the courts had some inkling of this when, rather than pursuing the 
grievance against Skinner, they merely imposed a fine to keep the peace between 
them for a year. As if to say, “You’ll get your money back if you stop making 
waves and just go away.”  
 The point, of course, is not that system apparently failed in this case, but that its 
failure or success is always irreducibly concrete, which is what gives “I” and 
individual their meaning. System also doesn’t shade into independence and self-
sufficiency as an outcome adheres more closely to pattern. In Cutan’s trial, the 
force of presented evidence, its career toward a guilty verdict, and the awful 
metaphors that removed Cutan’s humanity on the way to the gallows, emerged 
through multiple, livewire “I”s whose potency resided in their simultaneous 
presence to each other. One is tempted to see system at work through the agency 
of third-person “I”s, given that a conviction led where it usually did for burglary, 
especially when viewed through the . But it makes no more sense to understand 
the usualness of a burglary sentence as the unfolding of a system run by third-
person “I”s than it does to disembody the participation of unique identities that 
helped achieve Jack York’s escape. 
 But then, what is historical narrative if not reduction to third-person “I”s? The 
“I” of practice is a shifter whose identity gets fixed only in being inhabited, 
invested with the full power of irreducible concreteness and traction. That 
inhabiting never survives the trip into abstraction. But just as the gist of practice 
is evocative rather than definitive, so one might construe or combine elements of 
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narrative in a way that stokes imagination and, to a small degree at least, 
transcends the tight, persistent limitations of vocabulary. One hopes it does 
something to suggest that as practice, it is never individuals, but their trace 
fossils, that get linked to narrative. The practice individual is always steps ahead 
of any analysis, always over an event horizon separating emergent, traction-
driven moment and its recognition and interpretation. This radical embodiment, 
always beyond the reach of the named and therefore dead bodies of analysis, is 
surely a culprit in conjuring, despite best efforts and cunning circumlocutions, 
the kinetics of presumed ideas, bodies, habits and other “things” brought into 
engagement. 
7.1  Frontiers of fieldwork 
 Recalling the adventure of beginning research for his dissertation, Dirks 
(2002:50) says he “walked into the archive for the first time with all the 
excitement that my fellow anthropology students reserved for the moment they 
arrived in a ‘field of their own’”. He goes on to describe how excitement soon 
merged with terror at not knowing how to face such vast archival excess, a 
sentiment echoed elsewhere where he calls this a moment of panic. This 
recollection of panic and terror may seem familiar to anthropologists with their 
own fieldwork stories to tell. Anthropologists will also appreciate his ensuing 
deconstructions of historiography, and likewise his focus on small voices and 
contradictory ruptures—part of his strategy for relating insights from the 
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disciplines of history and anthropology. At the level of description, however—
and Dirks chooses his words carefully—there seems an important difference 
between Dirks’ experience and the core of conventional anthropological 
fieldwork. If historians and anthropologists alike will find an archive “pushing 
us by its recalcitrance, limiting us by its aggravating absences, fascinating us by 
its own patterns of intertextuality, and seducing us by its appearance of the real” 
(60)—or in the language of previous chapters, demonstrating a capacity to push 
back on researchers who push them—historians and anthropologists will 
experience pushing, limitation, fascination and seduction is some different ways. 
I want to suggest that this difference is more about the respective disciplines than 
the fields they typically operate within—that one can do primary anthropology 
in the archives and history in a small community, and vice versa.  
 Locating this difference between conventional anthropological fieldwork and 
archival research depends on being clear about characteristics of both. Taking 
them in order, it seems ironic, given its iconic status within the discipline, that 
conventional fieldwork is rarely systematically identified or discussed prior to 
the inaugural moment when the neophyte leaves home. In part, of course, this is 
because fieldwork tends to be unsystematic in the same sense that “deep hanging 
out” is a recommended long-term strategy. Plans are made and formally 
approved, but anthropology is perhaps unique among disciplines for the degree 
to which initial preparations are susceptible to revision and abandonment in the 
course of fieldwork encounters. Whatever the reason, the core of anthropological 
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fieldwork—the thing that makes it essential to admission to the profession—is 
rarely spelled out, yet for many it remains, as if by unspoken consensus, a 
necessary rite of passage for new candidates of the discipline.  
 So what is this thing that is so rarely spelled out? Although typically described 
in terms of time spent in the field, being among the locals, living in some sense as 
they do without easy recourse to home, such descriptions of conventional 
fieldwork gloss over what is perhaps the core of the enterprise: psychological 
shake-up that arises when routine social practices and expectations get revealed 
as wrongheaded, in a context that forces you to stay and deal with it. It is the 
absence of an easy retreat into the comforts of home when this happens—the 
ability to close a book and go for coffee, to fall back on myriad habits and 
routines that rejuvenate peace of mind and sense of place. If, as Guemple (PC) 
put it, being sane is a process of having bedrock social assumptions affirmed by 
those around you, then the conventional fieldwork moment is a kind of insanity, 
a moment where basic affirmation fails and there is no convenient exit from the 
situation. This insanity has unique potential to teach things, expose things, or 
simply drive one home again. 
 The rite of passage is more than this, of course. It is a rigorous and sometimes 
painful elaboration on moments of shake-up which leads, in the form of a 
dissertation, to a realignment with the discipline. This signature product 
supposedly owes its worth to the fieldwork moment, which provides a unique 
kind of impulse to think outside prior experience and expectations, just as it 
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constitutes fieldwork’s test of sheer resolve and mental toughness that not 
everyone will pass. This fieldwork moment, the spine of all fieldwork products 
including time spent in the field, resolves in two basic ways: perseverance and 
eventual success in producing an institutionally recognizable final product, or 
failure, retreat into existing comfort zones and (not uncommonly, perhaps) 
abandonment of the discipline, at least in a formal sense. Once completed, this 
rite of passage becomes a key basis of integrity and authority when talking about 
or within the discipline. And because this view seems to be a consensus, 
especially a somewhat unreflective one, it is very hard to defend any plan that 
appears to omit it. 
 It is hard to make similar claims about archival “moments”. Archival research 
has its epiphanies, of course, and failures, senses of loss, sinking feelings of 
having gotten it all wrong, senses of having perceived a new and larger world. 
But these generally happen (and certainly did in the present case) in the context 
of known and familiar worlds where safe retreat is around every corner—
libraries, archives, universities, and churches. Even institutions I’d never heard 
of, like the Sisters of the Holy Order of Mary and Joseph in Windsor, offered no 
obvious surprises at the institutional or social level; I explored their recesses from 
the comfort of habitual social space. The world in which I did research still 
operated in the same basic ways I expected. Other archives, like the Burton 
Collection in Detroit, hid surprises behind the sheer complexity of its filing 
system, but again one can blow off steam under a familiar blue sky, venti 
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Starbucks in hand. Archives, moreover, in lacking the kind of social interaction 
that puts your deep conventions actually at stake, also lacks conventional 
fieldwork’s source of insanity.94 
 Although archival research is by no means identical with this sense of 
conventional fieldwork, it does entail confrontations and transformations of its 
own that are easily overlooked in adhering to a fieldwork “tradition”. 
Psychological characteristics aside, one basic feature of conventional fieldwork is 
degree of openness and submission both to raw material that becomes analytical 
data, and to how one perceives/locates raw material to begin with. The 
underlying idea is that engagement of material in the field acts as a catalyst that 
propels effort and discovery in unpredictable new directions. Anthropology, to a 
degree not characteristic of most other disciplines, reverses cart and horse as they 
get proposed in the form of research plans. If all good social science discovers 
things not known beforehand, anthropology is perhaps most radical in the 
degree to which it makes research design itself subject to outcomes as they 
unfold in the field. This feature is no less evident in archival research than in 
conventional fieldwork, and indeed is the first and most basic thing the budding 
anthropologist must learn and grapple with when thrust into the archives for 
dissertation work. Nothing about my initial proposal even hinted at the 
importance of a burglary trial until I encountered it by accident. Even then, real 
                                                 
94 Peirce’s notion of firstness, secondness and thirdness, especially with its many subdivisions, offers a 
meticulous framework for talking about the conventional fieldwork moment and its aftermath.   
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questions only started to form after subsequently bumping into a court transcript 
about duels. Only then did the seeming paradox emerge: what consistent mode 
of thinking hangs someone for stealing a little rum and a few furs, yet acquits 
people for killing someone apparently outside the law, despite express and 
repeated legal emphasis that duels were murder? Going in, I hadn’t the slightest 
clue about the central moral importance of a dwelling house. I also had no 
thought of complicating everything with gender questions, or more 
fundamentally, with a plan to listen for something as diffuse as resonance. These 
new horizons deflected into utterly unpredictable areas and opportunities for 
insight. 
 If conventional anthropology is about expanding habitual horizons and finding 
new boxes to think inside, this is no less true of archival work. But it is much 
harder to achieve in the archives, which lacks the flashing neon of surprised or 
irate individuals, weird and sticky relationships, personal embarrassments or 
other faux pas that help point the way. By the same token that archives allow 
you to close the books and go for coffee when the going gets tough, they also 
demand keen and patient attention to unpack their interior worlds, those other 
boxes that let researchers get outside their previous selves. These new boxes are 
equally abundant in each case. But what often arrives with the force of a 
highway accident in the one case, can only come by quiet focus, reflection and 
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discipline in the other.95 New boxes also come by a different route in the 
archives, one that must account for how archival collections are assembled, by 
whom, for what purpose, what they systematically include and exclude. This 
kind of question is familiar in conventional fieldwork too but is directed there at 
different institutions. Other questions, which do not straightforwardly privilege 
one kind of fieldwork over the other, nonetheless distinguish them. What does it 
matter, for example, that texts can collect dust in ways spoken words and people 
do not?  
  To say that conventional fieldwork is based in social interaction easily suggests 
a wrongheaded contrast to archival work. It is certainly true that archives don’t 
get to “talk back” in the same sense that living people do, and that its physical 
space and contents didn’t emerge in interaction with the researcher the way 
conversation or living with people does. Bakhtin’s idea of co-presence, a basis of 
his model of dialogue, starts to seem either trivial or silly if we imagine 
researchers being present to the archives. Archives are also silent in the literal 
sense (sound archives notwithstanding) that they don’t take the form of audible 
vibrations to our ears. But to deduce wholesale silence and non-interactivity does 
not follow. If recent anthropology has accomplished anything, it is the end of 
social innocence for things in the world. In order for a box of archival papers to 
                                                 
95 Compounding this problem in the case of archives, it is difficult to use that discipline while 
simultaneously putting its underlying disciplinary force (in the corrective sense) up for scrutiny, something 
that happens more automatically in conventional fieldwork when routine interpretations fail despite the 
fieldworker’s tendency to cling to them. 
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rise above the role of a doorstop or paperweight, it requires the interactive 
positioning of a critical mind. 
 The usual buzzwords for fieldwork in anthropology, including participant 
observation and deep hanging out, attempt to capture a sense of the field’s 
dynamism, its capacity to shape projects rather than just give them a place to 
happen. They describe a sense of context’s agency. If all projects in all disciplines 
are somehow dynamic and engaged in place, anthropology perhaps commits to 
this more radically than most by viewing that agency as programmatic for the 
work to be done. For all their intended openness and flexibility, these buzzwords 
nonetheless evoke a sense of established routine as well, a basic sense of method, 
of knowing how we, as anthropologists, intend to orient ourselves toward the 
idea of being and learning in the field. They do this in part simply because the 
terms themselves are established in the literature, and thus reproduce a shared 
sense that there are real terms for what we do. Specialized vocabulary, whether 
invented by or simply appropriated by a discipline, seduces us further into 
imagining our methods with a precision deserving of the terms; saying “we go 
and do stuff we didn’t know we were going to do, pull our hair out, go crazy, 
and finally learn something unrelated to our initial project if we don’t give up 
first”, while probably more accurate, is harder act dignified about. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Burglary 
 
 The following definition comes verbatim from Keele’s Magistrate’s Manual. The full 
title of this work, including subtitles, gives a fair sense of overall contents and purpose: 
“The provincial justice, or magistrate’s manual, being a complete digest of the criminal 
law, and a compendious and general view of the provincial law; with practical forms, 
for the use of the magistracy of Upper Canada.” In reproducing this definition, I keep 
faithful to the use of spellings, italics, punctuation, and line breaks, but not to font 
(guesswork to reproduce anyway), or to line or page endings, which reflect nothing 
beyond the physical dimensions of Keele’s book. For ease of reference to passages, I also 
add line numbering; note that it does not relate in any way to lines in the MM.  
 
 
BURGLARY 
BURGLARY is a felony at common law, in breaking and entering the mansion-house of 
another in the night, with intent to commit some felony within the same, whether the 
felonious intent be executed or not. 
 By Stat. 12 An. c. 7. if any person shall enter into the mansion-house of another by day 
or by night, without breaking the same, with an intent to commit a felony, or being in 5 
such house shall commit any felony, and shall in the night time break the said house to 
get out, he shall be guilty of burglary. 
 Every entrance is not a breaking;—as, if the door stand open, and the thief enter—this 
is no breaking.  So if the window be open, and the thief draw out some of the goods—
this is not burglary, because there is no actual breaking.  But if the thief break the glass 10 
of the window, and draw out the goods—this is burglary.  3 Inst. 64.  And lord Hale 
says, these acts amount to an actual breaking:—opening the casement, or breaking the 
glass window; picking open the lock of the door, or putting back the lock; or the leaf of a 
window; or unlatching the door that is only latched.  1 H. H. 552.  And so does the 
pushing open of folding doors.  Rex. v. Brown.  2 East. P. C. 487.  2 Russ. 902.  Pulling 15 
down the upper sash of a window.  Rex. v. Haines.  Russ. & Ry. 451.  S. C. nom.  Rex. v. 
Harrison.  1 Chetw. Brom. 497.  Creeping down a chimney.  Cromp. 32.  Dalt. 253.  1 Haw. c. 
38. § 6. 
 The breaking is not confined to the outer door, or external parts of a house; for if A. 
enters the house of B. the outward door being open, or by an open window, and when 20 
within the house, turn the key of a chamber door, or unlatch it, with intent to steal—this 
will be burglary.  Johnson’s case, 2 East. P. C. 488.  And the like if any lodger in a house, or 
guest in a public inn, open and enter another persons chamber door, with intent to 
commit a felony.  1 Hale. 553. 554.  4 Bl. Com. 227.  Rex. v. Bington, 2 East. P. C. 488.  But if 
an inn-keeper break the chamber of his lodger or guest, at night, to rob, this would not 25 
be burglary; for a man cannot commit a burglary by breaking his own house.  2 East. P. 
C. 502.  Kel. 84. 
 Constructive breaking, is where, in consequence of violence commenced or threatened, 
the owner of the house, (through fear, or in order to repel the violence) opens the door, 
and the thief then enters,—this amounts to burglary; for the opening of the door in this 30 
186 
 
     
 
case, is as much imputable to the thief as if it had been done by his own hands.  Crompt. 
32 (a.)  1 Hale. 553.  2 East. P. C. 486.  And so, if in consequence of any fraud or deceit, the 
owner is induced to open his door to the thieves—this will amount to breaking.—As 
where thieves came with a pretended hue and cry, and required a constable to go with 
them to go with them to apprehend the owner and search his house; and the owner, at 35 
the command of the constable, open the door, when the thieves bound the constable and 
rob the house;—this was held to be burglary.  1 Hale. 553.  3 Inst. 64.  Cromp. 32 (b.)  4 Bl. 
Com. 226.  And the like if a man go to a house under pretence of being authorized to 
make a distress, and by this means obtain admittance.  Gascoigne’s case, 1 Leach, 284.  For 
in all these cases, the law will not endure to have its justice defrauded by such evasions.  40 
1 Haw. c. 38. § 5.  4 Bl. Com. 227. 
 
What is an Entering. 
 It is deemed an entry when the thief breaketh the house, and his body, or any part 
thereof—as his foot, or arm, is within any part of the house; or when he putteth a gun 45 
into a window which he hath broken; or into a hole of the house which he hath made, 
with intent to kill or murder.  3 Inst. 64.  Or where the thief merely puts his fingers 
within the window.  Rex. v. Davis, Russ & Ry. 499.  But if he shoots without the window, 
and the bullet only comes in, the point is doubtful.  1 Hale, 555.  Yet Hawkins says, this is 
a sufficient entry.  1 Haw. c. 38. § 11.  Where a glass window, which had shutters inside, 50 
was broken, and the window was opened with the hand, but the shutters were not 
broken or opened—this was ruled to be a burglary.  Rex. v. Roberts, alias Chambers, 1 East. 
P. C. 487.  But as in this case, Holt. C. J. and Powell, J. doubted, and inclined to another 
opinion, no judgment was given. But in a recent case, the same point was before the 
judges, who were of opinion (three being absent) that the entry was sufficient.  Rex. v. 55 
Baily, Russ. & Ry. 341. 
 If divers come in the night to do a burglary, and one of them break and enter, the rest 
of them standing to watch at a distance—this is burglary in all.  3 Inst. 64. 
 
What is a Mansion or Dwelling-house. 60 
 Where the whole of the house is let out into lodgings, and the owner does not inhabit 
any part of it, though there is only one outer door common to all its inmates, yet every 
separate apartment is the distinct mansion-house of its possessor.  Rex. v. Trapshaw, 1 
Leach, 427.  So where a loft over a coach-house and stables was converted into lodging 
rooms.  R. v. Turner, 1 Leach, 305. 65 
 But where the owner of a dwelling-house lets off the shop to a tenant, who occupies it 
by means of a different entrance from that belonging to the dwelling-house, and carries on 
his business in it, but never sleeps there, it then becomes so severed from the rest of the 
house, as no longer to be a place where burglary can be committed; for it ceases to form 
parcel of the dwelling-house of the owner, being thus severed by lease as well as by the 70 
distinct mode of ingress and egress to it; and it does not become the dwelling-house of 
the tenant, when neither he nor any of his family sleep there.  1 Hale, 557.  Kel. 83.  4 Bl. 
Com. 225.  2 East. P. C. 507.  But if the tenant, or his servant, should usually, or often, 
sleep in the shop at night, it would then become the dwelling-house of the tenant.  1 
Hale, 558. 75 
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 There is no severance, however, where there is any internal communication, though 
there may be a separate entrance from without to the part let off; as where the 
communication was formed by means of a trap-door and a ladder, which were seldom 
used, but the trap-door was never fastened. Lord Ellenborough said it could make no 
difference whether the communication was through a trap-door, or by a common stair-80 
case.  Rex. v. Stockton, 2 Taunton, 339.  2 Leach, 1015.  And when the owner of the house 
continues to sleep in it, no part of it then can be so severed, by being let off to a tenant or 
a lodger, as to become a separate mansion-house.  Rex. v. Rogers, 1 Leach, 89.  2 East. P. C. 
507.  Unless, indeed, that which was one house originally comes to be divided 
completely into two separate tenements, and there is a distinct outer door to each, 85 
without any internal communication; in which case, they will then become separate 
houses.  Per Ld. M. Cowp. 8.  But if the owner of a house neither inhabits it himself, nor 
any of his family, it will not then become his dwelling-house, as applicable to the offence 
of burglary. Therefore, when a man purchases or rents a house with intention to reside 
in it, and moves some of his furniture into it, but neither he nor any of his family ever 90 
sleep there, and it is broken open in the night time,—the judges have determined that a 
breaking into a house of this description does not amount to burglary.  R. v. Lyons, 1 
Leach, 185.  2 East. P. C. 496.  R. v. Hallard, 2 East. 498.  2 Leach, 701. (note a.)  R. v. 
Thompson, 2 Leach, 771.  2 East. 498.  Contra 1 Haw. c. 38. § 18.  1 Kel. 46.  And this—even 
though the owner of the house has used it for his meals, and for all the purposes of his 95 
business.  Rex. v. Martin, Russ. & Ry. 108.  Or, though a person actually sleep in the 
house for the purpose of protecting it, if such person forms no part of the domestic 
family of the owner,—as where the owner puts in a workman or other person, who is in 
no situation of servitude to him, for the purpose of taking care of his goods.  Rex. v. 
Fuller, 2 East. P. C. 498.  1 Leach, 186. (note b.)  Rex. v. Harris, 2 Leach, 701.  2 East. P. C. 498. 100 
 So if a servant it put into a ware-house to watch goods, this does not make it a 
dwelling-house.  Rex. v. Smith, 2 East. P. C. 497. 
 But where the owner of the house has once inhabited it, it will not cease to be his 
dwelling-house on account of any occasional or temporary absence, provided he has the 
animus revertendi—the intention of returning to it;—in such cases, the premises may be 105 
the subject of burglary.  Rex. v. Murray & Harris, 2 East. P. C. 496. cit.  Fost. 77.  But where 
a person had a country house at which he lived only a part of the year, and then quitted, 
with a considerable part of his furniture, with no intention of immediately returning, 
and during his absence his house was broken open and rifled—this was held not to be 
burglary.  Fost. 76. 77. 110 
 And now, by stat. 3 W. 4. c. 4. § 10. it is enacted, that no building, although within the 
same curtilage with the dwelling-house, and occupied therewith, shall be deemed to be 
part of such dwelling-house, for the purpose of burglary, unless there shall be a 
communication between such building and dwelling-house, either immediate or by 
means of a covered and enclosed passage leading from the one to the other. And by § 12. 115 
accessories before the fact shall be punishable as principals. 
 
Of the time of committing the Offence. 
 It must be in the night, and, generally speaking, in the darkness of the night; for though 
the day was formerly accounted to begin only at sun-rise, and to end immediately upon 120 
sun-set, yet it is now settled that if there be daylight or twilight enough to discern a 
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man’s face, there can be no burglary.  3 Inst. 63.  1 Hale, 550.  1 Haw. c. 38. § 2.  4 Bl. Com. 
224.  2 East. P. C. 509.  But this does not extend to moonlight, for then many midnight 
burglaries would go unpunished; and the malignity of the offence, as Blackstone 
observes, does not indeed so properly arise from its being done in the dark, as at the 125 
dead of night, when all the creation, except beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has 
disarmed the owner, and rendered his castle defenceless.  4 Bl. Com. 224. 
 The breaking and entering need not be the same night; for if thieves break a hole in the 
house one night, with the intent to enter another night and commit a felony, and they 
accordingly do so, through the hole they made the night before—this seems to be 130 
burglary.  1 Hale, 551.  4 Bl. Com. 226. 
 
Of the Intent. 
 The intent of the breaking and entering must be to commit a felony. Therefore, if the 
intention was only to commit a trespass, the offence will not be a burglary. Thus, an 135 
intention to beat a man in the house, will not be sufficient; for though killing or murder 
may be the consequence of beating, yet if the primary intention were not to kill, a 
breaking and entering for the purpose of beating, will not amount to burglary.  1 Hale, 
561.  2 East. P. C. 509.  And where a man broke into a house with intent to commit a 
rape—this was held to be burglary.  Rex. v. Gray, 1 Str. 481. 140 
 By stat. 23 G. 3. c. 88. it is enacted, that if any person shall be apprehended having 
upon him any picklock, key, crow, jackbit, or other implement, with an intent feloniously 
to break and enter into any dwelling-house, out-house, &c.; or shall have upon him any 
pistol, hanger, cutlass, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent feloniously to 
assault any person; or shall be found in or upon any dwelling-house, ware-house, coach-145 
house, stable or out-house, or in any inclosed yard or garden, or area, belonging to any 
house, with an intent to steal, he shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond within the intent 
and meaning of the 17 G. 2. c. 5.
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Appendix B: Proclamation for the Suppression of Vice, 
Profaneness & Immorality 
 
 
 
Cited online on April 17, 2011, at http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_LO-
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